CHRISTIAN ETHICS

BY
A. D. MATTSON



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CHRISTIAN ETHICS

The Basis and Content of the Christian Life

by

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TO MY PARENTS
REV. AND MRS. J. A. MATTSON
FROM WHOM I RECEIVED MY FIRST INSTRUCTION
IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

PREFACE

This book is designed to be used as a textbook for a course in Christian Ethics. It is based upon lecture notes which have accumulated over a period of years in connection with work in the classroom. Problems which have arisen in discussion periods have also served as a guide in the selection of subject matter.

The specialist in the field of ethics will find little, if anything, new in the book. I have constantly tried to keep in mind the needs of the students for whom it is primarily intended. Because of varying backgrounds, problems and needs vary with different institutions of learning, particularly in the theological sphere. Each denomination has a particular background, all its own, and some of the problems discussed in the text reflect the attitudes of my particular group.

The sources of impressions and ideas are not always easy to trace. However, I have tried to give due credit to sources which have influenced my thinking, wherever they were known and recognized.

The book is designed primarily for my seminary students, but it is my hope that it also may be of some value to a wider circle of readers.

A. D. MATTSON.

Augustana Theological Seminary,
May 7, 1938.

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"*It is the Spirit that giveth life.*"
John 6. 63.

"*If we live by the Spirit, by the Spirit let us also walk.*"
Gal. 5. 25.

"*The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control.*"
Gal. 5. 22–23.

Introduction

Chapter I

DEFINITION AND FIELD OF ETHICS

Derivation of Name.—The subject is variously designated as "Christian Ethics," "Christian Morals," and "Moral Theology." The word "ethics" is derived from the Greek word ἔθος. The Ionic form of this word was ἦθος. The former word means "custom" and is used in the New Testament in Acts 6. 14, Luke 1. 9, 2. 42, and 22. 39. The latter is found only once in the New Testament (1 Cor. 15. 33) and is translated "manners" or "morals." The latter word also has the sense of "custom," "usage," "character," or "dwelling." The word "moral" comes from the Latin word "mos," which means, "manner," "custom," "way of life," or "conduct."

The etymology of these words might leave the impression that morals and ethical conduct are simply matters of custom. There are those who look upon morality simply as a matter of convention. There are times when custom and morality do correspond, but they are not always identical.

The argument has sometimes been advanced that the morals of a community are a social product, and the conclusion is drawn that they are therefore mere matters of convention. Morality does arise and develop in a social order, but a conclusion such as this is unwarranted. Morality is more than a social product. It can be said to be a social product only in the sense in which we can speak of science as a social product. Science arises in society but every advance in science is dependent upon science laying hold of objective truth, in spite of any popular conventions of society. Popular ideas may correspond to that objective truth, but they do not necessarily do so. Conventional ideas do not determine the truth about morality any more than they determine scientific truth.

Custom has to do with the outward forms of human relations and has public opinion as its authority. The transgressor of custom reaps social disapproval as a penalty. Morality rests upon an inner authority, and the penalty for transgression is not mere social disapproval but inner pain and dissatisfaction.

It may be a matter of custom in a certain community to use a certain type of architecture but such custom is not necessarily a moral matter. Such customs as insist that men must pay their just debts, that they must live in peace with their neighbors and respect the rights of their neighbors to life and property are moral matters. This distinction well illustrates the difference between custom and morality. Morality may sometimes be custom, but it is custom that matters and makes a difference with respect to the welfare and the very existence of the individual and the social order. There is something objective about the nature of morality. A society of none but the wicked would soon destroy itself. Wickedness contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Vice separates and destroys. Morality is the cement which binds and holds society together. Morality may be custom, but it is custom which is imperative for the well-being of the individual and the social order. There is a way of living by which man realizes his own true being, and that way is the way of morality.

The very existence of the social reformer is testimony to the distinction between custom and morality. The great moral advances in the history of the human race have usually been brought about through the influence of reformers who have risen above the customs and conventions of their contemporaries. Men of science strive to lay hold of objective truth. In like manner the great ethical reformers of history have laid hold of objective truth in the ethical sphere, often in opposition to prevailing convention. That such an objective morality exists will be shown in the sequel.

Definition.—Christian Ethics has been defined by various authors in different ways, such as: "A body of teaching concerning the good life derived from the revelation of God given in Christ and in His Church" (Demant, *God, Man and Society*, p. 35); the study which shows "how the faith which is certain of salvation works in love to God and man" (Haering, *Ethics of the Christian Life*, p. 4); "the science of morals conditioned by Christianity" (Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, p. 1); "the science of Christian life" (Schaff, *Propaedeutic*, p. 421); "the science of living according to Christianity" (Smyth, *Christian Ethics*, p. 1); and "the science of Christian morals, that is, of principles and rules of duty which are formally sanctioned and taught by Christianity" (Weidner, *A System of Christian Ethics*, p. 1).

Christian Ethics is that part of systematic theology which treats of the Christian life. The Christian life is the object of consideration and study. By the term "life" we understand not only the outward acts of a person, but also the motive or motives which prompt to activity. Christian Ethics is intention ethics and must take into consideration the disposition of the mind. It deals not only with conduct, but also with character. We are interested not only in what a man ought to do, but also in what a man should be. Luther said that good deeds do not produce a man, but a good man does good works.

If a man has been put into prison because of some breach of the moral law, he is, as a rule, unable to repeat his crime while he finds himself in prison. The fact that such a man is not able to commit any crime under such circumstances does not make him a virtuous man. As long as he desires to commit crime he is not virtuous, even though his desires are never able to express themselves in an outward act.

Or, an individual gives of his money to some charitable cause or institution. He has no love for or interest in the cause, but nevertheless he gives of his money. He does not wish to disappoint his friends, he may be ashamed to refuse to give, or perhaps he is afraid of losing business if he does not give. Such a deed, even though the money may be used for a good purpose, can not be considered a good deed, from the point of view of Christian Ethics.

Jesus emphasized this principle when He said, "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit" (Matthew 7. 18). This was also the idea He had in mind when He said, "For out of the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, railings; these are the things which defile the man" (Matthew 15. 19–20). The author of Proverbs was emphasizing the same thought when he said, "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life" (4. 23). "The measure of a man's real character is what he would do if he knew that he never would be found out" (MACAULAY). From this standpoint it also becomes apparent that it requires more than law to make man good. Christian Ethics requires not only that a man do good and desist from doing evil, but also that he desire to do good and refrain from evil.

Relation to Philosophical Ethics.—One of the branches of philosophy is ethics. Ethical treatises have been written in pre-Christian times and by those who have ignored Christianity. We can not deny that there is a moral sense and a moral cognition outside of the pale of historic Christianity. Such a denial would do violence to both experience and the testimony of the Bible (Rom. 2. 14–15). There has been a recognition of the moral to some degree, outside of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Such institutions as marriage and the family are not confined to that tradition. The duties which are imperative for the well-being of our bodies are identical for Christian, Jew, and Gentile. The account of the death of Socrates in *Phaedo* certainly indicates a high sense of moral values. The Code of Hammurabi and the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* are other well-known examples of the same fact. The theologian who fails to detect a moral sense in these ethnic products lacks such a sense himself. The works of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius also testify to the truth of this position. In fact, the ethical systems of the Middle Ages were built upon the ethics of the Greeks. Thomas Aquinas combined the views of Augustine and Aristotle and worked them up into an ethical system. He divided the virtues into three classes, moral, intellectual, and theological. The first two classes were known to Aristotle. For Aquinas the moral virtues were the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks, and he added to these the theological virtues, which are, faith, hope, and charity. The mediaeval schoolmen saw in Christian Ethics the fulfillment of the Greek ethical systems. Melanchthon wrote the first Protestant Ethics (*Epitome of Moral Philosophy*, 1538) on the basis of Aristotle's philosophy. Many of the Church Fathers also saw in Christianity the fulfillment of that which had been anticipated in the gentile world. Justin Martyr said that Heraclitus, Socrates, and many Stoics had been enlightened by the Logos perfectly revealed later in the person of Christ (*Apol.* 1. 5, 46. 2. 8, 10, 13). Tertullian called Seneca "frequently ours" (*De anima*, 20). If man, in spite of sin, did not have an inborn moral sense, such an experience as repentance could not take place except through a capricious act on the part of divine Providence. There must be some point of contact for Christianity in the human soul. Like truth, there is only one absolute morality, and that morality is the same for Christian and non-Christian. The God of creation and the God of redemption are one and the same God. The will of God which operates in redemption is not a different will from that which operates in creation. God is one and His nature is always true to itself. The process of redemption completes what has been begun in creation. Some glimpses of the truth have been given to men outside of the Christian or Biblical revelation, and the truth which has been given to them must be recognized as truth. Christianity claims to have the truth, and whenever anyone outside of Christianity has discovered the truth, the two must meet. There is therefore no *essential* difference between philosophical and Christian ethics.

Practically, however, we do find that there is a difference. Philosophical ethics is often formal and fruitless. Christianity insists that the Christian ethical man is man at his moral best. Philosophical ethics often ignores Christian ethics as though such morality were outside of its scope. Unless philosophical ethics can prove that the Christian claim is untrue, there is no justification for such a procedure. Christian ethics, on the other hand, can not afford to ignore moral philosophy, because the Christian does not give up his rational nature when he becomes a Christian. Only at its own peril can Christian ethics contradict the reasonable and assured results of philosophical ethics. The world-view of the Christian must harmonize with all his other knowledge. In the long run, our knowledge must constitute a unity. The scientific and philosophic spirit of moral philosophy should also permeate Christian ethics. Christian ethics has much to learn from philosophical ethics.

Christian ethics is religious ethics. Its ethical requirements are grounded in the will of God. This postulate of Christian ethics is not necessarily contradictory to philosophical ethics. Statements that the norm of morality is found in the will of God, in the conscience of man, or in the effects which it produces are not necessarily contradictory, but may mean the same thing.

Christian ethics is no abstract theory, but has its origin in a creative personality—God as revealed in Jesus Christ. Christian faith and experience supplies a dynamic for the ethical life which philosophical ethics often lacks. The statement that the Christian experience of conversion is a dynamic for the ethical life needs no proof.

As philosophical ethics avails itself of the insights of Christianity, and as Christian ethics penetrates deeper into the truth of the revelation of God's will, the difference between the two will become less and less. We can not rest content with any permanent contradiction between reason and faith. Philosophical ethics should find its fulfillment in Christian ethics, and Christian ethics should make it possible for philosophical ethics to do so.

Relation to Dogmatics.—Previous to the seventeenth century, Ethics was treated as a part of Dogmatics. Sometimes it was treated under a section on the law or an exposition of the Decalogue. (See THOMAS AQUINAS.) Calvin treated Ethics in connection with regeneration and the new life in Christ (CALVIN, *Inst.*, books 2 and 3). In the Reformed Church, Lambert Daneau (1530–95) was the first to give Ethics a separate treatment, and in the Lutheran Church, Calixtus (1586–1656) was the pioneer in this respect. The separation of Ethics from Dogmatics promoted the study of the subject and the attention which it received. Dogmatics and Ethics must both be given due emphasis, or abnormal manifestations will occur in Christendom.

The two subjects have much in common. They both deal with God and man and their mutual relations. Christian Ethics looks upon the moral life as conditioned by religious faith, with which

Dogmatics deals. It might even be possible still to consider Ethics a part of Dogmatics, were it not for the fact that the importance of the subject merits special treatment. We might say that Ethics is a part of Dogmatics which has been separated from the latter for more detailed treatment. The intimate relation between the two subjects is well illustrated by the *ordo salutis.* Dogmatics treats of this order, but every step in the order of salvation has its ethical implications.

The two disciplines often deal with the same subject-matter, and still it is possible to make a distinction. Faith is both receptive and operative. Dogmatics deals with the former aspect of faith, and Ethics with the latter. Dogmatics emphasizes man's dependence upon God and the acts and efficiency of God. Ethics deals with the Christian life of man. Dogmatics sets forth what God has done for us. Ethics deals with our love and our duties to God and man.

The Field of Ethics.—Man pronounces judgment upon his experience. He says, This is true or false; or, This is beautiful or ugly; or, This is good or evil. The true, the beautiful, and the good may all fall within the realm of the ethical, but it is primarily the last, or the good, which constitutes the field of ethics.

Numerous expressions in our vocabulary belong to this field of experience. Such words as "ideal," "value," "good," and "evil" are common expressions and belong to this moral sphere. The most characteristic word in ethics is perhaps the word "ought." We say that we ought to do this, or we ought not to do that. This implies a sense of obligation which is fundamental for any ethical thinking. The moral enters into our consciousness and experience in the form of some ideal, and because of a recognition of an ideal or ideals we have such an experience as "regret." Regret implies that we have fallen short of an ideal. The subject-matter of ethics thus deals with things which are very real in human experience. What is the good? What ought I to do? How can I do it? These are the important questions which ethics seeks to answer.

Science is interested in the real, in facts, and in how things take place. The important questions for science are, How? What? When? Science is interested in the real regardless of whether it be good or not. Ethics is interested in the good and the ideal regardless of whether it is real or not. Ethical conduct strives toward an ideal which, as a rule, has not been realized. Ethics interests itself in the ideal over against the actual.

Man's conception of truth in the scientific realm has varied from time to time. Men have thought that the scientific truth about the shape of the earth was that it was flat. Man was mistaken with respect to the nature of the truth, but the fact that man was mistaken did not change the fact that the earth was round. The objective fact and the objective truth were always the same, namely this, that the earth was round. Truth is something objective. Man may have been mistaken in his conception of truth, but this fact does not make truth something subjective. The facts and truths which science discovers have objective reality.

The sense of beauty is also something more than a subjective state. To be sure, man's conception of the beautiful has varied, but the fact that one race or generation can pass on its art to another, and that another race or generation can appreciate it, is ample evidence of the fact that beauty is something objective.

What has been said of truth and beauty also applies to the realm of the good. In human experience there is a sense of obligation or "oughtness." The contents of the "ought" have varied and do vary, but this does not imply that morality is something merely subjective. If man has been mistaken in his conception of what has been moral, that fact does not prove that morality is not objective. Likewise if ethical conceptions have gone through a period of development and have a history, that fact does not deny the objectivity of the moral values. Science did not arrive on the scene all ready-made. It went through a period of development. The same is true with respect to art. Man's inadequate conceptions do not make truth or beauty or goodness subjective matters. In all of these spheres man is laying hold of objective reality. The universe does have "values at heart." There is a moral law in the very nature of things which is just as objective as the law of gravitation. Man can ignore the law of gravitation if he chooses, but he can not do so with impunity. If he leaps from a window, he pays the penalty for violating the law of gravitation when he strikes the ground. In like manner man may violate the moral law which is in the very nature of things, but not with impunity. There is a way of life which is the true way of life, and man must conform to that way or pay the penalty for the transgression. The immoral sows the seeds of its own destruction. Promiscuity in sexual relations brings venereal disease and other evils which hamper if they do not completely destroy life. In the realm of social relations, economic crises and distress are brought about through the transgression of moral laws. Social maladjustments always point to moral failure. Moral principles are embedded in the very nature of things. These principles are objective realities. We can not live our lives in a satisfactory way without conforming to them. We do not invent morality. There is a moral order given and it is the task of ethics to show us how to conform to that moral order.

Certain laws of health must be observed for the well-being of the body. Such laws are objectively given conditions. Man may not always have understood what those laws were, and our conception of them has varied, but they are not therefore subjective. Man has paid the penalty for violating them, and therefore they are objectively given.

We have a sense of "oughtness" or obligation. This sense requires an objectively given and absolute standard of morality, or it becomes meaningless. Just as water corresponds to thirst, so an objective morality corresponds to our sense of obligation. Man's moral experience demands that morality be something more than a figment of his imagination.

We have stated that the realm of the "good" is the field of ethics. Ethics must therefore concern itself with the nature of the good, or the ideal of life. Aristotle said, "Like archers shall we not more likely attain that which is right, if we have a mark?" It was this which led the Greeks and the Romans to inquire after the highest good. The "wisdom" literature of the Hebrews revolved about the same problem. "Wisdom" in the Old Testament meant primarily "moral principle." The wise man was he who directed his life worthily and well. Wisdom is thus virtually the equivalent of goodness. It was spiritual or moral insight, a true discrimination of values and an understanding of what is most worth living for. Wisdom was thus a recognition of the highest good.

The good is that which makes life worth living. Such a statement implies that life in itself is something good. With the West-Aryan peoples it has always been an axiom that life in itself is something good. Especially is this true in the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Christianity is life-affirming. Jesus Himself said, "I came that they may have life, and may have it abundantly" (John 10. 10).

From Plato onward the moral philosophers have recognized that the "Good for man must reside in that which completely harmonizes and most nearly brings to full fruition all his powers, capacities, and endowments" (BARRY, *Christianity and the New World*, p. 141). "That is moral which at any time tends to preserve the life of man in its largest capacity and efficiency" (SMYTH, *Christian Ethics*, p. 86). "If we inquire concerning the contents of the ideal, it can only be described as man himself, human personality conceived in its purity and perfection, as the one and universal type which shall assume form in a realm of human entities or individuals, where each on his own account and all in unison must work out the realization of this aim" (Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, p. 3). "We may therefore provisionally define the ethical as the normal condition of humanity insofar as it is fashioned and worked out by human self-government; and we may therefore express the requirement of ethics in the provisional formula, 'Strive to realize in thyself and in the community the ideal of humanity' " (*Ibid.*, p. 4). Albert Schweitzer says, "The essential thing to realize about ethics is that it is the very manifestation of our will to live. . . . If I am a thinking being, I must regard other life than my own with equal reverence. For I shall know that it longs for fullness and development as deeply as I do myself. Therefore, I see that evil is what annihilates, hampers, or hinders life. Goodness . . . is the saving or helping of life, the enabling of whatever life I can to attain its highest development" (*Christendom*, Vol. I, Number 2, pp. 227, 230).

Ethics has sometimes been called Moral Philosophy, and Christian Ethics has at times been called Moral Theology. The word "moral" is a term which is closely associated with the idea of the good or goodness. Morality means "the conduct, character, and ideas of men in their relation to goodness" (Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 68). Or, "the moral is that which regulates human will and action—the norm or rule by which men spontaneously acquiesce in what must and ought to be" (MARTENSEN, *op. cit.*, p. 1). The moral idea would exist when what is would correspond to what ought to be, or the good. Morality is the norm which expresses the good. The moral is that which corresponds to and is determined by the good, in character and conduct.

CHAPTER II

THE GROUNDWORK OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

How shall we determine what is moral? This is a fundamental question for all ethics. It is a question which has busied the minds of thinkers since the beginnings of moral philosophy. We shall be better able to understand the Christian answer to this question if we first examine a number of answers which have been given by a few outstanding thinkers in the realm of ethics.

We have already indicated that the ethics of the Greeks exerted a large influence upon the ethical thinking of the Christian theologians of the Middle Ages. The influence of a Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle is still with us, and it would be difficult to understand much of modern thought without a knowledge of the background which they supply.

Socrates.—The philosophy of Socrates was primarily centered in the moral realm. The subjects which particularly interested him were the nature of virtue and the good. He tried to discover a rational principle for right and wrong and to understand the meaning of morality. He wanted to establish a rational basis for conduct. The solution of the problem which Socrates reached was that if a man knows what virtue is, he will be virtuous. For Socrates, then, the basis for moral judgment is knowledge. His well-known dictum, "Know thyself," states the first duty of man. Socrates was not simple enough to believe that a man may not do what he knows, in the popular sense of that word, to be wrong. Knowledge, for Socrates, was not only theoretical conviction but practical conviction and involved the will as well as the intellect. There is a mystical strain in the philosophy of Socrates. To know the truth (as Socrates understands the term "know") or to know virtue is to have such a vision of it that one must love it and be devoted to it. To know virtue is to love it. If we really know virtue, it will be the only possible thing to wish for.

Plato.—Plato has not given us what might be called a systematic treatment of ethics. His ethical teaching also varied in different periods of his life. We shall not attempt to find a systematic treatment of the subject in Plato but rather point to some of the prominent features in his ethics which have influenced Christian thinking.

A life of virtue, said Plato, is the highest good. Virtue is the harmony, the health, and the well-being of the soul. Through virtue man realizes his essential manhood. A life of virtue is a life controlled by reason. Such a life will exercise the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. These are the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks, which figured so prominently particularly in the Christian Ethics of the Middle Ages. Plato did not arbitrarily select these virtues, and it is of interest to note how he arrived at them as fundamental. The path by which Plato arrived at these virtues can only be found in the light of Plato's psychology. The soul of man, he taught, had a previous existence before its earthly career, and it would also continue to exist after bodily death. The immortal part of man is reason. The abiding and true part of man is the rational, and this is also the immortal part of his soul. Now, wisdom corresponds to the rational part of man's soul. It is an expression of that which is highest in man and is therefore one of the cardinal virtues. Besides the rational aspect of the soul, Plato speaks of two others. One of these involves sensations, desires, and appetites. It is that part of the soul which is characterized by the lower appetites and passions. It is the function of reason to rule over this disordered side of man's soul, and when this takes place, we have the virtue of temperance. The third side of man's soul Plato calls the "spirited." This refers to the nobler impulses of human nature. It is the forceful, the spirited, the energetic side of man's nature. It is the basis of certain admirable virtues. Ambition and the love of power are manifestations of this side of human nature. In itself it is unintelligent and blind and is therefore on a lower level than reason. When reason rules over this side of human nature, we get the virtue of courage. When reason exercises its sway and brings these three sides of the soul into harmony, then we have justice, the fourth of the cardinal virtues. The virtuous man is wise and brave and temperate. He has harmonized his soul under the direction of reason and thus attained to justice.

This general point of view is also the basis for Plato's political theories, as they are expounded in *The Republic*. The claims of the State are primary. Everything must be subject to the interests of the State. Plato was opposed to private property. Even wives should be held in common, and the children should be brought up by the State. Marriages should be controlled, and weak children should be exposed. Plato's ethical ideal was to be realized in the ideal State. The philosophers, who represent reason, should rule. The virtue which should characterize them would be wisdom. The second class of society should consist of the warriors, whose duty it is to protect the State. Their function corresponds to the "spirited" part of the human soul and their chief virtue is courage. The third class of society was to consist of the artisans, the agriculturists, the merchants, and the producers in general. The chief virtue of this group was to be temperance or humility. Justice will be attained in the State when each of these classes effectively performs its own tasks, thus bringing harmony into the body corporate.

There is in Plato also a strain of the ascetic. In matter there is a sort of resistance to the striving of the rational soul. Matter is imperfection and evil. The body itself is a prison for the soul. Deliverance from the body, matter and sense, is something to be desired. The ultimate purpose of life is to be delivered from the material and to contemplate the beautiful world of ideas, which for Plato is equivalent to seeing God.

The idea of harmony and the idea of the beautiful figure largely in the philosophy of Plato. It is in the light of this conception that we must interpret Paul's statements to the effect that the preaching of the crucified Christ is "unto Gentiles foolishness" (1 Cor. 1. 23). Such Pauline statements are often used to minimize the rational element in Christianity, and sometimes we are almost led to draw the conclusion that Christians ought to glory in the irrational. It is possible to make use of such Pauline statements as an excuse for foolish preaching. The Greeks associated the idea of harmony and of the beautiful with God. The Christian gospel declared that God was revealed on a cross. The cross was an instrument of torture and execution. For the Greek mind to think of God as revealed on a cross was as difficult as it would be for many moderns to think of God revealing Himself on a gallows or in an electric chair. It was this which constituted the "foolishness of the cross" for the Greek mind, as they looked for Him in the beautiful and the harmonious. The thought of God in Christ, suffering on the cross of Calvary, is not irrational. It is simply contrary to the Greek conception of God. Christians believe that in Christianity the character of God is revealed. To maintain that Christianity is irrational is an insult to God, for it is the equivalent of saying that God is irrational.

Aristotle.—For Aristotle, as well as for his predecessors, the chief ethical question was the end of life or the highest good. He taught that for man good lies in realizing his own specific nature. Self-realization or well-being was the *summum bonum.* That was the highest good which permitted the exercise to the fullest extent of those functions which make man a man. That which distinguishes man from the rest of creation and makes him unique is the power of reason. The highest pleasure of man is the pleasure of pure speculation. However, Aristotle also taught a practical wisdom. The life of man in its entirety should be governed by reason. The feelings, the desires, and the appetites should be subordinated to the sway of reason. When reason becomes supreme and rules over the various elements of the human soul, virtue is attained. Pleasure will follow as a result of such virtue, but real pleasure is only that type of pleasure which the good man would choose.

How, then, does reason function? What is the principle according to which reason performs its task? Aristotle's answer is that this principle is the "golden mean" or moderation. Between superstition and impiety, at the extremes, lies the golden mean, the virtue of piety. Between foolhardiness and cowardice is courage; between sloth and greed is ambition; between bashfulness and shamelessness is modesty; between secrecy and loquacity is honesty; between moroseness and buffoonery is good humor; between quarrelsomeness and flattery is friendship; between indecisiveness and impulsiveness is self-control; between luxury and parsimony is temperance; and between craft and folly is prudence. Thus reason rules and brings about virtue through application of the principle of moderation.

The natural conservatism of Aristotle is emphasized when as a practical guide he suggests the opinion of the day. There would be little room for the social reformer. It is the aim of the State to produce good citizens. Democracy is better than oligarchy or monarchy because in a democracy the possibilities for the abuse of power are minimized.

Slavery is taken for granted by both Aristotle and Plato.

Aristotle gives us an interesting description of his conception of the ideal man. "He does not expose himself needlessly to danger, since there are few things for which he cares sufficiently; but he is willing, in great crises, to give even his life—knowing that under certain conditions it is not worth while to live. He is of a disposition to do men service, though he is ashamed to have a service done to him. To confer a kindness is a mark of superiority; to receive one is a mark of subordination. He does not take part in public displays. He is open in his dislikes and preferences; he talks and acts frankly, because of his contempt for men and things. He is never fired with admiration, since there is nothing great in his eyes. He can not live in complaisance with others, except it be a friend; complaisance is the characteristic of a slave. He never feels malice and always forgets and passes over injuries. He is not fond of talking. It is no concern of his that he should be praised, or that others should be blamed. He does not speak evil of others, even of his enemies, unless it be to themselves. His carriage is sedate, his voice deep, his speech measured; he is not given to hurry, for he is concerned only about a few things; he is not prone to vehemence, for he thinks nothing very important. A shrill voice and hasty steps come to a man through care. He bears the accidents of life with dignity and grace, making the best of his circumstances, like a skillful general who marshals his limited forces with all the strategy of war. He is his own best friend, and takes delight in privacy, whereas the man of no virtue or ability is his own worst enemy, and is afraid of solitude." (*Ethics*, IV, 3—Translation from *Story of Philosophy* by Will Durant, pp. 89–90.)

Epicurus and Epicureanism. Hedonism.—The ethical philosophy of Epicurus is a doctrine of enlightened self-interest. Happiness or pleasure is the highest good, and pain is the worst evil. Pleasure is the goal of life at which we ought to aim. Pain and pleasure constitute the motives for our actions. At times, though not consistently, it appears, Epicurus looked upon happiness as a kind of Buddhistic peace of mind or freedom from pain and care. Epicurean ethics is a system of egoistic hedonism.

Epicurus, however, taught that pleasures are not to be chosen without discrimination and without weighing all the consequences of our choice. The rules of morality were not to be ignored in the pursuit of happiness because they were aids in attaining the goal. Epicurus did not ignore the Platonic virtues, but looked upon them as means to the end sought. It is necessary to observe the virtues in order to attain to happiness, but the virtues are worthless except as means to happiness. Wisdom, however, teaches us what to do and what to avoid, temperance teaches us to avoid the evil consequences of excesses, and courage teaches us how to avoid fear. The virtues are therefore good as means to an end. Justice is also a good thing, because when we do injustice we fear punishment, our peace of mind is disturbed because we are afraid of being found out, and through justice we gain the good-will and support of our fellow men, which contributes to making us happy. The doctrine of Epicurus was not a doctrine of sensuality, but many of his followers began to interpret it as such in order to satisfy their desires for a life of luxury and sensuous enjoyment.

The great moral geniuses of the human race have not sought pleasure, and they have not feared pain, in order to attain their moral ideals. With them pleasure and pain have not been the motives of action. The moral as an object of desire is something sufficient in itself. It is something which exists *sui generis*, and there is absolutely no reason why we should interpret the moral in terms of the pleasant. Happiness may come as a result of the moral, but the moral exists in its own right.

If the motive for action is pleasure and pain, then man acts that way, and that is all there is to be said about it. There is then no sense in telling man what he "ought" to do. If it be true that the motive for conduct is simply the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, we need not tell man that he ought to do that, because he *is* doing it. On the basis of hedonism the moral loses its meaning.

To some people there is pleasure in doing good; to others there is pleasure in stealing. Epicurus did distinguish between pleasures. He looked upon mental pleasures as superior to physical pleasures. But just as soon as we commence to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures, or better and worse, we must introduce a moral judgment which is independent of pleasure. The moral can not be reduced to the pleasant.

Happiness is also a very elusive thing when man begins to chase it. The elusiveness of pleasure has produced pessimistic philosophy and cynical attitudes. The pursuit of pleasure has sent men to prison, nations to war, and has often brought misery to mankind. Happiness as a goal will not suffice as a guide of life.

Stoicism.—According to the teaching of the Stoics the universe is an organized, rational system. All things work together for good, and this we would realize if we could only view the universe from the standpoint of the totality of things. Here Stoicism is not realistic. Evil is not given due emphasis. Suffering, pain, and evil are a part of reality, and their interpretation of the problem of evil does not help him who is suffering.

For Stoicism virtue is the highest good and also the highest happiness. Virtue is looked upon as an inner unity of the will from which the separate virtues flow. The virtuous man acts on the basis of such an inner unity or on the basis of conscience. This inner unity may come to man in the form of a sudden conversion.

Reason has a large place in the ethical thinking of the Stoics, because reason shows man what his duty is. God, the ground of the universe, is a rational being, and man shares in this reason as a spark of the divine. Man attains his purpose by conforming to the divine purpose and acting in harmony with it. This implies that man follows the dictates of reason, or the *logos*, which is the bond that unites God and man as well as all men. Man attains to virtue by following reason, which is the divinest element in human nature.

The emotions, such as pleasure, desire, fear, and grief are to be eradicated. They are not only to be controlled but to be completely subdued. Passions are the result of false opinion. Pleasure is the result of a false judgment on a present good; desire is a false judgment on a future good; grief is a false judgment on a present evil; and fear a false judgment on a future evil. The Stoic sought to meet all experiences in a spirit of resignation. The wise man was not to be affected by the loss of children or friends. We ought to help our fellow men but not to feel pity for them. The gentler feelings find no theoretical place in Stoicism. Seneca says, "To feel pain or grief for the misfortunes of others is a weakness unworthy of the sage; for nothing should cloud his serenity or shake his firmness."

There is a cosmopolitan spirit about Stoicism. The humanitarian attitude of Stoicism embraced the entire world and looked upon all men as brothers. All men are children of the same father, the same universal reason speaks in all of them, and even our enemies should be helped and pardoned. The welfare of mankind should be placed above the particular interests of the individual. Even if we must sacrifice ourselves in seeking the common good, we will thereby be fulfilling our true mission.

Stoicism numbered in its ranks some of the noblest characters of antiquity. They found in religion the necessary support for morality. The Stoic system, however, is more an ethical than a religious system, because of its emphasis upon human effort. Many of the thought-forms of early Christianity have their origin in Stoicism.

Utilitarianism.—Most of the groundwork for all subsequent ethical thinking is to be found, in germ at least, among the ancient Greeks. Most of the modern ethical theories are developments of some aspect of Greek thought. Utilitarianism has many points of contact with Greek philosophy. It is the doctrine that the ultimate end of morality is general happiness and that those actions are right which bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number. Happiness is conceived of as being pleasure or the absence of pain. Utilitarianism is a universalistic hedonism.

This doctrine leaves no place for the sense of moral obligation, or duty. The data of experience which belong to that realm are simply ignored. That which duty demands and that which is pleasant do not always coincide. The sense of duty sometimes demands the suppression of inclination toward pleasure. There is no known unit of mensuration by which the greatest happiness for the greatest number can be calculated, nor is any such unit possible. Utilitarianism makes the moral quality reside in consequences and thus the *sui generis* quality of the moral is overlooked. We have already seen that there is something in the nature of the moral which unifies and integrates, but there is nothing in pleasure which necessarily does so. Utilitarianism has never answered the question why I should be bound to promote pleasure. The moral is not something which can be measured in terms of pleasure. In the very nature of the moral is that by which I judge pleasure itself.

Utilitarianism has recognized the truth that pleasure is an accompaniment of the good. The good must be pleasant in order to be an object of desire, but this does not mean that the nature of the good is pleasure. Man can not and should not avoid associating the pleasant with the good. Even when we are told that "the chief end of man is to glorify God," the statement, "and to *enjoy* him forever," is added. Happiness may come as a by-product of character, but happiness is not the essence of morality nor that which determines its nature.

Character, not happiness, is the ethical end of life. Usually we do not find man at his moral best in connection with a pampered life. Often we find the moral in connection with great suffering and pain. The moral quality of the life of Jesus was never more apparent than in connection with the crucifixion and the cross. The beauty of Hosea's character is particularly evident in the suffering occasioned by his domestic tragedy. The moral quality of Job's character can not be measured by pleasure. The utilitarian might reply that in the long run such a character would bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number, but we know that we are charmed by the moral quality of those lives, apart from any consideration of pleasure. If happiness and not character were the purpose of life, a jellyfish or a contented cow might be the most moral of all creatures.

Empiricism and Evolutionistic Ethics.—The empirical approach in ethics implies that man is by birth a moral ignoramus, who desires his own happiness. In order to live with his fellow men he must obey certain rules. The pains and pleasures which follow upon certain types of conduct determine that which is moral. Pleasure and pain are thus the experiences which determine what is called ethical conduct. This approach is closely related to the approach of the utilitarian to ethics, and most of what has been said by way of criticism of utilitarianism applies to empiricism in general. The fact remains that we pronounce moral judgments upon acts without taking pleasure and pain into consideration, and thus the empirical approach simply sidesteps the fundamental characteristic of the moral.

The doctrine of evolution, when applied to ethics, involves an empirical approach and usually is also definitely connected with the utilitarian viewpoint. Moral codes derive their authority from their utility. What the community believed to be essential to the welfare of society became the moral. The gregarious instinct is considered to be one of the essential factors in ethical development.

Herbert Spencer is one of the best known thinkers who applied the doctrine of evolution to ethics. He considered moral conduct to be that type of conduct which is conducive to the maintenance of life. The pursuit of happiness, he held, is, as a rule, advantageous to survival, and thus the doctrines of evolution and utilitarianism are brought together. The fittest survive and hand down their qualities to future generations.

Evolutionistic ethics looks upon the moral as simply formulae which fix standards for conduct for a given time. "The theory of a definite, rigid, and absolute ethic is a fiction," says Edward Clodd. The fact that man's experience has been a factor in revealing the moral to him does not necessarily lead to such a conclusion as that quoted. The trial-and-error method has been used by scientists and the man of science has not always known or found the truth, but this does not imply that truth does not exist as an objective fact. Man has not always known that the earth was round, but it was round just the same. Man's experience and comprehension did not reveal this fact to him until comparatively modern times. The fact that the moral has gone through a process of development does not do away with its binding quality nor the fact that there is an absolute morality. Neither does a lowly origin discredit the more developed forms of any phenomenon. Medicine and astronomy may not be proud of their connections in primitive society with the medicine man and astrology, but that connection does not discredit their present status. The recognition of a process of development in the realm of the moral does not discredit ethics. Evolutionistic ethics alone has no constructive principle to offer ethical theory. A description of an evolving process throws no light on the goal. No satisfactory ethical theory can ignore metaphysics. If morals are simply something arbitrary or subjective, their binding quality is lost and the sense of duty or "oughtness" loses its meaning. There must be an objective imperative, or our ethical thinking will be forced to revolve about something other than that which is given in the moral consciousness. Goodness is not something which evolves, any more than truth.

Intuitionalism.—Intuitionalism seeks to answer the question as to why we make moral distinctions by claiming that man possesses a natural faculty which immediately enables him to distinguish between right and wrong. This moral endowment or conscience is an inborn faculty by which man intuitively recognizes the moral. We recognize the truth of the axioms of geometry without demanding any proof, and in like manner we recognize the validity of the moral when we are brought face to face with it. We need not prove that it is wrong to steal, we simply recognize it as a fact.

The rational intuitionalists claim that man has innate knowledge of morality, a knowledge which is not derived from experience but is inherent in the very nature of human reason. Reason is the power by which man recognizes self-evident truth. Through the exercise of reason man recognizes the moral.

The emotional intuitionalists stress the feeling which attaches to the moral act and find in this the basis of morality. However, different feelings are connected with the same act at different times and in different places. Formerly a Turkish woman would experience a feeling of shame if she were to appear in public without her veil. An American woman would have no such feeling. Primitive man would experience a feeling of remorse in killing some sacred animal, while civilized man would not have such a feeling. Emotional intuitionalism will not serve to account for the genesis of the moral.

The path of intuition does not lead us to the moral distinctions which the intuitionalists claim. The deliverances of man's conscience are too varied. If we had such an inborn sense as is claimed, the deliverances of conscience should agree. Conscience must be enlightened or educated; this fact the intuitionalists overlook.

The intuitionalists have discerned the truth that the moral is a constant of human history. There is no time in human history to which we can point when the moral tendency was not present. There has been no satisfactory way found of deriving the moral from the non-moral. The moral sense is something which is given in human nature; it is a part of that which makes man a man. Intuitionalism and empiricism can easily be reconciled. The moral sense of mankind is something given, but experience supplies content to the capacity for the moral.

Eudaemonism.—The Greek word *εὐδαιμονία* means happiness, but the eudaemonistic theory of ethics is not hedonistic or utilitarian. The moral principle for the eudaemonist is not happiness or pleasure, but the preservation of life, virtuous activity, welfare, development, progress, and perfection. Self-realization is the end sought. That is good which tends to preserve and develop human life. Paulsen says, "Acts are called good when they tend to preserve or promote welfare; bad when they tend to disturb or destroy it. Welfare consists in the perfect exercise of all human psychical powers." (*System of Ethics*, pp. 222 and 224.) Welfare (*Wohlfahrt*, *välfärd*) is the ethical end.

Eudaemonism is too formal to give much practical guidance in the moral realm, but we need not object to the self-realization formula for the human good, provided that we guard against its perversion by selfishness. If the self is viewed in relationship to nature, to fellow men, and to God, self-realization may well correspond with the Christian ethical norm.

The Will of God.—Most of the approaches to the problem of the groundwork of ethics will find a place under some of the theories discussed, in various combinations. The groundwork of ethical thinking has been found in man's reason, in the compelling nature of the truth when man perceives it, in self-realization, in happiness for the individual or the group, in that which is conducive to life, or in an intuitive sense of the moral.

Christian Ethics is indissolubly connected with Dogmatics and finds its norm or groundwork in the will of God. God's will need not be, and can not satisfactorily be conceived to be, like an arbitrary decree on the part of an oriental despot. The will of God can not be separated from the nature of His creation if the Christian's appeal to the will of God is to have any validity. Blind obedience to an arbitrary command is an insecure foundation for Christian morality.

Tertullian taught that law demands obedience because it is law and not because it approves itself to man's conscience. He said, "I hold it to be audacity to dispute concerning the good of a divine precept. For it is not because it is good that we are bound to obey, but because God commands it. To secure obedience the majesty of divine power has the prior right; the authority of him who rules is prior to the utility of him who serves. Is it good to repent or not? Why do you ask? God commands." (*De paenitentia.*) Duns Scotus also was so interested in stressing God's absolute will that he maintained that the sole ground of right and wrong was the will of God. A thing is good simply because God has willed it; He does not will it because it is good. (*Opus Oxoniense.*) It is to be noted that Duns Scotus found it difficult to maintain consistency in this attitude.

Mohammed would, in this connection, have had no quarrel with either Tertullian or Duns Scotus. To Mohammed morality was not connected with any fundamental distinction between right and wrong in the essential nature of God. Sin was not something which went to the heart of the universe itself, but was rather a violation of an arbitrary command which might be changed at the whim of Allah. The will of Allah is supreme, and he is not restrained by any principle within or without. To Mohammed God is unlimited power, unrestrained by justice or love.

We know that any form of marriage other than monogamy is and has been a curse. The biological, psychological, and historical nature of life is such that it demands monogamy, but the Mohammedan Koran allows polygamy while limiting to four the number of wives a Moslem may have. By a special dispensation, Allah removed this limit for Mohammed himself, so that the prophet had about a dozen wives. On one occasion the founder of Islam married the wife of his adopted son, but he had a revelation from Allah which made it right for him to do as he had done. Morality was simply an arbitrary affair on the part of the deity. Christian Ethics must find a more secure basis than such an arbitrary decree for its moral norm.

Thomas Aquinas taught that God does not will anything arbitrarily. What He wills is not good because He wills it, but He wills it because it is good. He does not will that which is opposed to His nature or character, nor what is impossible or self-contradictory. Aquinas' conception of the nature of God and His will make Christian morals intellectually acceptable. Right and wrong are not a created distinction in the sense that God might have willed otherwise. God could no more by an arbitrary decree change that which is immoral into the moral than He could by an arbitrary fiat make two and two equal five or make a door stay open and stay closed at the same time. God could not and would not make theft a moral act by declaring that it is right to steal. God is true to His own nature, and that nature is moral, and the essence of the moral is the same for God as for man. "Be ye holy; for I am holy" (Leviticus 11. 45). By this process of reasoning we are not in any measure limiting God by anything outside of Himself. We are simply stressing the nature and character according to which His will functions. If that be limitation, it is self-limitation. God reveals the right because it is right.

When we think of God as the Ground of the Universe, we can also say that right is right because God has revealed it; but this is not the equivalent of looking upon morality as an arbitrary decree. Christians look upon the Bible as "the rule of faith and practice." The moral precepts of the Bible are in the Bible because they are inherently moral. Rightly interpreted, they are moral because they are in the Bible, Scripture being a revelation of the nature and heart of reality. God punishes nations and peoples who transgress His moral laws, but in doing so He is not an arbitrary, angry Jupiter, hurling thunderbolts at his adversaries from his home on Mount Olympus. Augustine speaks of the will of God as being the nature of things. God is not only transcendent but immanent in the creative process, and there is a moral order in that process which will brook no opposition. Men must obey that moral order or suffer the consequences. There is a divine moral order in the nature of things which is an expression of the will of God. God's will is moral, and that which is moral is an expression of His will.

Christian ethics does not simply describe states of the Christian consciousness, but having found its basis in the will of God, it makes Christian morality objective. This does not deprive the moral life of the Christian of its autonomy, because if we give due prominence to the doctrine of the immanence of God, the will of the Christian and the will of God become a unity. The objection can not be raised that the Christian ethical approach is too dogmatic. It is no more dogmatic than any other approach, and it is certainly less dogmatic than the approach of the hedonist or the utilitarian.

This approach to ethics does not deny that the moral is rational, that there is something overpowering in the nature of the moral as it is presented to man, that the moral leads to self-realization, that happiness follows as a result of the moral, that the moral brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number, that it is conducive to life, and that man has by nature a moral sense. Neither do we need to deny that morality has gone through a process of historical development. Christian ethics can include within itself all that is good in all ethical systems. Truth is one and consistent, whatever may be its source.

CHAPTER III

ROMAN AND PROTESTANT ETHICS

Roman Ethics.—In the Roman Church the moral ideal is sought in the ascetic and monastic type of life. There is therefore a dualism in its ethical outlook. A distinction is made between a common morality for all men and an uncommon morality for the spiritual aristocracy. The latter group obeys, in addition to the laws of common morality for all men, the "evangelical counsels" demanding voluntary celibacy, voluntary poverty, and absolute obedience.

The ascetic tendency appeared very early in the history of Christianity. The Didache, which undoubtedly dates from the close of the second century, contains the germ of asceticism or higher morality, when it says, "If thou art able to bear the whole yoke of the Lord, thou shalt be perfect; but if thou art not able, do what thou canst" (IV. 2). Justin boasts that many Christians lived as celibates (*Apol.* I. 14), and in the treatises of Tertullian and the writings of Cyprian there is a very distinct leaning toward asceticism.

With the union of Church and State under Constantine, the Church gained some things but lost much. With that union the spirit of militarism entered into the ranks of the Church. (See article by Prof. McGiffert in *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. XIX.) Much of the fervor and spirit of the Christian life was lost, and as a protest against the worldliness of the Church monasticism developed and spread with great rapidity. Ambrose of Milan (d. 397) glorified virginity as one of the highest of the Christian virtues. He made no allowance for a second marriage of widows. He opposed the use of violence, even in self-defense, and was averse to war.

Jerome (d. 419) was the most pronounced advocate among the fathers of the ascetic form of piety. He praises the fellowship with God which may be obtained in the solitude of the desert. He does not condemn marriage but exalts the celibate state far above the married.

Augustine introduced monasticism into northern Africa. He did not condemn marriage but looked upon the unmarried state as superior to the married. The highest type of life for the Christian was to be found in withdrawing from the world to live the life of an ascetic.

Throughout the Middle Ages the two outstanding powers in the Church were the papacy and the various orders of monks. Gregory the Great (d. 604) was not only pope but a Benedictine monk and united in his own person the papal interest and the monastic ideal. In his *Magna Moralia* he laid the foundation for the ascetic trend of ethics in the Middle Ages.

The height of medieval dogmatic and ethical thought was reached in Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). The monastic vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience, Aquinas taught, were the paths that led to perfection.

During the Middle Ages the Mystics emphasized a more spiritual type of piety than the usual, but mystic piety also was connected with asceticism. One of the most popular devotional books of all Christendom has been that of Thomas a Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ.* This work is one of the finest examples of devotional mysticism, but the moral ideal is nevertheless ascetic. The ascetic strain is a marked characteristic of the ethics of Romanism throughout.

Closely connected in spirit with the ascetic is also a legalistic trend in the ethics of Romanism. This tendency led to an emphasis upon the quantity of works. The quiet assurance of faith and peace of conscience is difficult for the Romanist to attain and maintain, because he can never be sure that he has done enough. If the quantity of works is stressed together with a distinction between that which is "required" and that which is "advised" in the moral sphere, the doctrine concerning works of supererogation is a logical step. Works of supererogation are works done over and above those required by the law. God does not require such works, but He is well pleased with them. Through them a higher perfection can be gained than without them, and they constitute the merits of the saints. As a Scriptural basis for the doctrine of works of supererogation are cited such passages as Luke 17. 10; 18. 22; Mt. 19. 11, 12, 21; and 1 Cor. 9. 14–17. This doctrine is to be found as early as the time of the Shepherd of Hermas (middle of second century), who wrote, "And if you do any good beyond what is commanded by God, you will gain for yourself more abundant glory, and will be more honored by God than you would otherwise be" (B. III, Similitude 5). Thomas Aquinas taught that there is a treasury of hypermeritorious works from which the pope can dispense indulgences.

One of the fallacies underlying the doctrine of supererogation is that morality is viewed in the abstract without taking into consideration that the contents of the moral ideal may vary with different individuals under different circumstances. The duty of the monk was not the duty of the farmer, and the duty of the farmer was not the duty of the monk. It does not follow that because it was the duty of the apostle Paul under certain circumstances to do a certain thing it is therefore my duty to do the same thing. Every individual's calling and opportunities impose upon him certain duties which may not be duties for someone else. It is the duty of a doctor to set a fractured bone, but it is not everybody's duty to do so. It is never possible to do more than duty requires. When duty thus is individualized, no works of supererogation are possible. This of course does not mean that each individual becomes a law unto himself, for the "individual instance" must always be subject to divine will, but rather that when morality is individualized, it becomes an absolute obligation. Love is the fulfillment of the law, and love claims all the human faculties for itself and in its service. There can be no more than "all" and therefore no works of supererogation. The Christian looks upon himself as God's steward of time, talents, and possessions, and there is no possibility of doing more than he "ought" to do. From the Christian viewpoint it is also a mistake to look upon the law as something which enslaves as opposed to freedom. The *consilia evangelica* are not the only realm of freedom for the Christian. The Christian finds his highest freedom in conformity with the divine will, of which the law is an expression.

Roman ethics is also atomistic. Practically, the unity of the ethical life is often lost sight of. Each individual act is judged by itself, penance is done, and a new start made. The sacrament of repentance held within itself the germ of this outlook. Professor Calhoun has well said that the Reformers changed the ethical emphasis from the act to the agent. With the Reformers the attention was not centered upon the individual act but upon the total character of the agent performing the act (*God and the Common Life*, p. 44). The atomistic tendency of medieval ethics was overcome by Luther and Calvin. Their very conception of faith as a principle of life consistently carried out brought unity into the ethical life.

Protestant Ethics.—There were those during the Middle Ages who realized the weaknesses of the ascetic manner of life in attaining perfection. Jerome tells us that in the midst of his ascetic practices his imagination tormented him with obscene images of Roman banquets and dances. Augustine in his work, *De Opere Monachorum*, speaks of the idleness and spiritual pride of the monks and warns against it. With the Reformers the reaction against monasticism became pronounced. Luther had known monasticism as it was, in his own experience, and has a great many harsh things to say about it.

The Reformers looked upon the secular activities of life as raw material with which religion works and to which religion imparts its quality. It was not necessary to withdraw into a monastery in order to serve God most effectively, but for the Reformers the most effective service of God was to be found in permitting the spirit of Christ to permeate the various secular activities of life. The earthly calling was to be the sphere in which the Christian is to manifest his Christian faith and life. Luther said, "It is possible that a peasant and his plowing are more acceptable to God than a nun and her chastity." Again he says, "When a poor servant maid sweeps the house and does it because God has commanded her, she does a better work and renders God a greater service than did Anthony in the desert."

It has become common among writers on social ethics to criticize Luther's individualism in ethics. They point out that Luther did not sufficiently emphasize the social application of the gospel but confined himself to personal conduct in his ethical thinking. (See INGE, *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*, p. 235 ff.) It is a fact that the emphasis Luther made in Christian ethics is individualistic. However, in order to understand Luther and interpret this emphasis correctly, we must remind ourselves of the background against which Luther reacted. Men did not need to be told in Luther's day that Christianity has something to do with the social order. That fact was then axiomatic. The Church of Rome had during the Middle Ages tried to influence public morality, and had to a large extent succeeded in influencing group life socially, economically, and nationally. The ideal had been a Church State. The pope had tried to control all things, temporal as well as spiritual. It was taken for granted that religion should influence social life. No sphere of life was left untouched by the influence of religion. Education was guided by religion. The inspiration of art was religious. Science and scientists bowed before the authority of religion. The letters of a Tycho Brahe reveal how religion was enthroned at the center of life even in the thinking of a man of science. The Church mitigated the evils of war, it built up philosophic systems, it forbade the lending of money at interest, and controlled life in all its aspects. There is much to be said by way of criticism of the kind of religion which held sway during the Middle Ages but the fact remains that religion was enthroned at the center of life and was the integrating factor for all society. The idea that the Church and religion had nothing to do with society is one never entertained before the days of the Reformation. This was the background of Luther's individualistic emphasis with respect to the ethical conduct of men. Luther found himself in a world where emphasis was laid on the social and political aspects of Christianity. The individual aspect had been neglected; it needed the emphasis Luther placed on it. Luther never thought of Christianity as having nothing to do with the social order. He took for granted that the princes should rule as Christians. He said, "It is not right that one should work that another may be idle, and one live ill that another may live well." He condemned the manipulation of the markets by those who oppress the poor and enrich themselves with exorbitant prices. (See LUTHER, "On Worldly Power," 1523.) He demanded reform of the universities and promoted popular education. He advocated laws to control dress and luxury foods, the prohibition of usury, and the suppression of prostitution. According to Luther's idea the state was to assume a theocratic role.

However, when Church and State came to be separated, as we know that separation, the background against which Luther reacted no longer existed or exists. In such a new environment many of Luther's followers have continued to make use of his individualistic emphasis and have forgotten what he considered an axiom, namely this, that religion does have to do with the social order. It was unthinkable for any of the Reformers that religion should be a kind of epiphenomenon to life, as it has become in much of modern life. The Lutheran Church has often tended to neglect the social side of Christianity. On this point Lutheranism has been severely criticized by modern writers, such as Dean Inge (*Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*), Reinhold Niebuhr (*Does Civilization Need Religion?*), Professor Tawney (*The Christian Mission in Relation to Industrial Problems*), Barry (*Christianity and the New World*), Rauschenbusch

(*Christianizing the Social Order*), Weber (*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*), and many others.

At the Stockholm Conference on Life and Work in 1925 it appeared very clearly that two types of Protestantism have developed during the last two centuries. One of these types is individualistic and eschatological, emphasizing the transcendent aspects of the kingdom of God and assuming a rather pessimistic attitude toward the world and the social process. At Stockholm this attitude was manifest among the Scandinavian, the German, and the French delegates to a marked degree. The other type of piety is more universal and social, emphasizing the immanent aspects of the kingdom of God, and assuming a more optimistic attitude toward the world. This type was to be noted particularly among the Anglo-Saxons.

The heirs of Luther certainly have a contribution of permanent value to make to Christendom because of their insistence upon the fact that Christian activity must never be separated from divine grace. On the other hand, we can never rest satisfied with a mere individualistic type of piety. We must insist that God be allowed to rule in the public as well as in the private affairs of men. These two types of piety need to supplement and complement each other. Religion must not withdraw from the world and simply enjoy its particular type of individual experience, and on the other hand, religion, as it goes forth to conquer the world, needs to drink deeply from the fountains of fellowship with God. Quietism and activism both have their dangers and both have their contributions to make to the vitality of religion.

Lutheranism has tended to be more subservient to the power of the State than Calvinism, and this difference goes way back to the Reformers themselves. Calvinistic morality has been more severe, energetic, and aggressive than that of Lutheranism. Calvin's attempt to establish a theocracy at Geneva was an attempt to make the sovereignty of God as visible as the medieval Church had been. The social implications of Christianity are emphasized to a greater degree in Calvinism than in Lutheranism. Calvinism is also more legalistic than Lutheranism. Calvinism has refused to bow before any earthly despot. It has fostered the Huguenots of France, the Waldenses, the defenders of liberty in Holland, the Puritans of England, the Covenanters of Scotland, and the Puritans of New England. Lutheran and Reformed ethics can each with profit learn from the other.

PART I

The Basis of Christian Ethics

CHAPTER IV

THE THEOLOGICAL POSTULATE

The Relation of the Moral to the Idea of God.—Immanuel Kant dealt a severe blow to the classical arguments for the existence of God, but his religious nature forbade him to remain in the agnosticism in which his *Critique of Pure Reason* had landed him. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* he elaborated his famous moral argument for the existence of God, in which he holds that the nature of the moral is such that we must postulate the existence of a God. He starts his argument by pointing out that morality is a fact. The idea of goodness is something which is immediately given to us in consciousness. Our reason demands a union of virtue and happiness, but this union is often not realized in the realm of experience. Nature is often very ruthless with the moral and seems to frustrate the aims of the moral. God must exist in order to bring about a harmony between the moral and nature. Without God moral ideals would not be capable of realization in the world. In nature there is power and goodness exists wherever a will is in harmony with the moral law. If nature and goodness are to be brought into harmony, there must be a God who unites in Himself both power and goodness. "Unless there is to be a dualism in the universe, I must believe in a power adequate to bridge the gap between moral ideal and fact." The gist of Kant's argument is simply this, that we must on the basis of the moral consciousness assume that God exists in order to safeguard the moral order of the world and keep the moral consciousness from landing in self-contradiction.

There is something valid about this argument which we can not escape, but more satisfactory ways of stating the argument have been found. We need not stress the union of virtue and happiness. All that need be said is that goodness is often not realized in the material world, and the material world is certainly not the source of goodness. Kant has well stated and emphasized the universal character of the moral. There is something super-individual about the nature of the moral. Our sense of obligation implies that we are obligated to something outside of ourselves—to something universal. If the material world and the individual person are not the source of morality, then we can appreciate Dr. Rashdall's argument when he says, "An absolute Moral Law or moral ideal can not exist in material things. And it does not exist in the mind of this or that individual. Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real, a Mind which is the source of whatever is true in our own moral judgments, can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself. Only so can we believe in an absolute standard of right and wrong, which is as independent of this and that man's actual ideas and actual desires as the facts of material nature. The belief in God, though not (like the belief in a real and active self) a postulate of there being any such thing as Morality at all, is the logical presupposition of an 'objective' or absolute Morality. A moral ideal can exist nowhere and nohow but in a Mind; an absolute moral ideal can exist only in a Mind from which all Reality is derived. (Or at least a Mind by which all Reality is controlled.) Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God" (*The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 212). The argument hinges on whether morality is "objective" or not. The sense of obligation, given in consciousness, loses all meaning unless morality be such. Further evidence for the objectivity of the moral has already been given and more will follow later. The moral itself thus becomes an argument for the very existence of God, in that it demands that we postulate the existence of God as we try to understand its nature.

When we analyze our sense of obligation, we realize that it implies that our moral obligation is something imposed upon us by a power outside of ourselves. The very experience of the "ought" postulates an absolute Mind or a God. If realism be true in epistemology, we need not limit it to the realm of sense perception but can certainly extend it into the realm of the moral. Mind is a mirror of that which is outside of itself. Mind reflects reality. Corresponding to our sense perception there is a physical reality and corresponding to our moral perception there must also be a moral reality outside of ourselves. This moral reality can exist only in a Mind or in God. Furthermore, if we can show, as we hope to do later, that the universe "has values at heart" and that there is a "Power not ourselves which makes for righteousness," this too will point to the necessity of postulating the existence of God as a necessary basis for morality. The subjective experience of the moral realm and the signs of a moral order in history both testify to the existence of God.

Intellectually, an absolute morality requires that we postulate the existence of God. The moral leads us to believe that there is a God. Practically, the moral also leads to God. The order of Luther's *Catechism* has sometimes been criticized, and the suggestion has been made that the first article of the creed should come first instead of an explanation of the decalogue. The arrangement of the *Catechism* can be defended on the basis of religious experience. The immoral is that which breaks off fellowship between man and God. The first step, subjectively speaking, in the restoration of that fellowship consists in a sense of sin being awakened. A sense of sin is one of the fundamental characteristics of Christian experience. The exposition of the decalogue, as an expression of the will of God and the moral law, may well stand first in the *Catechism*. Practically, as well as theoretically, the path of the moral leads to God.

The Nature of God.—Christianity does not only assert that God exists but it also has something very definite to say about the kind of God in which it believes. Materialism looks upon the universe as indifferent to mankind and human interests and neutral to humanity. Various religions have looked upon the power or powers of the universe as malevolent or hostile to man and demanding attention of various kinds in order to be kept peaceable. Christianity refuses to look upon the universe as a fortuitous clash of atoms or as hostile to man. Christianity believes that at the heart of things is a God who is good and whose nature is love. In fact the New Testament says that "God is love" (1 John 4. 8).

The question presents itself to us as to whether or not the facts of experience make it possible for us to believe in such a God. All the evil of the world stares us in the face, and we ask ourselves whether the Being at the heart of things can really be a God of love. Professor Whitehead has well said that the problem of evil can not be satisfactorily solved theoretically, because it has not yet been solved practically but is still in the process of being solved. The statement is undoubtedly true, but the evidence which we do possess must not contradict the possibility of believing in a God of love, if we are to hold to the conviction. Professor Macintosh has pointed out that the universe does meet every challenge which the problem of evil presents and does make it possible for us to believe in the goodness of God. The universe is law-abiding. We should not desire any other kind of universe because if it were not law-abiding, we should never be able to learn anything from past experience. Our planet would not be a very pleasant place if we could not depend on the regular recurrence of the seasons of the year or the regular succession of night and day. However, the working out of the natural processes tends at times to be disastrous to life. A means of guarding against such disaster without violating natural law is found in the fact of sensation, including the sensation of pain. Sensation itself, however, occurs according to law, and thus there tends to be needless pain. A means of guarding against such needless pain has been provided in the power of thought. By the use of thought science has provided many ways of overcoming pain. But the fact that we have the power of thought makes erroneous thought possible. Again the challenge has been met by providing us with the power of attention, through which erroneous thought may be overcome. Attention implies the existence of a will, and the existence of will makes moral evil possible. But again the challenge has been met and a moral salvation has been provided for man. Even the challenge which death presents has been met by providing us with a faith in immortality (*Theology As an Empirical Science*). We can not refuse to face the implications of the problem of evil as it bears upon the character of God, but the fact that every challenge which the problem presents has been met by the universe itself makes it possible to believe in the goodness of God in spite of all evil. "Evil in the world does not mean the impossibility of believing in God, rather the converse: it proves that the world is not self-sufficient, and that God does exist" (NICHOLAS BERDYAEV in *Christendom*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 417). The very problem of evil presupposes the existence of a good God. If there be no good God, there is no problem. The universe then simply is what it is, and that is all there is to it. It is only when we try to reconcile the existence of a good God with the fact of evil that any problem arises.

Christianity itself has overcome the problem in the doctrine of the atonement. *Because of His goodness* God Himself suffers because of evil. "The one escape from evil is in the suffering of God Himself, that is, in Christ, not in God the omnipotent but in God the Redeemer, the God of sacrificing love. This is the essence of Christianity" (N. Berdyaev, *op. cit.*, p. 422). The fact of the existence of the good is as great a problem as the problem of evil. Furthermore, over against all the evil in the world we posit the fact that the universe has given us a being such as Jesus Christ.

Moral evil must be possible, or there could be no morality. If man were so constituted that he could not sin, he would be an automaton, not a moral being. Self-determination is a necessary postulate for any morality. We can find no fault with God for having created us moral beings. We should certainly not desire to have been created automatons.

This universe of ours is a moral universe. It sides with the good and against the evil. Man destroys himself by violating God's moral laws. We can choose to disregard the moral law and violate it, but we can not choose the result of our actions.

God often crushes that which stands in the way of His purposes; this He must do in order to be good. The merciful must destroy the merciless, and a God of love must be a God of justice. That which is unjust can not be love. Love in order to be love must be just. The judgment which comes as a result of the transgression of the moral law is only another expression of love. For a generation men in our country had been building a social structure on the law of the jungle. *Laissez faire* was the economic watchword. Everybody was for himself, and the devil took the hindmost. The moral law was violated, and it was considered to be "good business." In 1929 a crash came and with it all the suffering connected with the worst financial crisis in our history. Millions of our people were thrown upon charity as they lacked the barest necessities of life. God had visited us with judgment because we had violated His will and the moral law, which must be obeyed if a social order is to exist. The suffering which came as a result of our *laissez faire* policy does not argue against the goodness of God, but rather that God is good and will not permit a social order to exist which is based upon selfishness and greed. Amos said, perhaps better than he fully realized, "For three transgressions . . . yea for four, I will not turn away the punishment . . .; because they have sold the righteous for silver, and the needy for a pair of shoes—

they . . . pant after the dust of the earth on the head of the poor. I will smite the winter house and the summer house; and the houses of ivory shall perish, and the great houses shall have an end, saith Jehovah" (chapters 2 and 3). "Forasmuch therefore as ye trample upon the poor and take exactions from him of wheat; ye have built houses of hewn stone, but ye shall not dwell in them; ye have planted pleasant vineyards, but ye shall not drink the wine thereof" (5. 11). Transgression of the moral law, which is an expression of the will of God, brings with it retribution. No people can tamper with or violate morality in the long run and escape the consequences.

There is something self-destructive about evil. It frustrates its own purposes. Greedy men and nations go to war, and war destroys the very things for which they fight. In 1917 the United States went to war to protect the freedom of the seas for commerce. The United States profited to the extent of five billion dollars from trade with the Allied Powers between 1914 and 1918 and we piled up a debt of twenty billion dollars in order to do it. Evil defeats itself in the long run. The financial crash of 1929 was the direct result of an immoral economic system. If those who own tools of production become too greedy in piling up profits, wages must be lowered or less men employed to do the same amount of work. Such a policy will defeat its own purposes. Purchasing power will be decreased, and finally the manufacturer will be forced to cease manufacturing because he can not sell his products. The greed of the manufacturer thus locks the wheels of his own industry. The structure of the universe is on the side of the moral. There is nothing arbitrary about God's judgments, but they are as sure as the setting of the sun. God, immanent in the universe, does side with the good and does destroy the evil. As Christians we can with good reasons believe in a God of goodness. He who is at the heart of things does not tolerate the evil but furthers the good. Evil is not enthroned at the heart of the universe. There are good forces in history and in human life battling against the evil forces, and the advantage lies on the side of the good.

The line of argument here followed does not imply that God and the universe are identical. The blow which a person strikes is not that person but an act of the person. In like manner God's activity in nature and the historical process can and must be distinguished from God Himself. The Being of God and the activity of God are related as cause and effect. The two are not to be identified, yet they belong together.

Jesus, the Revelation of God.—Christianity believes that in Jesus of Nazareth God "became flesh" so that Jesus could say of Himself, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." In Jesus, Christians have found the revelation of the nature and character of God. The "wisdom" conception of the Old Testament throws a flood of light upon the moral implications of the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus.

In the Old Testament, "wisdom" is often used in the sense of "skill" in the various affairs of life. "Wisdom" was a required qualification for those who were to make the priestly garments for Aaron (Exodus 28. 3, 35. 25, Psalm 107. 27, Deuteronomy 34. 9, 1 Kings 3. 12). Especially did the expression come to mean "moral principle." The wise man was the man who directed his life worthily and well. Wisdom is thus virtually the equivalent of goodness. Wisdom had its roots in religion, and so to be wise meant to estimate the values of life from God's standpoint. It involved spiritual insight and a true discrimination of values. For the wise man, God was at the center of life and governed thought, word, and deed (Proverbs 1. 7).

The simplest expression of wisdom is to be found in the Book of Proverbs, which aims to reveal the principles by which the wise man conducts his life. In Proverbs 8. 22 ff., wisdom is spoken of as the first creation of God, which is now present among men as the mouthpiece and representative of God. Wisdom is the impersonation of a moral quality.

The ethical quality of wisdom is also emphasized in Ecclesiasticus, where it is identified with the "law that Moses commanded" (24. 3 ff.)

In Wisdom 7. 22 ff., wisdom is the "artificer of all things," "the brightness (effulgence) of the everlasting light and an unstained mirror of the power of God," and it penetrates and permeates all things.

In the works of Philo, the *logos* idea is the equivalent of wisdom. In the Fourth Gospel (ch. 1), Jesus is spoken of as the *logos*, and in the Letter to the Hebrews (1. 3) Jesus is spoken of as "the effulgence of his (God's) glory."

Similar to the Fourth Gospel and the Letter to the Hebrews are the epistles of Paul when they apply terms to Jesus which had originally been applied to the idea of wisdom. In fact Paul calls Jesus Christ "the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1. 24), "made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor. 1. 30). He says that in Christ "are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden" (Col. 2. 3). As wisdom was the first creation of God so also is Christ "the firstborn of all creation" (Col. 1. 15).

It is evident that the role which wisdom had played in the Old Testament and in the Apocrypha is transferred to Jesus in the New Testament. Often that which was said about wisdom in the Old Testament is stated about Jesus in the New Testament. Jesus was the manifestation of the wisdom or the "moral principle" of God. In Jesus there was a true discrimination of values. He was the revelation of what life ought to be and of perfect goodness. He viewed life *sub specie aeternitatis*. Whatever else and more the doctrine of the divinity of Christ means, it at least means this, that Jesus revealed the goodness of God or that He revealed the character of God as goodness. Christians believe that at the heart of the universe is a God of whom Jesus Christ "is the image" (Col. 1. 15). The divine is manifest in the moral perfection of the life of Jesus, as well as in His death.

Jesus is the "wisdom" or the "moral principle" of God. Naturally it is the moral side of the personality of Jesus that reveals the moral nature of God. As we view the morality of the life of Jesus, we see the kind of moral being which God is. The doctrine of the divinity of Christ involves more than this, but it does imply that the morality of Jesus is the revelation of the morality of God. In Jesus we see what God is like as to His moral nature. The "moral principle" in the life of Jesus is the "moral principle" of the Being who is at the heart of things.

So many have found in Jesus man at his moral best that the burden of proof would rest with those who might deny it. Morality is one and the same for God and man. There is no qualitative distinction between what is moral for God and what is moral for man. Jesus being a manifestation of man at his moral best is therefore also the highest manifestation of the moral nature of God given to the human race. Where we find morality most concentrated, there we find the highest revelation of the moral nature of God. Jesus being man at his best is therefore also the highest manifestation of the moral nature of God. When, with the author of the Letter to the Hebrews, we believe that Jesus was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (4. 15), He becomes not only the highest but the absolute and perfect revelation of the moral character of God. His absolute morality becomes a manifestation of the absolute morality. The absolute is a revelation of the absolute.

It has already been shown that the universe does have "values at heart" and that it does react negatively against certain types of conduct. Morality is something absolute. Sin bears in itself the seeds of its own destruction. The type of life against which the universe does not react negatively is supremely given to us in Jesus Christ. That the life of Jesus is such a life will be shown later. This implies that God, the Being at the heart of the universe, wants the kind of life exemplified perfectly in Jesus. He tends to destroy that which is contrary to such life. What a mind *wants* is indicative of its moral character. If man wants the evil, he is evil, and if he desires the good, he is a good character. God wants and desires the kind of life which we find in Jesus. Therefore, God is in His moral character like Jesus. To be sure, Jesus suffered vicariously, and happiness (in the ordinary sense of the word) and virtue were not harmonized in His case, but the moral principles manifest in the life of Jesus are the only principles which make for the survival of the race. God wants the type of life which Jesus represents.

What God desires indicates what His character is and therefore Jesus is the revelation of the character of God.

Mutual Relations of Religion and Morality.—God is the object of religion and He is also a necessary postulate of Christian Ethics. The object of religion and the source of morality are God. An examination of the relation of religion to morality and morality to religion therefore is imperative upon us.

In primitive society the religious interest was not separated from the other interests of life. Everything had its religious implications for primitive man. It is even difficult to find a word corresponding to our modern word "religion" in many primitive societies. The reason for this is not to be found in the fact that primitive men were without religion, but in the fact that everything was religious. Primitive science, art, and morality were all religiously conditioned. Law, medicine, and astronomy, and many other branches of learning, were originally functions of religion. Even at as late a time as the Middle Ages, the Church was the depository of learning and the custodian of education. In modern times, one after another of these interests and branches of learning have declared their independence of religion.

Historically, the moral was always connected with the religious outlook upon life. Moral sanctions were determined by and were derived from religion. The *mores* of the tribe or clan were always religiously conditioned. That which has happened in the realm of other human interests has also taken place in the realm of the ethical.

This declaration of independence is not to be altogether deplored or looked upon as a total liability, even from the point of view of religion. Instead of a liability it has often proved to be an asset to religion itself. It has brought with it a recognition of the fact that man must never ascribe to the deity that which is immoral or amoral. A certain autonomy is legitimate for ethics, but there can be no absolute separation between religion and morality. God commands the good because it is good and because it is moral. The religious interest and the ethical interest must ultimately be brought together. Religion demands a unification of life under its control. The moral ideal makes the same imperative demand. These two interests of life must be brought together, or one must yield the field to the other. Religion is the whole of life viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. The religious man is also a moral being, and we can never rest in any dualism between the religious and the moral.

Morality needs religion as a basis and as a dynamic. There are, to be sure, those who have tried to build up ethical systems, more or less satisfactory, without a religious basis. Comte, Mill, and Spencer are well-known examples of this school of thinkers. The argument runs that historically religion may have been necessary in order to enforce moral sanctions, but as the race grows wiser we can dispense with the authority of religion and still build up a moral code. In primitive society morality and religion were closely associated, but now we can do without religion and still have a moral code sufficient for our needs. The implication, of course, is that religion is not the basis for morality. Religion is only a kind of superfluous addendum to morality, which we can easily get along without, once we recognize the fact. Such is the line of thought, with numerous variations, advocated by this school of thinkers.

The burden of proof rests upon those who claim that morality is not dependent upon religion, and that morality can get along without religion. To be sure, there are persons professing no religion whose conduct nevertheless conforms to high moral standards. Such persons are not the rule, but they can be found. These have, however, received their ideals and standards in a society where religion has exerted its influence. A morality without religion would be like the afterglow of the sunset. The sun has set, but its light continues to spread. A man may continue to enjoy good health while living an unhealthful life because of a sturdy physique which he has inherited. A man may be moral without religion because of his social inheritance. A home may continue with one blind person in it; but if all the members of the family were thus afflicted, the matter would be different.

Religion is one of the most universal traits of humanity. At the dawn of history man emerges a religious being and he remains such to the present time. We find religion among the most primitive peoples of the world today, and we find it in the highest centers of culture in Europe and America. Religion is also found among all classes of society. Man is by nature a religious being. There never was a time in history when he was not, and we are confident that there never will be, as long as man remains man. Therefore, who can say, on the basis of historical facts, that morality can exist in a society without religion? The bare historical fact is that it has never done so. The burden of proof rests with those who make the claim.

It is also interesting to note how those who would build up an ethical system without religion drive out religion and its moral values through one door, and then usually bring in, through some other door, the very values which religion has emphasized and caused to be recognized.

The nature of the moral is such that it needs religion. The moral must be grounded in the very nature of things if it is to have a claim upon us. Ethics can not be complete without some attempt to set human conduct and history in their real cosmical environment. The weakness of all forms of humanism is that they do not answer the question as to the cosmic place of the moral. Ethics without religion is in the same category as physics without astronomy. The good must be the power that rules the world, or it is difficult to see why I should be under obligation to obey it. Our sense of absolute obligation involves not only that we are striving to attain the moral but also that it is assigned to us by the World-Ground. Our sense of dependence and our sense of obligation must find a common meeting point. Such a meeting point can be found only in God. Religion deals with the relationship between reality and value and grounds the moral in reality. Religion finds the clue to the meaning of life, apart from which it is difficult to see how morality could either arise or function. A moral world-order is inherent in the ethical experience itself. "If I am a part of the world-reality, and if by my nature and by the requirements of that reality my chief good is moral, it is impossible that the world-ground should not be moral and have a moral end" (FOSTER, *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*, p. 217).

An agnostic or pessimistic answer as to the question of the meaning and order of the world can never serve as a dynamic for moral life. There are those who do not believe with religion that the "universe has values at heart" but who still maintain certain forms and types of ethical conduct. Oswald Spengler says, "Time does not suffer itself to be halted; there is no question of prudent retreat or wise renunciation. Only dreamers believe there is a way out. Optimism is cowardice. We are born into this time and must bravely follow the path to the predestined end. There is no other way. Our duty is to hold on to the lost position, without hope, without rescue, like that Roman soldier whose bones were found in Pompey, showing that during the eruption of Vesuvius he died at his post because they forgot to relieve him. That is greatness. That is what it means to be a thoroughbred. The honorable end is the one thing that can not be taken from man." Bertrand Russell puts the matter this way, "The fairest achievements of men are destined to be destroyed at last by the trampling march of unconscious power." His advice is that we hold an "unyielding despair." Joseph Krutch says, "Ours is a lost cause, and there is no place for us in the natural universe: but for all that we are not sorry to be human. We would rather die as men than live as animals." Such a philosophy of despair must fail as an ethical dynamic. "If there are atheists who say, 'I do not believe in God, but I believe in my duty,' and if such men evidence by their self-denial and their self-sacrifice that they are sincere in their belief, then we regard them not as atheists, but as believers in religion, in so far as in their consciousness of duty there is manifestly 'an altar to the unknown God.' For to believe in duty, and to be ready to sacrifice worldly honor, possession, nay, life itself for the sake of duty, is just to believe in the ethical as the highest reality in existence, which is one and the same thing as believing in the final victory of the good and right over all opposition. Not to believe in this victory is distrust of the power which binds my will: neither is it comprehensible why I should unconditionally sacrifice myself in the service of a power which is unable to carry through its object. Unlimited faith in duty, therefore, contains a hidden faith in a moral government of the world, a hidden faith in divine providence, which victoriously achieves the good and ensures that labor in the service of duty shall not be in vain. No moral activity which is self-conscious can dispense with this faith in the moral government of the world." (MARTENSEN, *Christian Ethics*, pp. 19–20.)

Other thinkers have taken the position that all that is of value in religion is the moral. Matthew Arnold defined religion as "morality touched with emotion." It is true that morality and religion do have much in common. They both take in all of life. They also both seek the morally good. However, religion also seeks other values besides the good. The range of values in religion is wider than in morality, though including the latter. Religion finds the good in the structure of the universe itself as well as in the lives of men. Religion has something to say about the nature of reality and the disposition of the universe. The pronouncements of religion in this respect give meaning to life and direction to ethics. Morality is a valuable and vital part of religion, but the value of religion is not to be confined to the moral alone. Religion has value as truth and beauty as well. Moral values in fact are dependent upon the wider outlook of religion.

Ethics can not exhaust the meaning of religion from other points of view as well. For morality the good is a task to be achieved. Ethics functions with a certain tension and effort. From the moral point of view our goal can be achieved only at the end of the process. For religion the good is something given and is a present possession. Religion gives to the soul a peace and joy which the moral struggle by itself can never produce. Ethics can never take the place of religion in the great crises of life. It has little comfort to offer in suffering, in bereavement, or in the face of death. Ethics must also find some principle of integration for life, and religion affords such a principle. Morality needs the religious outlook for the establishment of its own standards.

Ethics can not solve the question as to what shall be done about a sin which has been committed. How shall the sense of sin and guilt be lifted from the soul? Religion offers forgiveness of sin and imparts a sense of reconciliation with God. This is a religious experience which ethics by itself could never give. Religion lifts the burden from man's soul. Religion is greater than ethics, and the latter can never take the place of the former. Religion responds to fundamental needs of the human soul which ethics alone can not satisfy.

Morality needs religion. The religious outlook is a necessary soil for any absolute moral standards. Morality and religion can not be identical, and morality can never take the place of religion. There may, in exceptional cases, be moral individuals without a professed religious faith, but historically religion and morality have gone hand in hand.

Periods of religious decline have also been periods of moral decline, and the most triumphant moral chapters in history have been written through the inspiration of religion.

The connection between religion and morality has been opposed and an attempt at separation made because it has been felt that the connection of morality with religion has made the moral law insecure. The argument runs that we do not know if there be a God, and if our duty depends upon the will of God, the whole realm of duty rests upon an insecure foundation. We have already shown that a belief in God does not make the moral law insecure but establishes it. The existence of God is a necessary postulate for any absolute morality. The root of the objection lies in the supposition that materialism and naturalism have triumphed. There is a type of crude supernaturalism which thinks of God as only making an occasional expedition from His heavenly home to this world of ours and which fails to see God in the natural processes of nature and history. We are not interested in trying to defend such a supernaturalism, but materialism and naturalism have not won the field. God and the supernatural claim our allegiance today with as great a validity as they ever did. Even the results of modern scientific research are making it ever more imperative even for men of science to believe in God. A scientist said not long ago, "The time is coming when the man who does not believe in God will be considered a fool."

Another objection to connecting religion and morality is that such connection makes morality dependent upon external authority. This, it is said, destroys morality, for morality involves an inner and good motive. Morality is not something imposed from without. Such criticism implies that the will of God is something external to the will of man. Christianity finds in the moral law a law of freedom. Man does not obey because of external authority but because his will has become one with the will of God. The Christian wants to do what God wants him to do, and thus the inner motive for the moral remains in Christian morality. The Christian obeys, not because of external restraint, but because it is his desire to do so.

The objection that the connection between religion and morality cripples the moral energy has also been raised. Man looks to God for everything and assumes a quietistic attitude and so fails to engage in the moral struggle, it is argued. We have already shown that such an argument has no validity historically. Religion has throughout history proved itself a mighty dynamic for the moral.

It has also been objected that religion offers rewards and punishments and therefore corrupts the moral motive. It is said that man should do the good because it is good and for no other reason, and that if heaven is offered as a reward for living a moral life, such an offer is immoral. In answer to this objection, let it be said that the Christian is not merely interested in attaining to happiness here and hereafter but is also desirous of attaining to moral perfection. Such a desire is not immoral. The Christian does not seek deliverance only from the results of sin but from sin itself. The objection is based upon a misinterpretation of Christian experience.

The advocates of a religionless morality also hold that religion introduces morally worthless tasks along with moral conduct. Our energies and time, it is claimed, ought to be devoted, not to the cult and religious exercises, but to moral tasks. We answer that every morally worthless task is done away with in vital religion. Jesus' attitude to the law of the Sabbath and to the money changers in the temple indicates that He would not allow the cult to stand in the way of the moral. The cult is a means to moral activity and thus also a moral act, where it is what it ought to be. In the measure that the cult develops devotion, reverence, and delight in the will of God, it is a moral act, even if each specific cultic act does not issue in moral activity. Everything which tends to develop such attitudes is legitimate from the moral point of view, even if it be not directly associated with the moral. The cult is a dynamic for the moral. The objection to cult is directed against distorted forms of religion, but not against vital religion. Worship which does not issue in moral conduct is an abomination (Is. 1. 10–17, Amos 5. 21–24). Where religion is vital, cult and moral life must go hand in hand and the cult will directly and indirectly prove an incentive to the moral life. Through the cult man should, as it were, "take his breath" for the moral struggle.

Morality has been closely connected with religion historically and finds in religion with its outlook a most secure foundation. Religion also needs the connection with morality and must not separate itself from it. The laws of health and the laws of the physical universe are looked upon by religion as an expression of the will of God. Man must not ignore them and can not do so with impunity. The moral law is also an expression of the nature and will of God and can not be set aside without paying the penalty.

The religious man can not ignore scientific facts in the long run without robbing his faith of vitality. Neither can religion ignore the moral outlook without peril to itself. The insights of science and the insights of ethics both contribute to an understanding of the nature and will of God.

Religion is *one* aspect of experience, but being that, it also imparts a certain quality to all of life and demands for itself the control of all life. The truly religious man's attitude to life colors all his activities and all his interests. Ethics too demands that its ideal cover all of life and all activities and relations of man. Here are two absolute authorities demanding allegiance. When religion takes up into itself the ethical, there will be no tension, and where there may have been tension, such tension ceases. The ideal good of ethics and the good of religion must be brought together and harmonized.

Religion demands that its ideal good be translated into the life of the individual and the social order. A good example is to be found in Christian experience, illustrating how religious experience, at its best, implies the ethical outlook on life as well. It also illustrates how inseparably religion and ethics are related. Repentance, sanctification, conversion, and faith, all have their ethical implications. Christianity and Christian experience are inseparably united with moral values. Religion can not function vitally without a sense of ethical values.

The inner life and experience of the Christian involve recognition of and devotion to moral values. However, we can not be satisfied with merely a private type of piety. The individual is not a unit apart from a social order. The individual lives his life in a social order. The religious man repents in a social order and he lives his sanctified life in a social order. All his acts have social implications. Man does not live in a vacuum, he is not saved in a vacuum, and he does not have his religious experience in a vacuum. Man lives in a social order, and that order influences him, and he in turn influences it. It is fundamentally true that no one of us lives unto himself. Every day of our lives thousands and tens of thousands of people minister to our needs and comforts. We are dependent upon one another, and our lives touch the lives of thousands of our fellow men every day. The religious man can not be indifferent to the implications of this fact. He can not be indifferent to the purchase of things made in a sweat shop. In the measure in which he purchases these things, he is partaking in the sins of the social order. Whether we want it so or not, the fact remains that we are social beings, and if religion is going to be vital, we can not confine it to a private type of piety. We must insist that the quality which religion gives to life must manifest itself in the public and social affairs of men, as well as in their private interests.

Ethics needs religion and religion needs ethics. Christian character and experience belong together. The kingdom of God is both a religious and a moral concept. Archbishop Söderblom once said, "A Christian with low morality is like a rich man who shamefully squanders his possessions; and a good man without religion is like a poor man who bears his poverty in such a manner that we are forced to respect him" (OLFERT RICARD, *Romarbrevet*, p.

161). Professor Lyman has said that the relation of religion to morality is one of alternation and interpenetration (*The Meaning and Truth of Religion*). Ethics needs the religious outlook as a basis and dynamic. Religion, on the other hand, must translate the good which it has found into terms of life, individual and social. Olfert Ricard, the Danish theologian, says that the relation of religion to morality is "like two electrical currents which constantly influence each other, separate, cross each other, and fuse into one another, different, independent, and yet related; . . . the relation is such, because both are the product of God's thought and have their origin in His will, morality as well as religion" (*op. cit.*, pp. 161 and 162).

Chapter V

THE SCRIPTURAL POSTULATE

Protestant Christianity has found in the Bible its rule of faith and life. Christianity looks upon the Bible as a revelation of God's will and nature. Christian Ethics finds its basis in the will of God and that will is revealed to men in the Scriptures. Throughout the centuries men have appealed to the Scriptures in order to determine their duty. The Bible is known as the Word of God, and it is necessary in any treatise on Christian ethics to consider the nature of this postulate.

The Nature of Revelation.—To experience a revelation is the equivalent of experiencing a new insight. A divine revelation is, subjectively speaking, a new insight into the nature and will of God. The test of a revelation is that it reveals something new. Revelation is not a radio message which brings something new into the universe which was not there before. Subjectively, it is the comprehension of some truth or fact which has not been known before. Revelation did not bring God into the universe. He has always been here, but through revelation men have learned to know God and learned more of His nature and will. When a fact which has not been known becomes evident, we call it a revelation. Revelation is "the coincidence of event and appreciation" (TEMPLE, *Nature, Man, and God*, p. 315). Sometimes such revelation comes through a flash of intuition; at other times it comes through long periods of thought and meditation, and again it is brought about through a combination of both. Revelation has reference to an objective fact, and the subjective factor appears as a "discovery" to the person to whom the revelation is given. "Revelation is the correlate of faith on the objective side" (HARKNESS, *Recovery of Ideals*, p. 99).

As far as Columbus was concerned, he discovered America, but America revealed itself to Columbus. His discovery did not make America. That continent had been here for a long time, but when Columbus discovered it, America simply revealed itself to Columbus and through him to the world. The analogy has its value but is faulty at one very significant point. America did not proceed to find Columbus, but was absolutely passive. Columbus had to do it all. A divine revelation, however, is an act in which God is not passive or inactive. God is active and is seeking man through the spiritual influences with which He surrounds man. Therefore the word "discovery" can not take the place of the word "revelation." The divine initiative is emphasized through the word "revelation." God imparts knowledge about Himself by His own activity through revelation. The person to whom the revelation is given has a sense of being "laid hold of," which corresponds to this divine activity. Even if we should use the figure of one person coming to another and revealing himself to him, the analogy would not be adequate to express all that is involved in revelation. God, in whom "we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17. 28) gives to men the very powers by which they know Him. If the concept of revelation is to have any meaning for us, it is, however, necessary to keep in mind that revelation involves an objective and a subjective factor. There is an objective factor revealing itself and a subjective factor receiving that revelation. Certain individuals are better prepared than others, through their work and sensitiveness, to receive such revelations. To such persons revelations come, and they are a revelation of the truth, not only for themselves, but for all mankind.

There are at least three ways in which God has revealed Himself to man. He has revealed Himself through the processes of nature. The cosmological and the teleological arguments for the existence of God are based upon this form of revelation. Kant undoubtedly gave a severe blow to these arguments, and since the days of Kant the extent and scope of these so-called proofs has been limited. However, they have not lost all meaning or significance. They are at least inferences which make it easier for the intellect to believe in the existence of God. They certainly do not carry the weight which some of their exponents have wished them to carry, and they may not bring us as far along the path of demonstration as some have thought they did, but they do serve as cumulative evidence and make it difficult to doubt that there is a God. This form of revelation is recognized by the Bible itself. Paul says, "For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse" (Rom. 1. 20). Jesus saw a revelation of God in nature when He said that it was God who did "clothe the grass of the field, which today is and tomorrow is cast into the oven" (Mt. 6. 30). The nineteenth Psalm is a classical example of the recognition of God in the realm of nature.

"The heavens declare the glory of God;
And the firmament showeth his handiwork.
Day unto day uttereth speech,
And night unto night showeth knowledge.
There is no speech nor language;
Their voice is not heard.
There line is gone out through all the earth,
And their words to the end of the world.

In them hath he set a tabernacle for the sun,
Which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber,
And rejoiceth as a strong man to run his course.
His going forth is from the end of the heavens,
And his circuit unto the ends of it;
And there is nothing hid from the heat thereof."
(Verses 1–6)

The realm of nature is the work of God. Such was the insight of the author of the first chapter of the Bible, and the fact that God is the Author and Lord of creation is a theme which runs throughout Scripture. The realm of nature is a revelation of God. God has revealed Himself through His activity in the realm of creation. One of the most sublime statements of history are the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth" (Gen. 1. 1).

Secondly, God has revealed Himself in the movements of history. Such a statement is almost a platitude to the person who has even an elementary knowledge of the Bible. We can not fail to recognize that the prophets saw a divine providence in the movements of history. "There was something happening in that which happened." For the prophets there was a divine moral order which determined the course of history. They had their philosophy of history, and that philosophy was built around the idea of the kingdom of God. To them, God was the Lord of history and led and guided the course of history in order that His purposes might be attained. Paul speaks of the time of the birth of Jesus as the "fulness of the time" (Gal. 4. 4) and in that expression is implied a profound philosophy of history. The Bible recognizes that God is working in and revealing His will and purposes in the historical process. The statement, "Righteousness exalteth a nation, But sin is a reproach to any people" (Prov. 14. 34), is more than a pious platitude. It is a principle which has determined the destiny and fortunes of nations throughout history.

That God has revealed Himself in the history of the race is so patent a fact in both Scripture and experience that it would seem unnecessary to emphasize it. There are, however, those who have minimized this sphere of divine revelation. Professor H. E. Brunner says, "God can not be known by His active presence in the world. His presence in nature and history is not denied, but it is regarded as hidden, so that what God is, is not revealed" (*The Theology of Crisis*, p. 28). The Barthians do not find signs of God in the visible world. We reply that there are such signs, and if faith and fact were to contradict each other, it would be too bad for faith. If the Barthians can not see God in nature and history, I suppose that we shall have to take them at their word and believe that they do not do so. The loss is at any rate theirs, and the fact remains that Jesus did see God in history and nature (Luke 10. 13–15, Luke 19. 41–47), Paul and the prophets did likewise (Hosea 11. 1, Hab. 1. 5 ff.), and the Scriptures in general see God both in nature and in history. Such facts, however, mean nothing to Brunner, who states that "the Biblical world-view, cosmological and historical, is gone for good" (*The Word and the World*, p. 98). The dogmatism and the philosophical skepticism of the Barthians is not Christianity, whatever else it may be. If the revelation of God in Christ is to have any meaning for us, we can not deny the revelation of God in history. In Christ, God is revealed, precisely, in history.

The third form in which God has revealed Himself is the most direct. God has revealed Himself in direct contact with the spirit of man. Human personality is here the medium of revelation. Mysticism and the whole realm of religious experience are experiences in which God touches the soul and reveals Himself to the soul in a most direct manner. Again, contrary to the Barthian position, we insist that God can reveal Himself through the human. If that be not so, the revelation of God in Christ would have no meaning. The doctrine of the Incarnation says that God can reveal Himself in human form and that the human is capable of expressing the divine.

These different ways in which God reveals Himself are a trinity in a unity and a unity in a trinity. They all belong together. There are historians who, having given their lives to the study of history, yet have never seen the movements of God in history. There are also men of science who have busied themselves for years with the phenomena of nature, and yet have never seen God in the realm of nature. History, by itself, is not a revelation, and the study of nature, by itself, is not a revelation of God. It is when the divine meaning and purpose of things breaks through and impresses itself upon the consciousness of an individual that a revelation has taken place. "Theoretically revelation is as universal as the process of the world. But that is actually revelation for us which fulfills some function within our experience as the educative purpose of God. While potentially all reality is revelation of God, actually that is revelation in which we can trace God's hand" (FOSTER, *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*, pp. 259–260). Historical facts and scientific data are therefore not revelatory material. Man can discover scientific data and learn historical facts without revelation. Secular history records facts which are also recorded in the Bible. The latter we look upon as a revelation because the historian saw the movements of God in history. The religious historian was not primarily interested in recording history, but in setting forth the activity of God which the facts reveal, and that is revelation. For example, the author of the Book of Kings was not a mere secular historian. His main interest was not to chronicle political and social events. The reign of Jeroboam II was a long and a very important reign from a secular point of view, but the author devotes only seven verses to this prosperous reign (2 Kings 14. 23–29). He expressly referred his readers to other sources of information with regard to events. His chief purpose was to set forth the religious lessons which the history of the time afforded. He showed the ill consequences of disobedience to the divine will and the blessings resulting from loyalty to God. It is in this latter realm that revelation lies. God does not reveal either history or science. He reveals *Himself* and His nature and will.

In like manner, science is not revelation, taken by itself. The scientific details of the Bible are often the science of the time when the Bible was written (Genesis 1. 6, Amos 9. 6, Ps. 93. 1). The Bible was never meant to teach science. Jesus Himself spoke about the rising of the sun (Mt. 5. 45). If the purpose of Jesus had been to teach exact science, He would not have spoken in such a way. It was when the author of Genesis saw God behind the forces of nature, when Amos saw God as the sustaining power and directing spirit of the universe, and when Jesus told His hearers that there is a God behind nature, that revelation took place. A person living during the time when Ptolemaic astronomy was the accepted interpretation might have said, "God makes the sun revolve around the earth and so causes night and day." After the Copernican astronomy displaced the Ptolemaic, the matter would be put this way, "God causes the earth to revolve upon its axis and so causes night and day." The experience of night and day would be identical in both cases, and the religious value of the statement does not change. Scientific thought forms have changed and will undoubtedly continue to change, but they do not in any measure affect the revelatory character of the Bible. The authors of the Bible have seen God in history and in nature and have experienced His presence in their own lives, and such an experience is not affected by either accuracy of historical details or changing scientific conceptions. The nature, the character, and the will of God constitute the stuff of which revelation consists.

Inspiration.—Revelation involves inspiration, for the latter is the quickening of man's powers by the Spirit of God. Before a revelation can be given, man's reason and conscience must be quickened and enlightened through the presence of the Divine Spirit. Revelation is not dictation by God in the form of words, but, as we have seen, is given through nature, through history, and through human personality. Events in the divine moral order and man's experience of God are the method of divine revelation. Man must be inspired in order to see and experience these things; therefore revelation involves inspiration.

Some Protestant confessional writings imply a theory of verbal inspiration. In this respect the broadest of the Confessions is the Lutheran. It recognizes the fact of inspiration but embodies no particular theory of inspiration. There is no word in the Book of Concord which espouses the theory of verbal inspiration. It is sometimes argued that an idea must be clothed in words and that word and idea belong together, and therefore the theory of verbal inspiration is psychologically the only tenable theory. Such an argument is altogether beside the point, because it certainly is possible to express an idea in various word forms. The trouble with many advocates of verbal inspiration is that they lay down rules according to which they think the Bible ought to have been inspired, instead of asking the Bible itself how it was inspired.

The theory of verbal inspiration implies that the very words of the original authors were inspired. There are thousands of variant readings in the manuscripts of the Bible, and therefore we can never be sure that we have the exact words as they came from the authors of the various books.

The inspiration of the Bible becomes dependent upon the work and accuracy of the textual critics. The advocates of verbal inspiration, it would seem, find themselves upon rather insecure ground. The verbal theory also implies that its exponents are defending the inspiration of a Bible which neither they nor any living person has ever seen. At least, we do not know if we have seen a Bible exactly like that which came from the authors of the Bible. It would seem to be of more value to defend the inspiration of the Bibles which we have seen and do possess. If the verbal theory were correct, it would certainly also be true that only the Bible in the original languages is inspired. The common sense of most Christians, however, recognizes that the Bible in translation also is inspired.

How ill the theory of verbal inspiration fits the facts can easily be determined by anyone who desires to compare parallel passages in the Gospels or in any other portions of the Bible. A classical example is the superscription on the cross of Jesus. This superscription is given in the four Gospels as follows:

"This is Jesus, the King of the Jews." Mt. 27. 37.

"The King of the Jews." Mark 15. 26.

"This is the King of the Jews." Luke 23. 38.

"Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews." John 19. 19.

The Bible nowhere claims verbal inspiration for itself, the facts do not substantiate the theory, and if we analyze the implications of the theory, it robs us of any certainty we may have as to the inspiration of the Bible. The Spirit of God quickened and guided human souls and thus inspired the Scriptures, but this does not imply verbal dictation or inspiration with respect to exact words. Neither does it insure freedom from errors of memory, accuracy of historical detail, or scientific fact. When the Holy Spirit led men to receive a revelation, He gave all the inspiration necessary, and under all circumstances we shall have to be content with what He has done.

The Bible as Revelation.—The Bible is a record of divine revelation. Being a record of such a revelation it also mediates this revelation. A revelation of God has been given to the authors of the Bible, through the various means indicated for a revelation, and of such revelation the Bible is a record. It is the "Word of God" because it expresses the nature and the will of God to the human race. The Bible needs no apologetics. It is its own best apologete.

Revelation was not given in the form of a book. It was given through men. Behind the Bible was a religious community in which the literature of the Bible grew and stood persons who had been made sensitive through the work of the Spirit of God upon their hearts to receive such revelations of God as were later recorded in the Bible. In the religious community thus there arose a religious literature. Much of this literature never found its way into the Bible, but certain portions of it were selected as divine and authoritative, as a rule of faith and doctrine. The reason for this selection was that, in the estimation of the faithful, this literature revealed in a special way the will and character of God. The Bible formed itself by virtue of a power inherent in itself. The utterances themselves appealed to the consciousness of men guided by the Spirit of God. There is therefore a kind of double inspiration. The men who wrote were guided by the Spirit of God, and the Spirit guided the whole religious community so that it arrived at a general recognition of the writings as authoritative and inspired. The method and manner in which the Biblical literature grew is a matter which can be learned from any reputable Biblical Introduction.

The matter which primarily concerns us is the ethical teaching of the Scriptures. That the Bible has served as a basis for ethical teaching is a patent fact. A problem which therefore confronts us, in considering the Bible as a postulate of Christian Ethics, is the sub-Christian standard which we often meet in the Scriptures.

In the Book of Numbers, 5. 11–31, trial by ordeal is prescribed. The Christian conscience is not and can not be satisfied with such a method of meting out justice. In Judges 4. 17–24 we have an account of the killing of Sisera by Jael. Treachery and murder bring about the final result, and the deed is ascribed to the guidance of God (v. 23). In Judges 5. 24 the stamp of approval is placed upon the deed. ("Blessed above women shall Jael be, the wife of Heber the Kenite; Blessed shall she be above women in the tent.") The moral standard of such a passage as Proverbs 17. 8 can hardly be the sentiment of Christian judgment. ("A bribe is as a precious stone in the eyes of him that hath it, Whithersoever he turneth, he prospereth.") The motivation for the giving of presents in Proverbs 18. 16 can not be reconciled with New Testament ethics. ("A man's gift maketh room for him, and bringeth him before great men.") The same may be said of Proverbs 21. 14. ("A gift in secret pacifieth anger; and a present in the bosom, strong wrath.") The emphasis upon "profitableness" in the two last passages is foreign to the New Testament. The moral estimate of some of the Old Testament heroes is also open to question. (See Judges 11. 29, 13. 24–25). In the Book of Esther the name of God is never once mentioned, and there is a spirit of revenge and persecution, which caused Luther to say with respect to this Book, "I am so great an enemy to the Second Book of the

Maccabees, and to Esther, that I wish they had not come to us at all, for they have too many heathen unnaturalities" (*Table Talk*). Luther undoubtedly went too far in wishing that the Book of Esther were not in the Canon, but the relatively low religious and moral tone of the book must be admitted.

The wars of extermination also present a moral problem to the student of the Bible. Numbers 25. 16–18, 21. 1–3, Deuteronomy 20. 10–18, and 1 Samuel 15. 2–3 are well-known examples. ("And when Jehovah thy God delivereth it into thy hand, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword; but the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and that that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take for a prey unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which Jehovah thy God hath given thee. Thus shalt thou do unto the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not of the cities of these nations. But of the cities of these peoples, that Jehovah thy God giveth thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth; but thou shalt utterly destroy them; . . . as Jehovah thy God hath commanded thee." Deut. 20. 13–17). ("Thus saith Jehovah of hosts, I have marked that which Amalek did to Israel, how he set himself against him in the way, when he came up out of Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass. 1 Sam. 15. 2–3.)

Some of the imprecatory Psalms present a similar problem. ("The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance; He shall wash his feet in the blood of the wicked." Ps. 58. 10.) In Psalm 69 the Psalmist prays relative to his enemies, "Let their table before them become a snare; and when they are in peace let it become a trap. Let their eyes be darkened so that they can not see; and make their loins continually to shake. Pour out thine indignation upon them, and let the fierceness of thine anger overtake them. Let their habitation be desolate; Let none dwell in their tents." (Verses 22–25). "Let them be blotted out of the book of life, and not be written with the righteous" (v. 28). In Psalm 109. 29 the author prays, "Let mine adversaries be clothed with dishonor, And let them cover themselves with their own shame as with a robe." One of the exiles of Babylon expresses his hatred of the Babylonians when he says,

"O daughter of Babylon, that art to be destroyed,
Happy shall he be that rewardeth thee
As thou hast served us.
Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones
Against the rock." (Psalm 137. 8–9)

A similar spirit is reflected in Psalm 140. 9–10:

"As for the head of those that compass me about,
Let the mischief of their own lips cover them:
Let them be cast into the fire,
Into deep pits, whence they shall not rise."

It would require a considerable stretch of the imagination to place such imprecations on the same spiritual and moral level as the prayer of Jesus when He prayed for His enemies, "Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do" (Luke 23. 34). In a similar spirit the first Christian martyr, Stephen, prayed, at the time of his stoning, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." Every candid mind must recognize and admit that there are different spiritual and moral levels in the Bible. Jesus Himself stated that fact when He said, "Ye have heard that it was said, . . . but I say unto you," "It was said also . . . but I say unto you," "Again, ye have heard that it was said to them of old time . . . but I say unto you" (Mt. 6. 27, 31, 33, 38). Jesus reinterpreted and restated the principles of the Old Testament on a higher level. Mark 10. 4–12 is another New Testament passage which has direct bearing on this question. "And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. But Jesus said unto them, for your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment. But from the beginning of creation, male and female made he them. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh: so that they are no more two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. And in the house the disciples asked him again of this matter. And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her: and if she herself shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery." It is evident from this passage that the revelation of the will of God through Jesus superseded and took precedence over the will of God as revealed through Moses.

We must recognize that revelation has been progressive. All parts of the Bible are not of equal value and on the same level of spiritual and moral insight. There are various classes in God's school of revelation. God must of necessity accommodate His revelation of Himself and His will to man's capacity to receive and comprehend that revelation. No man has valued the Scriptures more highly than Luther did, but he recognized this principle of interpretation and therefore felt free to criticize such books of the Bible as Esther, Hebrews, James, Jude, and Revelation. When we recognize this fact of progressive revelation, the problem involved in dealing with sub-Christian ethical standards in the Bible simply ceases to exist. Our solution is that they simply are not on a par with the ethics of the New Testament, and with that we leave it. The solution is based upon ethical and intellectual honesty, upon the facts in the case, and upon the manner in which Jesus Himself and the New Testament deals with the Old Testament.

An objection has often been raised against this position. It is said that the Biblical interpreter presumes to set himself up in judgment over the Scriptures and sets his own standard by which he judges Scripture. This objection is, however, beside the point and fails to recognize what is being done. The Biblical interpreter is not judging the Scriptures. He is simply allowing Christ to pass judgment on the Scriptures for him. True, he passes judgment upon the relative value of the various portions of Scripture, but in the spirit of and from the standpoint of Jesus. This is not to presume to set one's own standard by which the Scriptures are to be judged, but simply to do what the Bible itself does. This is what Luther had seen and meant when he said, "All the genuine sacred books agree in this, that all of them preach Christ and deal with Him. That is the true test by which to judge all books, when we see whether they deal with Christ or not, since all the Scriptures show us Christ, and St. Paul will know nothing but Christ. What does not teach Christ is not apostolic, even though St. Peter or St. Paul taught it; again, what preaches Christ would be apostolic, even though Judas, Annas, Pilate and Herod did it" (*Preface to the Epistles of James and Jude*, 1522).

CHAPTER VI

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL POSTULATE

Body and Soul.—The apostle Paul speaks of man as consisting of "body, soul, and spirit," but such a trichotomy is not maintained consistently throughout the Bible (1 Th. 5. 23). James, on the other hand, speaks only of body and spirit (2. 26). It has been claimed that the expression "spirit" has reference to that side of human nature which is turned toward God, and that the expression "soul" has reference to that part of man which is turned toward the body and the material world. Such a distinction, however, will not survive an examination of the passages where the terms are used. (See Mt. 16. 26, Acts 20. 10, 2 Cor. 12. 15, Heb. 13. 17, Rev. 6. 9.) The Bible makes no consistent distinction between "soul" and "spirit," and human experience does not furnish us with any data upon which to build any tripartite division of human nature. The two words may be used interchangeably and have reference to the same thing.

Men of science know that the human being is composed of a large proportion of water, as much carbon as there is in a shovelful of coal, about as much iron as there is in a large nail, about seven pounds of lime, a lump of sugar, a little salt, a little soda, and a few grains of sulphur, potassium, magnesium and copper. Naturalistic psychology would say that this is all there is to the human being. The body is all there is, and spirit is only a mode of matter. Man's whole work is done automatically by the intricate bodily mechanism. Consciousness simply imagines that it does things. Shakespeare wrote his poetry and Edison perfected his inventions as automata. Mind is only an epiphenomenon. Behavioristic psychology is, however, baffled by such experiences as memory and time-consciousness. The stimulus-response formula ignores the fact that man responds to ideals as well as to physical environment. Results obtained through the methods of psycho-analytic psychology are definite proof of the fact that man is more than body and matter.

Man is not only body but also soul. The soul of man can not be known as it is in itself. Psychology has never been able and perhaps never will be able to discover what the soul is. However, we are not to be too greatly discouraged by this fact. There are other things in the realm of nature which we do not understand in themselves, and yet we study and utilize them. Electricity is a good example. We know nothing of the true nature of electricity, but we observe its influence in light, heat, and power. We can and do know something about the manifestations of electricity. So also when we look in upon the soul of man, we will not discover a thing but a process. As in the case of electricity, what we know about the soul we must learn through the activities through which it manifests itself. The manifestations of the soul are within the experience of all. There is a something which thinks and feels and wills. We know only the phenomenon. The noumenon eludes us. The thing in itself can not be understood, but its manifestation is always present. This is the proof for the existence of the soul. We know that electricity exists because we know its processes. We can not tell what electricity is, but we would not think of denying its existence—so also with the soul. We can not escape the conviction that where there is activity, there must be something that acts; where there is movement, there is some force to cause the movement. The whole field of psychology testifies to the existence of the soul. The manifestations of the soul testify to its existence. We know, we feel, we will, and there must be something which does these things: this we call the soul.

Physiologists tell us that every few years the human body completely renews itself. All the cells of the human body are periodically renewed. However, in spite of the change which constantly goes on in the body, the individual remains the same. Man speaks of what he did forty or fifty or sixty years ago. There is an identity from childhood to old age which characterizes the life of the soul. The ego or the soul abides in spite of bodily changes. It is the same man that exists even after the bodily cells have been completely changed. This is one of the characteristics of the soul.

The identity which characterizes the soul is, however, not something static. The soul is capable of growth and development. Were this not true, such a process as education would have no value. A part of this growth is an organic process. It is only partly conscious. The whole realm of the subconscious is testimony to the organic nature of the soul.

Man has much in common with the brute creation, but there are certain distinct manifestations of his soul life which separate him from the rest of creation. Man has developed art, a social and political order, language and literature. Darwin connected man with the brute, but he needed something which the brute does not have—his mind—in order to write the history of the race and interpret it as he did. Man also has a capacity for religion and thinks of and prepares for an immortal life. In man nature has also become capable of moral life. Whatever may be our theory of man's physical origin, this fact remains. However it came to pass, we are now moral beings and we can shape our lives according to ideals. A sense of obligation is a constant fact in human history. The contents of what man has considered to be moral may have varied, but the sense of obligation has been there as a moral constant in history. Man is the crown of creation and stands alone among the creatures of the earth.

The Image of God.—Nicholas A. Berdyaev says, "The most important part of Christian teaching about man is that he is fashioned in the image and likeness of God; he reflects the highest in material creation; he is the child of God, and not merely a drop in the vast ocean of nature" (*Christendom*, I, 3, 419). Man is somehow allied to God and was created in His image. The qualities of man's soul somehow relate him to the heart of the universe. That which separates man from the brute creation connects him with the Intelligence which is above both nature and man and explains both. At those points where man is distinct from the animals he attains to kinship with the divine. God is not a glorified man, but neither is it correct to speak of God as "an absolute other." (See Mt. 5. 48.) The infinite is both in and beyond the finite. The transcendent is in the immanent. The fact that man is related to God makes it possible to express the divine in terms of the human. If this were not so, then the cardinal Christian doctrine of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ would have no meaning. That doctrine does imply that the human can express the divine. To be sure, God can not be comprehensively known, but the knowledge which we do have of Him is nevertheless real knowledge. To speak of finite truth is a contradiction in terms. Either truth is infinite, or it is not truth at all. Athanasius saw this very clearly long ago when he said, "The way of truth, the path to the knowledge and comprehension of God, is in the soul of man. The road to God is not far off, but it is in us—it is in the soul of every man" (*Contra Gentes*). The Book of Proverbs says that "the spirit of man is the lamp of Jehovah" (20. 27). The soul of man is a flame, lit from the heart of the Eternal. Sin is a sad fact of human experience, but we must never allow the sense of sin to obscure the fact that man is created in the image of and is related to God.

It is necessary to distinguish between a formal and a material image of God. By the former is meant the human personality apart from any qualitative considerations. This aspect of the divine image has never been lost and can not be lost without destroying human personality. If the formal image of God were lost, man would be man no longer; he would be annihilated. By the expression "material image of God" we refer to the qualitative content of the formal image. The material image of God has been and is lost through sin, but never the formal. The essence of human nature is not sin. If the essence of human nature were sin, man would be outside of the pale of salvation, because sin can never be saved. Flacius taught that original sin was the nature and essence of man, but however great the sense of sin may have been, theologians have not been satisfied to rest in a position which would make man unsalvable. The old Lutheran dogmaticians used the terms *non essentiale, sed accidentale* in describing original sin. Sin is not the essence of human nature, but is something accidental. The coin may have been lost and soiled in the dirt until the image and the superscription are invisible, but the essence of the coin is not dirt. The image of the great king is still there and may be made visible by cleansing. The material image of God in man may in like manner be lost through sin, but this does not make the essence of human nature sin. The formal image of God still remains and is salvable.

It is contrary to Scripture itself to look upon sin as involving a total renunciation of the image of God. The Bible attributes to every man a consciousness of God (Rom. 1. 19), a conscience (Rom. 2. 15), a capacity for morality (Rom. 2. 14), an unlost image of God (Gen. 9. 6, Acts 17. 28, James 3. 9), and a participation in the light that shines in the darkness (John 1. 9). The capacity for these things forms a point of contact for divine grace to operate upon; were it not for this fact we might well despair of attaining our goal in the Christian ministry. (See John 3. 21, Acts 10. 34 and 35, and 1 Peter 3. 1, where this truth is taught without question.)

God is the Father of all men and all men are brethren, that is the practical implication of what has been said here. God is not only the Father of Christians, and not only Christians are brethren. There is a sense in which all men are brethren and God is the Father of all men. In Matthew 23. 9 Jesus says, "One is your Father," and in the previous verse He says, "All ye are brethren." These statements were not made only to the disciples but "to the multitudes and to his disciples" (Mt. 23. 1).

Freedom of the Will.—One of the most difficult problems in Christian Ethics is that of the freedom of the will. If man is to be held responsible, he must have some measure of freedom. If a man *must* will and do that which he wills and does, he can not be held responsible. This seems to be a self-evident fact, but the problem arises as soon as we try to reconcile this position with divine providence, with divine grace, with the influence of heredity, and with the circumstances of environment.

There are three types of determinism. The first is theological. It deduces the impossibility of the freedom of the will from the power of human sin, from the work of divine grace, or from the omnipotence and omniscience of God, and issues in the doctrine of predestination. The second is philosophical and may take on a materialistic, pantheistic, or fatalistic form. The processes of the will are in no sense causative, but are only sequential phenomena which take place according to natural law or natural necessity. The third type of determinism is psychological. According to this last type, man is absolutely predetermined by inner necessity and environment.

The facts given by the moral consciousness of man can not be satisfied with such an interpretation. Man is conscious of guilt and as a result experiences remorse. If man were compelled to do that which he does, why should he then experience remorse? Certainly the very experience of remorse implies that man feels that he was not predestined. Someone has said that if the universe makes man do that which he does and then makes him feel remorse for doing it, it is a rather wicked arrangement of things. We praise and blame men for their acts and omissions, but such judgments would lose all meaning unless men could have done otherwise than they did. The deterministic attitude does not satisfy the facts of human experience.

Indeterminism holds that man determines himself in an absolutely arbitrary fashion without respect to the character of the man who does the willing. In its theological form the indeterministic attitude, as represented by the various forms of Pelagianism, holds that man by himself is able to do the good. The trouble with many indeterministic positions is that they look upon the will as if it hovered over the person and determined his choices. The will is not something apart from the personality, but an aspect of it, and therefore the innate disposition of man, his habits, and antecedent history will play a part in determining his choices. Man wills, but what and how he wills is determined by the quality of his personality. If man is sinful by nature, the quality of his willing will be sinful. What we must maintain if ethics is not to lose all meaning is self-determinism. "What we affirm is self-determinism; it is the whole man who wills, and not a faculty distinct from others. When a moral choice has to be made, two or more objects are presented to his consciousness: each of these may appear desirable; he compares them, exercising such knowledge and judgment as he can to determine which will satisfy him, i.e., be in that situation at that moment his good; and what he regards as his good will depend on what manner of man he is. He identifies himself with one object; that is, he fixes his attention upon it; and the others fall into the background. The desire for the object then becomes his motive, and he acts accordingly. We may admit that volition depends on motive, so long as we make clear that it is the man who, identifying his good with one object, makes the desire for it his motive" (ALFRED E. GARVIE, *The Christian Ideal for Human Society*, p. 123). "I am going to mean by freedom that a person in the sphere of ethical decisions is a decisive factor in causing his own acts. This merely means that our essential acts are our very own. They are self-chosen acts" (JONES, *Problems of Life*, p. 137). We place the emphasis upon the self. Christian ethics is intention ethics and we look not only to the outward act but to the disposition that prompts the act. The disposition often determines whether an act is good or evil. If man's sinful nature predisposes him to will the evil, it is still a fact that man wills the evil, and that fact makes him evil. If the evil which a man does were not the product of his will, he would not be considered responsible and could not be judged. Against the indeterminism which would ascribe to personality the ability to choose in an absolutely arbitrary way, we assert that what one wills depends on the quality of the self.

Against Pelagianism, in its various forms, it must be said that man has never by himself, and left to himself, done the good. God has always been here, and man has been surrounded by spiritual influences. These spiritual influences were here before us, and they will remain after us. The facts of experience certainly testify to the fact that were it not for these spiritual influences which confront man he would be helplessly and hopelessly lost. We are forced not only to recognize, in general, the significance of our spiritual environment, but our Christian consciousness bears unmistakable testimony that we have been "laid hold of by God." This fact and the providence of life, by which we became Christians, was not our work, but must be ascribed to the grace of God. The spiritual influences by which the quality of man's personality can be changed meet man, and he may refuse to respond to them. Here we are also conscious of a *responsibility*. Man may assume a negative attitude to these spiritual influences with which he is surrounded, or may say no to the grace of God which is offered to him. Thus any apparent contradiction between the grace of God and human responsibility ceases to exist. The author of our salvation is God, but our responsibility remains. A physician may offer his patient a curative medicine, but the patient may refuse to take the medicine. The cure lies in the medicine, but the patient is responsible for his illness if he refuses to take it. In like manner, salvation is a gift of God, but we are responsible if we refuse to avail ourselves of the free gift of God.

Archbishop Söderblom has an interesting remark on the relation between divine sovereignty and human freedom and activity. He says that the paradox can be stated thus, "Man's activity is God's work" (*Den levande Guden*, p. 39). We do and will according to the good pleasure of God, and it appears to us as if we ourselves were the sole agents, but from the Christian point of view it is the work of God in us. Such a conception is not difficult, provided the immanence of God is given due recognition in our thinking.

The highest type of freedom is Christian freedom. Christian freedom is not license. It is not liberty to sin and then to trust in the goodness of God for forgiveness. The grace of God is no cloak for maliciousness. Christianity saves both from the guilt and the power of sin. Christian liberty consists in the agreement of the human will with the divine. When the human will has been laid hold of by the divine and man comes to want to do the things which God wants him to do, there is no restraint any longer. Man is free and has attained to the highest type of freedom. He is free by being bound in God. Freedom exercised so as to violate the laws of health does not lead to real freedom. It leads rather to bondage under disease. In like manner, spiritual freedom does not consist in the ability to sin, but in finding oneself in harmony with the Moral Intelligence which is at the heart of the universe.

Individuality.—The leaves of any particular species of tree are similar enough to make it possible to identify their origin, yet botanists tell us that when these leaves are microscopically examined they reveal many differences. No two leaves are exactly alike. In like manner, man possesses the elements which humanity has in common, but he has those elements in various combinations. Each man is a distinct individual. Each has characteristics which are peculiarly his own. Temperament, sex, race, nationality, heredity, and environment determine and mark this individuality.

"By temperament we mean that part of the innate constitution of the mind which is different in different men, so far as this refers to their feelings and perhaps also to their wills; but that part of their constitution which is the same in all of them we do not call their temperament" (Shand, *The Foundation of Character*). Dr. Douglass has this to say on the subject, "What appear as fixed temperamental types are actually a highly complicated compound of instinct, habit, feeling, and intelligence, partly hereditary, but mostly acquired, and in the main derivative from a long course of historical evolution in the social group to which the individual belongs" (*Church Unity Movements in the United States*). Dr. Dorner defines temperament as "the physical, i.e., corporeal and psychical, fundamental mood; the original and peculiar constitution of the sensibilities in themselves and in their relation to the objective world" (*System of Christian Ethics*). Usually four fundamental temperaments are distinguished. These four are the sanguine, the melancholic, the choleric, and the phlegmatic. Some people feel keenly, others feebly; some are introverts, others are extroverts; some are controlled by environment, others control themselves; some are dominated by perception, others by reflection. In the great variety of individualities it might be possible to distinguish more than four fundamental temperaments, as some students have done. It might also be possible to eliminate some one of the temperaments. Some make no distinction between the melancholic and the phlegmatic. The fourfold classification is, however, the most common and serves all practical purposes. The temperaments are seldom found pure but almost always mixed. This does not hinder us from analyzing the four fundamental moods which lie at the basis of the mixed temperaments. It is also to be noted that the temperament of an individual may vary with the different ages. At one time of life one temperament may predominate and at another period of life another type.

The sanguine temperament is the temperament of childhood. It is optimistic, easily stirred, has a low persistence and little inhibition. It is the enjoying temperament, susceptible to impressions, restless, open, and loves change. Kindliness and courtesy are assets of this type of individuality. The particular temptations against which the person possessing this temperament must struggle are indecision, unreliability, flightiness, superficiality, and fickleness.

The melancholic temperament is that of youth. It is imaginative, tends to pessimism, has a low persistence and great inhibition. Ofttimes it is characterized by pronounced prejudices. It is idealistic, is not content with the present and therefore tends to live in the past or in the future. It is given to subjectiveness and introversion, to criticism and speculation. It is the temperament which makes for mysticism in religion. It has the advantage of a serious outlook on life, but also its marked weaknesses in unpracticality, selfishness, pride, narrowness, and distrust of other men.

The choleric temperament is that of middle age. It is the attitude of practical activity with little inhibition. It is courageous, enthusiastic, and has the power of endurance. The particular weaknesses which this temperament must guard against are obstinacy, stubbornness, pride, lust of power, anger, irritability, hatred, revenge, and jealousy.

The phlegmatic is the temperament of old age. It is quiet, contemplative, calm, conservative, and stable. It manifests rather high persistence, considerable inhibition, and discretion. The pronounced weaknesses of this temperament are indifference, insensibility, sloth, and ofttimes a hard and cold heart.

Sex is another factor which makes for individuality. Man is characterized in terms of strength, woman in terms of beauty. The male is given to dealing with universals, woman with the individual and the detailed. One of the outstanding virtues of man is courage, and of woman gentleness. Man is a philosopher. Few women have ever become famous as thinkers. Man is more given to abstract thinking than woman. It has often been said that reasoning is a characteristic of man, while intuition is a characteristic of woman, but perhaps Weatherhead comes closer to the truth when he says that "women work by instinct and men work by instinct, only men make up reasons afterward" (*Psychology and Life*, p. 191). The male qualities fit men better for the sciences, while woman inclines toward the arts.

Man's nature inclines him to love of power, ambition, covetousness, and to despising the immediate and detailed. Woman is more given to vanity than man, and craft, dissimulation, intrigue, hatred, and revenge, on the part of women, are notorious in history.

Various movements dedicated to the cause of the emancipation of woman have sometimes tended to overlook the natural polarity which lies at the root of the differences between man and woman. Woman may set up a psychic conflict within herself by engaging in duties which naturally fall to the lot of man. Woman's self-realization is not to be attained by entering into masculine fields. The place of man and woman in the affairs of life is not the same. We do not hold that women ought to be different from men, but that they always have been, are at present, and always will be. Nor do we hold that men ought to be different from women, but that they simply are different. We must not resent this difference between men and women, but rather cherish it, enrich it, and embrace it gladly. We are not at all interested in trying to produce masculine women or effeminate men. The more womanly women become and the more masculine men become, the better it will be for all concerned. This is no argument for the enslavement of womanhood. It is simply a recognition of a fact which nature itself has established.

Another factor which makes for individuality is race or nationality. The solidarity of the human race is explicitly stated and regarded as an axiom in Biblical religion. That "he made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth" (Acts 17. 26), is a fundamental tenet both of the Old and the New Testament. Practically, the solidarity of the human family has often been lost sight of in the history of the church, but theoretically the church has always emphasized it. The doctrines of original sin and redemption through Christ certainly stress the unity of the human race. "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive" (Rom. 5. 12). The recognition of the fact of human solidarity could not be more forcibly expressed. The races are not original and are not different species or genera of men. The psychical nature, the rational constitution, and the possibility of a common culture testify to the truth of the Biblical conception. Common traditions, legends, and affinities of language point in the same direction. However, the various races do have their peculiar characteristics and combinations of temperament. Heredity and environment undoubtedly have played their part both in transmitting and developing these traits. It is a part of the moral mission of mankind to see to it that races and nations appropriate one another's excellencies and overcome the weaknesses. After all, when social environment is equalized, there is a remarkable sameness about human nature. It is our moral responsibility to give ourselves to an equalization of social heredity. The individuality of races and individuals also impresses upon us the dictum, "Know yourself."

Sin.—The New Testament uses a number of words to denote the concept of sin.

ἁμαρτία means missing the mark. When applied ethically it refers to missing the true goal of life and has reference both to the act and to the result.

ἁμάρτημα is related to the former word but means only sin itself without any reference to a particular manifestation. This word is a more abstract term than the former.

ἀσέβεια means ungodliness. It implies opposition to God. Sin is not only anti-ethical but it is also anti-divine. Sin has its ethical aspects, but it is also a religious matter. The ethical teaching of Jesus has its horizontal implications but there is always a predominant vertical and religious reference. Obedience or disobedience to *God* is the primary consideration. Alms are not to be given and prayers are not to be said for the sake of social approval but in obedience to God's will. (Mt. 6. 1–6.) Good deeds are not to be done for the sake of gaining some personal advantage. (Luke 14. 13–15.) The ethics of the New Testament is always God-conscious. Sin is not only a transgression of the moral, but it is also a desecration of the religious. We find the same emphasis in the Old Testament. The superscription of Psalm 51 attributes its authorship to David, "when Nathan the prophet came unto him, after he had gone in to Bath-sheba." David sinned against the fifth and sixth commandments and yet he says, "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, And done that which is evil in thy sight." All sin is ultimately sin against God.

παρακοή means failing to hear. It is the failure to hear when God speaks and the disobedience which follows.

ἀνομία means lawlessness and has reference to a condition or action contrary to the law.

παρανομία is found only once (2 Pet. 2. 16) and has practically the same meaning as the previous word.

παράβασις means transgression, which implies passing beyond some assigned limit. It is the breaking of some definitely recognized commandment.

παράπτωμα is sometimes used in a milder sense, denoting an error, a mistake or a fault; and sometimes meaning a willful sin.

ἀγνόημα is used only in Hebrews 9. 7, where it has reference to error or sin which has been committed to a certain extent as a result of ignorance.

ἥττημα means being worsted or defeated. It has reference to a failure in duty.

With respect to the New Testament words for sin, Trench says that sin "may be regarded as the missing of a mark or aim: it is then ἁμαρτία or ἁμάρτημα; the overpassing or transgressing of a line: it is then παράβασις; the disobedience to a voice, in which case it is παρακοή; the falling where one should have stood upright: this will be παράπτωμα; ignorance of what one ought to have known: this will be ἀγνόημα; diminishing of that which should have been rendered in full measure, which is ἥττημα; non-observance of a law, which is ἀνομία or παρανομία."

Definition of Sin.—Sin is not a material thing, nor is it to be identified with matter, as asceticism has either consciously or unconsciously done. Nor is sin mere ignorance. We must distinguish between sin, mistake, and moral disease. To overcome sin, the attitude of the will must be changed. To avoid mistakes more knowledge must be supplied and in dealing with moral disease psychotherapeutic methods must be employed. Sin is also something other than a stage in man's development toward perfection. If man's sinful way is simply the stage of development which he has attained, neither praise nor blame have any significance. Man's sense of guilt always involves a sense of having fallen short of an ideal which it would have been possible to attain. Sin is not only something negative, but there is a positive element in sin which no stage of development can excuse. Sin has no eternal existence as a substance antagonistic to God. It is something which can not exist apart from a personal being. There is no such thing as the "sins of society" or "social sin." Sin is always personal, but it has its social consequences.

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We can, however, distinguish between sin and the sinner. Sin is a quality of the human ego, and that ego is not to be identified with any particular quality which characterizes it. It is therefore possible to love the sinner and to hate his sin. The essence of human nature is not sin. A weathervane may point northwest or southeast, but neither northwest nor southeast are the essence of the weathervane.

Sin is the insubordination of the will to the sovereignty of God. The divine destiny of man is revealed in Jesus Christ. He is the ideal. Sin is the contradiction between the ideal and the actual. Sin consists in this that man is not and does not do what God wants him to be and do. It is disloyalty to God. This disloyalty may take on various forms. It may be a divided loyalty, it may be a lack of loyalty or indifference, it may be an incomplete loyalty or it may be idolatry.

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments the whole law hangeth and the prophets" (Mt. 22. 37–40). In this statement Jesus summed up the law and the prophets. Love is the fulfillment of the law (Rom. 13. 10). The opposite of love is the essence of sin. A lack of love, or lovelessness, is the heart of sin. The lack of a disposition of good will is the attitude of sin. Athanasius said that "the essence of sin is the erecting of means into ends." To set up other values than those for which Christ stands as the goal of living is the essence of sin.

The Origin of Sin.—For our purpose we need not answer the question as to the origin of sin except to point out that in man nature has become capable of moral life. Man is a moral agent, capable of ordering his life according to ideals and recognizing a distinction between right and wrong.

We must also insist that God is not the author of sin. God created man, but in the moral realm the good must be won on the plane of freedom. Man must have the power of choice in order to be a moral being at all. The possibility of a fall into sin had to be given to any moral being, and the liability to sin is implied in the concept of virtue. If the possibility to sin were not given to man, he would be an automaton and no longer a moral being. If man could not commit sin, he would not be a moral being. If God had made man such that it would have been impossible for him to sin, there could have been no morality. A nonmoral universe is certainly not a thing to be desired. When man emerges upon the stage of history, we find him a moral agent with the power of choice in the moral realm, and for our purpose this is all that we need emphasize. Man chose to sin and thus sin entered into the world through the abuse of freedom.

The account of the fall of Adam and Eve in Genesis 3 is a splendid presentation of the origin and nature of sin. The author of that chapter understood the nature of sin in a manner which has never been surpassed. In the first place there is the temptation from without. Hadfield has defined temptation as "the voice of suppressed evil when good is dominant." Sin requires for its existence an environment in which rival and opposing ideals exist and out of which temptations arise. God and the devil, Ahura Mazda and Ahriman, both express this dualistic truth. Secondly, there was an inner response. It was "good for food," "it was a delight to the eyes," and "the tree was to be desired to make one wise." It was the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life. There is in man that which Scripture terms "the flesh," which is a constant temptation to sin. There are impulses and inclinations which in themselves may be morally neutral, but which become sinful when man allows them to rule in opposition to the known will of God. Thirdly, there was the yielding of the will to the temptation, and lastly, the consummation in the outward act.

The Epistle of James gives an excellent analysis of the nature of sin when it says, "Each man is tempted by his own lust, being drawn away by it and enticed. Then the lust, when it hath conceived, beareth sin." Lust is egoistic desire. Lust conceives when man dwells upon and cherishes the temptation. Thus sin is born.

Original Sin.—The doctrine of original sin is based upon a fact of experience and describes sin as a permanent habit or tendency. Not all sin can be accounted for by conscious choice. There is an inheritance of evil which reaches back to the very beginnings of human history. In the case of every man there are sins which are not entirely his own guilt. Every one is enmeshed in sin through the guilt of others and becomes guilty for the sins of others. There is a fellowship of humanity in guilt. Every man shares in the sins of the race. Man finds himself biased and inclined toward the evil. Man finds himself inclined to make use of his instincts for the gratification of selfish desires. Various explanations of this fact have been offered, and we shall consider a few of them.

The facts of social heredity have been offered as an explanation. In every society or social order there are certain customs, standards, and institutions in which the individual is caught. Man participates in the forms of life which society has determined for him and thus becomes a participant in the sins of that social order. Someone has said that if we were not to participate in the sins of the race, we would have to leave the planet. Using the products of unethical child-labor; sharing in benefits gained through war which has despoiled others makes the beneficiary a sharer in the sins of society. There is undoubtedly more included in the doctrine of original sin, but this aspect of sin is an aspect of which we need to be made aware and concerning which our conscience needs quickening. Through the force of suggestion, sin embodied in institutions is passed on. Evil embodied in social institutions also serves as a temptation for man.

Another explanation, based upon the evolutionary hypothesis, holds that that which is called original sin is merely the survival of animalism in man. Sin is, however, not simply failure to have attained the good. It has a positive aspect which manifests itself in a willful choice of the evil. If man is active in his goodness, he can not be merely passive in his badness. Sin is a product of the spirit of man and is no mere vestigia. The attempt to pass responsibility on to the animals overlooks some of the worst sins.

A third explanation of man's bias toward sin is the recapitulation theory. It is held that the child recapitulates in his development the evolution of the race. The theory is not generally taken very seriously by psychologists at present, and as an explanation of the existence of sin in the race it offers little light. It ignores the fact of heredity and environment, and in connection with this it

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fails to take into account such well recognized facts of psychology as the law of habit.

A fourth attempted explanation of the truth expressed in the doctrine of original sin recognizes that the child embarks upon its moral career with a bias toward evil. It is held that the egoistic appetites develop first in the life of the child and thus, when it starts out upon its moral life, it starts with a bias in favor of evil and selfishness. Tenant expresses this view when he says, "The moral life is a race in which every child starts handicapped. The pleasures of forms of conduct which are destined to be forbidden him have been tasted and known; pleasure-giving actions have already become forged into chains of habit; the expulsive power of the new affection which is to establish another rule can not at first be strongly felt. When will and conscience enter, it is into a land already occupied by a powerful foe. And, in the primary stages of the moral life, higher motives can not, from the very circumstances of the case, appeal so strongly as the lower and more accustomed already in possession. Into 'the seething and tumultuous life' of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, and desire, is introduced the new-born moral purpose, which must struggle to win the ascendancy" (*The Child and Religion*, p. 178). There is truth in this statement, but it needs to be supplemented with an emphasis on heredity and social environment. A bad environment stimulates the possibilities for evil and the influence of Christian parents and teachers may restrain the natural evil tendencies. Garvie has said that "prevenient grace may come to a child from his mother's womb."

The doctrine of original sin has expressed a very important truth. It has recognized that the various expressions of sin are not isolated, one from the other, but proceed from the general character of the will. It has also recognized that individual men, in their sinning, are not isolated from each other. Sin in its essence is a perversion of the general quality of the will. There is in human experience a perversion which passes from one generation to the other. This doctrine emphasizes that sin is something super-individual and that there is in human history a sinful heredity which is transmitted from one generation to the next. There is, as Ritschl puts it, "a kingdom of sin."

Modern psychology undoubtedly throws some light upon this doctrine. The subconscious mind is a depository for numerous instincts which must be restrained if sin is not to develop from them. These instincts come to us as an inheritance from the race. These instincts involve certain drives and urges which may tend toward evil, and this fact perhaps is the psychological explanation of the experience underlying the doctrine of original sin.

The doctrine of total depravity is closely related to the doctrine of original sin and has its roots in that doctrine. This doctrine does not mean that all men are totally depraved in an absolute sense, but that they are so apart from the grace of God. It seeks to emphasize the divine initiative in man's redemption and the fact that God is the author of our salvation. It is interesting to note that the doctrine of original sin was developed in connection with the Pelagian controversy. The doctrine of total depravity stands for the fact that men are totally depraved apart from God and apart from the influence of His spirit. The state of total depravity would exist if we could remove or think away all the influences for good in the world, which we associate with divine grace.

Kinds of Sin.—"For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the vainglory of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world" (1 John 2. 16). Some ethicists have tried to classify all sin under these three evil elements or tendencies—sensuality, covetousness, and pride. The lust of the flesh refers to unlawful desires for the pleasures of sense. The lust of the eyes has reference to the desire of seeing unlawful sights for the sake of the sinful pleasure to be derived from the sight. The vainglory of life refers to ostentatious pride.

Pride is closely associated with despising fellow men. Envy and distrust lie close to it. If pride meets opposition, it may lead to anger, violence, and hatred. In the religious sphere pride is one of the cardinal sins; lies at the root of self-exaltation and self-idolatry and may lead to scorn and mockery. Hypocrisy, which is the spirit of the lie and the falsehood, which Jesus condemned so severely, is an expression of pride. Defamation, deceit, and treachery usually issue from the spirit of pride.

The lust of the flesh may manifest itself in gluttony, drunkenness, and sensuality. It is the parent of many kinds of evil, such as anger, quarreling, fighting, revenge, murder, sloth, carelessness, and dishonesty.

The lust of the eyes may appear under the form of covetousness, desire for gain, the desire to grow rich, mercilessness, usury, falsity, fraud, and robbery. These three chief directions of sin are closely related and they mingle with each other, like branches on the same tree. The classification has its value and insight into the nature of sin, but we need to keep in mind that the same sin may grow from any of the three roots at different times and in varying circumstances. Envy or lying may spring from either source with equal facility.

The words vice, crime, and unbelief fix our attention upon another classification of sins. Vice is the injury which a man does to himself in making the wrong choice. Crime has reference to the injury or wrong which a person inflicts upon others. Unbelief is the negative attitude toward God. Jesus said that the Holy Spirit would convict the world of sin "because they believe not on me" (John 16. 9). The very essence of sin lies in this, that man says no to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. To assume a negative attitude toward the goodness, the justice, and the holiness of God as revealed in Jesus Christ is the cardinal sin. The love of sin is revealed in such an attitude, and from such a disposition the numerous isolated manifestations of sin spring. Not to cherish the things which are manifested in Jesus and for which He stands is the very essence of sin, and therefore the world would be convicted of sin because it had rejected Him.

Sins may also be classified as sins of commission and sins of omission. Love is the fulfillment of the law, and love not only refrains from doing that which is evil but also does that which is good. There are altogether too many people whose ethical conduct consists of "don't." The New Testament says concerning Jesus that "he was without sin," but it also says that "he went about doing good." In Confucianism we have what has been called the Negative Golden Rule. It reads, "Do not do to others what you would not have done to yourself." Jesus stated that rule in a positive form when He said, "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them" (Mt. 7. 12). The emphasis in Jesus' statement of this rule is positive. In His description of "the judgment" Jesus' emphasis is on the positive and on the sins of omission. To the righteous will be said, "Ye gave me to eat, ye gave me drink, ye took me in, ye clothed me, ye visited me, ye came unto me." He does not say, "You did not swear, you did not kill, you did not steal." They had done something and the emphasis is on the positive. The charge against the wicked will be, "Ye did not give me to eat, ye gave me no drink, ye clothed me not, ye took me not in, ye visited me not." The emphasis is on sins of omission (Mt. 25. 31 ff). Christian ethics says "don't" with respect to that which is sinful, but it also says "do" with respect to that which is good. Luther had caught the force of this emphasis. In his explanation of the ten commandments we catch this positive note when he says, "Call upon Him in every time of need, and worship Him with prayer, praise, and thanksgiving," "deem it holy and willingly hear and learn it," "honor, serve, love, and esteem them," "rather assists and comfort him in danger and want," "be chaste and pure in words and deeds," "rather assist him to improve and protect it," "apologize for him, speak well of him, and put the most charitable construction on all his actions," "be ready to assist and serve him in the preservation of his own," "use our endeavors that they may remain and discharge their duty to him." The first part of the explanation of most of the commandments is negative. "We should so fear and love God as not to," etc., but the positive emphasis is never lacking in any of the explanations. This aspect of Christian ethics needs more emphasis than it has ordinarily received.

Sins may also be classified as those of thought, word, and deed. We have already emphasized that Christian ethical conduct is concerned not only with the outward act, but with the disposition as well. In interpreting the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, Jesus teaches that both anger and abusive language are a sin against this commandment (Mt. 5. 21–26). The person who loves will not murder his fellow man. Anger and the spirit which gives rise to abusive language are the roots from which murder grows, and Jesus condemns the evil disposition itself. The law against adultery, Jesus says in the light of the gospel, implies "that everyone that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committeth adultery with her already in his heart" (Mt. 5. 28). Jesus condemns the thought, which is the seed out of which action grows. The look the deliberate purpose of which is to awaken sexual impulse is a sin against the sixth commandment. Any individual who in the glance of the eye allows himself to regard a human being as an instrument of lust has committed adultery already. In interpreting the law of the oath, Jesus did not forbid the taking of such oaths as the State may demand. He Himself took an oath (Mt. 25. 63). The present state of society is such that oaths may be necessary, but Jesus is stressing an inner purity or disposition. The ideal is that truthfulness may be enthroned in man's heart to such an extent that "yea" means "yea," and "nay" means "nay." If this were the case the oath would not be necessary, and its very existence points to the fact that man's word can not be relied upon. It is sin in the form of untruthfulness that makes the oath necessary. Among Christians truthfulness should reign to such a degree that the oath ought never to be necessary. Again, Jesus stressed the inner motive and the purity of man's heart. The gospel does not concern itself merely with the outward act but with the inner attitude from which the act proceeds. If that attitude is evil, that in itself is a sin. The evil word or the evil deed is a sin, but so also is the evil thought which leads to the outward act.

Sins may also be spoken of as sins against God, sins against oneself, and sins against one's neighbor. Swearing and sins against the third commandment would belong to the former class; drunkenness, gluttony, and sometimes sexual sins would fall in the second group; and murder and stealing belong in the third class.

Sins may be deliberate, or they may be sins of weakness. The line is sometimes difficult to draw between these two kinds of sin, and yet there is a real distinction. We have no means of measuring the relative quantity of guilt in the denial of Christ by the apostle Peter and the betrayal by Judas Iscariot. We do, however, recognize that there is a difference. The sin of Judas was deliberately planned. He bargained in advance with the enemies of the Lord to make the betrayal. It was a deliberate act on the part of Judas, whatever his motives were, or whatever he thought the outcome might be. (Mt. 26. 14–16 and 26. 47–50.) The case of Peter (Mt. 25. 69–75) was different in that there was no deliberate consideration of the denial before it took place. Peter had fled in terror with the other disciples when Jesus was arrested. He had so far overcome his fear that he had followed into the courtyard of the high-priest's palace. He sat by the fire warming himself when suddenly he was accused of being a disciple of Jesus. In that moment of weakness Peter denied Jesus. There is a difference between this sin and that of Judas Iscariot.

The worst form of sin is the sin against the Holy Spirit. There are a number of passages in the New Testament which speak of a sin for which there is no forgiveness. (Mt. 12. 31–32; Mark 3. 28–29; Luke 12. 10; Hebrews 5. 4–6; 1 John 5. 16.) The fall into sin for which there is no forgiveness, of which Hebrews speaks, is possible only in the case of Christians or those who have at some time experienced the power of the gospel in their lives. In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus indicated that the Pharisees had either committed the sin or were on the verge of doing it, because they had said about Him, "This man doth not cast out demons but by Beelzebub, the prince of the demons." These Pharisees had met face to face the grace of God in the person of Christ. It is therefore evident that the sin can only be committed by such as have been Christians or by such as have been confronted by the revelation of God. A state of character can develop in which the sense of right and wrong no longer exists. The Pharisees did not recognize divine love when it met them face to face but blasphemed in calling satanic the person of Christ. The sin against the Holy Spirit is a character rather than some single word or deed which a drunkard, for example, in a state of intoxication, might utter or do. It is a condition of life rather than a specific act. "The highest degree of guilty sin is the conscious fundamental and definite resistance to the revealed and known perfect will of God (blasphemy against the Holy Spirit)" (Foster, *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*, p. 127). "The sin against the Holy Spirit is a fixed state of unbelief, in which an individual has rejected and continues to reject the grace of God in its highest manifestation, the grace of God in Christ, and this in spite of the fact that he has been brought into so close touch with this grace that he has realized, in a greater or less degree, its power" (NORRBY, *Den kyrkliga själavården*, p. 289).

A state of despair is hardly ever the result of this sin. It may at times manifest itself, but when the individual seeks forgiveness, that fact is proof that such a sin has not been committed. The only sin that can not be forgiven is the sin for which no forgiveness is sought. Where there is a desire for forgiveness, a love for the good, and a desire for fellowship with God, the sin against the Holy Spirit has not been committed. In the individual who has fallen into this sin there is "rooted a deep hatred to the holy as such, and it blasphemes and persecutes every revelation of this holiness as much as possible" (NORRBY, *op. cit.*, p. 289). "Christians have sometimes made themselves miserable by the thought that they may have unconsciously committed the 'sin unto death,' blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. But we ought certainly to believe that this sin is not a sinful act, however heinous, but a state of mind in which a man has deliberately chosen evil as his good and shut his heart against the Holy Spirit. The mystics held that even in the worst sinners there is a 'spark' in the soul which never consents to sin, and while this spark is unextinguished, there is hope of recovery. Our Lord warns us that it is not impossible to extinguish this spark, but those who are reduced to agony by the fear that they have 'quenched the Spirit' need not be afraid that they have been guilty of blasphemy against Him. Callousness, we may suppose, is always one of the symptoms of the death of the soul" (INGE, *Every Man's Bible*, p. 339 ff.).

Degrees of Guilt.—There are various degrees of guilt. In James 2. 10 we read, "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all." This passage of Scripture does not deny the fact of the degrees of guilt but refers rather to the essence of sin. One deliberate choice of sin indicates that the personality is evil and is disposed to sin. If man willfully transgresses one commandment, it shows that in principle he disregards all. Actual transgression of one commandment involves potential transgression of all the commandments. The Scriptures make a distinction in various degrees of guilt. (See Mt. 11. 24 and John 19. 11.) It is not the same thing to be one foot under water and a thousand feet. There is a difference in being one mile or a thousand miles from a given place.

The degree of guilt is dependent upon the nature and the character of the sin committed. Murder is worse than theft. The man who steals a penny is not as guilty as the man who murders his mother. The degree of guilt is also dependent upon the person committing the sin. The Christian has a greater responsibility than the heathen. One of the outstanding lessons of the Book of Amos is that privilege implies responsibility, and the greater the privilege, the greater the responsibility. Jesus expressed the same idea when He said, "That servant, who knew his Lord's will, and made not ready, nor did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. And to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required: and to whom they commit much, of him will they ask the more" (Luke 12. 48–49). To the cities of Chorazin and Bethsaida, Jesus said, "It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you," and to Capernaum, "It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment than for thee," impressing the lesson that responsibility increases with privilege (Mt. 12. 29–34). The degree of guilt also depends upon the intention of the person committing the sin. The man who accidentally discharges a firearm and takes a life is not as guilty as the man who deliberately takes the life of his fellow man. The result may be the same in both cases, but the intention of the agent determines the degree of the guilt. If the deed is added to the desire or the thought, the degree of guilt is also increased. Evil desires and thoughts are sinful, but the desire which is restrained is less guilty than the desire which permits itself to issue in an outward act.

The Consequences of Sin.—From the moral point of view sin issues in guilt. Guilt and penalty are related terms. The sinner has broken a law and is therefore subject to punishment. Remorse and regret are the subjective manifestations of guilt.

From the religious point of view sin issues in estrangement from God. This estrangement is nothing fictitious nor judicial. There is no unity of mind and purpose between the sinner and God. They are estranged and separated. The prodigal son who left his father's house (Luke 15) was estranged from his father in his very attitude, even if he had never taken a step to separate himself physically from the parental home. "He that keepeth his commandments abideth in him, and he in him" (1 John 3. 24). Unity of mind and purpose unites man to God, and the lack of it is estrangement.

From the point of view of the divine government and providence sin issues in penalty. God punishes in order to promote His moral government. The inevitable consequence of sin is suffering. Suffering which comes as a result of sin does serve as a dam to stem the onrush of sin. The inevitable consequences of sin do serve as a check for its spread. We have already shown that there is something self-destructive about the very nature of sin. Sin frustrates the attainment of the very goal which it strives to attain. This does not justify the conclusion that wherever we find individual suffering, that suffering is the result of some particular sin or sins. There are instances innumerable where suffering is the direct result of sin, but it is not always the case. Job's friends suggested that the suffering of Job was due to some secret sin, but the Book of Job rejects as unsatisfactory a formula as simple as that in explanation of all suffering. The disciples of Jesus seem to have taken for granted that there was a direct relation between suffering and sin when they asked Jesus the question, "Who sinned, this man, or his parents, that he should be born blind? (John 9. 2.) Jesus, however, rejected this explanation when He answered, "Neither did this man sin, nor his parents: but that the works of God should be made manifest in him" (John 9. 3). Concerning the Galileans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with the sacrifices, Jesus said, "Think ye that the Galileans were sinners above all the Galileans, because they have suffered these things?" and concerning the eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, He likewise said, "Think ye that they were offenders above all the men that dwell in Jerusalem?" (Luke 13. 1–5.) Jesus rejected the explanation of suffering as a direct result of sin whenever there was an attempt or an assumption to universalize such an interpretation. There is a vicarious suffering in life through which the individual suffers for the sins of others. There is a relationship existing between sin and most suffering, but before the whole story is told we must take into account the fact of the solidarity of the race and the fact of vicarious suffering. The innocent often suffer for the sins of others. God often does "visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate him" (Ex. 20. 5).

Conscience.—The word "conscience" is not found in the Old Testament. The word "heart," however, sometimes expresses the idea involved in the word. The idea and recognition of conscience is plainly present in passages such as 1 Sam. 24. 5, 10, 11; Job 27. 6, Ps. 6. 2, 32 1–5, 38. 2–11, 51. 1–9. Neither is the word found in the teaching of Jesus, though a recognition of its presence is clear from passages like Luke 11. 34, 12. 57, Mt. 6. 22 ff., John 1. 4, 5. 38, 8. 32. In the Pauline Epistles the word is of frequent occurrence. (See

Rom. 2. 15, 9. 1, 13. 5, 1 Cor. 8. 7, 10, 12.) The Stoic philosophers had made use of the word long before Paul used it, and it is probable that it was from them that Paul derived the word. (See also Heb. 9. 9, 10. 22, 13. 18, 1 Pet. 2. 19, 3. 16.) Our form of the word comes from the Latin *conscientia.* The Greek word σμνείδησις and the Swedish word *samvete* imply exactly the same meaning. The words for conscience all mean "knowing with," or "joint knowledge."

Conscience is not a special faculty of the soul. Neither is it something parallel to intellection, feeling, or volition, for it involves all these things. It is the whole mind of man functioning in the realm of the moral. Conscience has sometimes been defined as the voice of God in us. Such a definition can not be defended, because we often find conscience contradicting itself, and thus it would involve God in self-contradiction. We may speak of conscience as a divine voice in the sense that God created man a moral being, but only in this sense. The potential capacity is divine, but the deliverances of conscience can not always be identified with "God's voice." It would be a matter of conscience for some women to wear a veil in public; for a Hindu it would be a matter of conscience to butcher a cow. Children have been sacrificed and widows burned by conscientious people. Heredity, environment, and the character which a man has formed for himself often determine the deliverances of conscience as to what is moral.

Conscience functions in various ways. It may condemn man for what he has been or done. The self, as it were, sits in judgment upon itself. The self is both the accuser and the accused. Some ideal is recognized as involving an obligation. The deed which was done is recalled. The self is recognized as the cause of the deed. There is also a feeling of pain in the form of regret, self-reproach or remorse. The fifty-first Psalm is a splendid example of the condemning conscience.

Conscience may also function as a warning. Man knows what he ought to do, and yet he is contemplating some evil act. He feels that he can leave the act undone, and he experiences a feeling of pain which the contemplated act threatens to bring.

There is also such a thing as a good conscience or an approving conscience. The feeling here is not as intense as when conscience condemns. However, the good conscience is not simply the absence of the evil conscience. There is a positive feeling of joy.

Conscience approves, conscience condemns, conscience warns, and it urges us to do our duty. This implies that it is a function of conscience to determine what is right and what our duty may be. This has sometimes been called the normative function of conscience. Conscience is not an infallible guide to the right. Some terrible crimes in history have been committed by conscientious men. Paul stated that he had "lived before God in all good conscience" and undoubtedly included in that statement his activities as a persecutor (Acts 23. 1). Man may also misinterpret the divine law and be conscientious about it (Mark 7. 8–13). Two conscientious men may differ as to their understanding of what is moral. At other times conscience may reverse its own judgment. Paul the apostle was equally conscientious as a persecutor and as a Christian. Conscience may also be blind to certain sins. The story is told concerning a man who belonged to a denomination which considered the use of the oath to be one of the worst sins. He was a farmer and shipped his milk to a nearby distributing point. On one occasion there was more dirt in the milk than the law allowed and his milk can was returned with a red label. In his anger the farmer uttered an oath. As a result he was excommunicated from the church and the reason given was that he had taken the name of the Lord in vain. The greater sin, the attempt to sell an impure and probably germ-infected product, was not mentioned. Another illustration of the blind spot which may exist in the conscience is the case of a clergyman who visited an army camp. While there, he heard the name of the Lord taken in vain constantly. He sent a protest to the authorities against the swearing which was going on in the camp, but it never occurred to him to attack the system which makes men brutes and blasphemers. With respect to slavery it is common knowledge that many churches defended the slave system at the time of the Civil War in our own country, even to the extent of quoting proof texts from Scripture. All of these things remind us of the fact that conscience is not an infallible guide and that it needs enlightenment. The degree to which conscience can be trusted is dependent upon such enlightenment. The voice of conscience may also atrophy with disuse. Conscience is like an alarm clock. If we fail to heed the signal morning after morning, we finally become so accustomed to it that we no longer hear it. If man fails to heed the voice of conscience, it may cease to function. The sense of sin is always keenest in the saint. The more conscience is used, the keener the instrument becomes.

The reliability of conscience as a guide depends upon its degree of enlightenment. However, the voice of conscience should never be disobeyed. Something in a man's character is destroyed when he acts contrary to his convictions. Matters which might not be sin if they could be done with a good conscience do become sin if they are done contrary to the voice of conscience. If man says to himself that a certain act is wrong and then does it, he has sinned in going contrary to his moral sense, even though the thing may not be objectively wrong. This is what Paul means when he says, "The conscience being weak is defiled" (1 Cor. 8. 7. Read 1 Cor. 8 and 10. 23–32). This fact does not make morality something subjective. Morality as an objective fact still remains, but an act, such as eating meat "sacrificed to idols," is not objectively an immoral act, but if a man is convinced in his own mind that such an act is immoral and still does it, he becomes immoral in his own eyes and therefore commits a sin. Man does not make morality or decide what is moral, but if, because of a lack of enlightenment, he considers a certain thing to be immoral which in itself may not be so, and still does it, he is breaking down his own character. The voice of conscience should always be obeyed.

If it be the function of conscience to determine the path of duty, the question arises as to how we are to determine the will of God. The will of God will not necessarily be the most difficult task nor the task where remuneration will be the smallest. We must ask ourselves what the mind of Christ requires of us in any particular situation. It is of course evident that a knowledge of the mind of Christ will only come to us in the measure that we learn to know that mind through the study of the Scriptures. Prayer is also necessary, because through prayer we are "put into tune with the Infinite" and enter into fellowship with God, and it is only in the light of such fellowship that we will really seek to do His will. Reason and common sense are gifts of God, and they, too, should be employed in determining what the will of God is. Consulting with Christian friends may be of value for us in determining our duty. Our own particular talents and gifts need to be taken into consideration. These talents fit us for particular types of service and point to the line of duty which we ought to follow. We ought never to act as long as we are in doubt about our duty, if it be possible to avoid it. Yet there are times when we are compelled to act, and all that we can do under such circumstances is to adopt and follow the course which according to our best judgment seems to be the right one. The "will of God" should be something more than a pious phrase on the lips of Christians.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOTERIOLOGICAL POSTULATE

The Greek word for "salvation" is a word rich in meaning. The fundamental idea of the word σωτηρία is the removal of dangers which menace life and the placing of life in conditions favorable to a free and healthy expansion. In the LXX the word is sometimes used to denote deliverance from physical peril (Judges 15. 18; 1 Sam. 11. 9, 13). It was also used to describe the great deliverances of the nation, e.g., the passage of the Red Sea (Ex. 14. 13) and the return from exile (Is. 45. 17). The word has a negative aspect, as a rescuing from something evil, and a positive aspect, as an imparting of something good. A very interesting use of the verb is found in Matthew 1. 21, "thou shalt call his name Jesus, for it is he that shall save his people from their sins." The word used for "sins" is ἁμαρτιῶν, which means a failing to hit the mark. The verse really says that Jesus shall save men by removing those things which cause men to fail to attain the true end of life and by placing them in a position where they will attain the true end and scope of life. Jesus saves men from missing the mark. It is also to be noted that He is to save not "in" but "from" sin. Salvation is not an arbitrary judicial act but a real deliverance from those things which hamper life. Evil is that which hampers life, and Christianity claims to have a real remedy for sin.

Salvation is not a mere geographical transfer from one place to another. It is not an insurance policy which we "cash in on" when we die. Salvation is an ethical redemption from the power of sin, as well as salvation from the guilt of sin. That salvation has its ethical implications is evident when we think of such related terms as repentance, faith, regeneration, and sanctification. Salvation from the ethical point of view is not yet fully complete. Christians grow toward it (1 Pet. 2. 2), work it out (Phil. 2. 12), and may be nearer to it than when they first become believers (Rom. 13. 11). The Christian should grow "toward the fullness of the stature of Christ." Through salvation the image of God in man should be more and more fully restored (2 Cor. 3. 18).

Character and salvation stand in a very intimate relation to each other. Salvation implies an ethical character. Character is achieved in and through salvation. There is sin in the life of the Christian and sincerely he prays, "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us," but the center of gravity in his ethical attitude is nevertheless different from what it was before he experienced salvation. The "permanent choice" has been made. There may be a great deal of sin in the life of the Christian, but he nevertheless cherishes the goal of the Christian ideal and at the core of his being is devoted to it. Christian salvation is a moral salvation and through it there is a transformation of character. An emotional ebullition, by itself, may be mistaken for a genuine conversion and genuine salvation, but it is not genuine unless the whole character is affected and man commences to steer toward the Christian ideal, in spite of temptation and opposition. Neither can salvation consist in simply fearing the penalty of sin. It is possible to fear the consequences of sin and still not have salvation, for the latter implies a transformation of man's whole attitude to sin.

Conversion.—A word which includes in its meaning both repentance and faith is "conversion." That the experience of conversion has its ethical implications is too evident to require any proof. Etymologically the word is derived from the Latin *convertere* which means "to turn." Conversion has reference to the direction in which man is going and how he is ordering his life. It fixes attention upon that which takes place in the mind or disposition of man, through the process of salvation. It designates a transition in the experience of a person; his turning from the anti-divine, the anti-ethical, and the selfish to the moral, to God, and to service. For the converted person life becomes organized and integrated around Jesus Christ.

Conversion may take place in the form of a crisis at some definite time, or it may take the form of a continuous turning away from the world and to God. The important thing is the nature of the choices that are being made in the present. Psychologists have fixed attention upon the fact that conversions usually take place about the time of adolescence or between the twelfth and twenty-fifth year. Yet such a change of personality as conversion involves may take place much later in life. A complete transformation of interests and loyalties may occur at any time of life. The important thing is not that a person shall be able to point to a definite crisis in his life but rather the general direction in which he is going, and that he is continually turning away from sin and to God.

The conversion of the apostle Paul is a well-known example of that which takes place in conversion. The apostle had been a persecutor of the church and the Christians. He was converted, he turned right about face, and became the great missionary to the Gentiles. Such a turning about is common in the annals of Christianity. Such conversions always imply a turning from sin to righteousness, and therefore the experience of conversion has its ethical implications. Conversion brings about new ethical attitudes.

One favorite method of bringing about conversions in many circles has been the revival meeting. That it has accomplished much good can not be denied, and that true conversions have often resulted is a patent fact. It has often been the means of bringing about an initial act of repentance. One of the weaknesses of revivalism is that the process has often stopped with the initial act of repentance, and a pseudo-conversion has been the result. Revivalism is attended by other dangers. Sometimes mere natural excitement is mistaken for conversion. A mass psychology often dominates the revival meeting, the revivalist is often a masterful personality, and the result is often an absence of self-dependence in the individual which can not be healthy when the individual is left without the hypnotic influence of the revivalist or the crowd. The word "backslider" is common in connection with the revival, and backsliding or recoil is usually caused by the dangers enumerated above. Revivalism also tends to press religious experience into a mold and to dictate how the Spirit of God must work. Stereotyped religious experience is usually never very vital. Conversion must imply a complete change of personality so that the convert is headed another way than before.

Repentance.—The connection between the words "conversion" and "repentance" has already been indicated. Conversion has a negative and a positive aspect. It is a turning away from sin and a turning to God. Faith expresses the idea of turning to God and repentance the idea of turning away from sin. Repentance, from this point of view, is thus the converse of faith. Repentance means a "change of mind." It involves a change of attitude in relation to sin. It is the "full purpose of and endeavor after a new obedience." It involves the whole human personality and every side of mental life. The repentant man recognizes sin as sin and confesses it as such before God and sometimes before fellow men. There is today a marked absence of a sense of sin, as compared to other times. This is not due to the fact that there is less of sin, because the sense of sin grows with moral progress. The saint, not the sinner, has the keenest sense of sin. The first mark of true repentance is a sense of sin, that is, a recognition of sin as sin. A second mark of repentance is grief or sorrow over sin. This grief may express itself in various ways, depending on the temperament of the person involved, but there is always a loathing of that which is sinful. This sorrow is not confined to the results of sin but includes sin itself. It is one thing to be grieved over the consequences of sin and quite another to grieve over sin itself. A true repentance always involves the latter. Thirdly, repentance is characterized by a longing to be delivered from sin. Repentance itself is an integrating experience because it involves a new loyalty. The repentant individual no longer desires to sin; there is a definite purpose to part company with sin. There is a desire not only to escape the consequences of sin but to escape sin itself. The prodigal son, (Luke 15) when he repented, lost the desire to remain away from the father's house.

It is to be noted that faith presupposes repentance. Repentance is the soil in which faith grows. Through faith man appropriates to himself the assurance of the forgiveness of his sins. Christianity does not hold that the forgiveness of sin is possible except for the penitent and therefore the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins is neither immoral nor amoral.

There may be crises in life at which the experience of repentance is very pronounced, but the experience is also prolonged through the whole life of the Christian. It is more a character than an act. Repentance is to be looked upon as a type of life rather than an episode. We must guard against looking upon repentance as an act or a series of atomistic acts. It is rather an attitude, with a unity, in the character of the penitent. The fact that repentance has its ethical implications is too evident to need any elaboration. It is evident from the description of the experience itself.

Faith.—The Godward, positive aspect of conversion is called faith. The response of the soul to God is called faith. Like repentance, faith involves the whole personality and every side of mental life. Clement of Alexandria said, "Faith is a voluntary anticipation, the assent of piety; or we may call it the uniting assent to an unseen object. It is the beginning of action, the foundation of rational choice, when a man sets before himself the proof which he anticipates. Voluntarily to follow what is good is the beginning of understanding it" (Quoted from INGE, *Every Man's Bible*, p. 211). William Adams Brown defines faith as "personal commitment of self to 'the unseen but living God, as He is revealed in His gracious character in Christ, the Saviour of men' " (*Christian Theology in Outline*, p. 381).

Faith is an experience which involves the whole human personality. It involves intellection, affection, and conation. Faith is not something separated from the intellect. It is, however, more than a matter of intellectual assent or of giving assent to a certain number of doctrines and dogmas. It is more than orthodoxy. A man may be thoroughly orthodox and still not have faith. He may never have denied a single doctrine or dogma of the church and still be lacking faith. Yet faith is partly an intellectual matter. If man has faith in anyone or anything, he must know something about that person or thing. Knowledge is therefore an element of faith. Faith is, after all, based upon knowledge. Faith and knowledge can not in the long run contradict each other. What I know to be true must somehow be related to the object of faith. We can never rest satisfied to define faith as "believing what you know is not true." Paul's use of the term "mystery" has often been used as a proof-text in defense of intellectual laziness. (See Ephesians 1. 8 and 3. 14–19.) "Mystery" as it is used by the apostle Paul is no blind, unintelligible emotion. Such was the meaning of the term in the mystery cults of the first century. Paul refers to the fact that God's revelation of Himself excites a feeling of wonder and reverence. The mystery of which Paul speaks is something which is based upon knowledge or revelation, the knowledge of God's love in Christ, which is so inexhaustible that it is not possible for man to fathom it. To be sure, the creeds do speak about God as being "incomprehensible," but this does not mean that God can not be known at all but that he can not be comprehensively known. The knowledge which we do have of God is real and true knowledge. The apostle Peter urges his readers to be "ready always to give answer to every man that asketh you a reason concerning the hope that is in you" (1 Pet. 3. 15). Faith is not credulity, and it must ever be guarded against sinking to that level. My faith can only be vital when it is based upon knowledge of what I actually believe the universe to be, in the light of all the knowledge that I possess.

The intellect has its limitations. The mind of man can not comprehend interstellar space, the essence of the human soul, or the possibility of growth in the vegetable or the animal kingdom. We do not understand these things fully, but to believe them is not to fall into the realm of the superstitious. In like manner man's understanding is limited in the sphere of the divine without being superstitious.

In the realm of personal relationships, which religion involves, demonstration, which is equivalent to mathematical certainty, can not be expected. The convictions of faith are never demonstrated by mathematical or scientific methods but are nevertheless actually believed to be true. If they could be demonstrated, they would no longer be in the realm of faith. A man may not be able to prove or demonstrate in advance the kind of reception which his friend will accord him, but he may still be as certain of it as if he were able to do so.

Reason and faith are not antithetical. Neither does faith commence where reason can go no farther. Man does not reason part way to God and then complete the gap with faith. God never appears at the further end of a logical train of thought to which has been added a leap of faith. Faith is the only avenue of approach between God and man. Yet reason is always present as a part of that faith. Reason serves as a constant regulator of faith. Great has been the service which reason has rendered to faith. It has eliminated from faith much that is not founded on fact and has purged faith of many superstitious elements. Reason has taught man that there are no gods on Mount Olympus. It has eliminated much of the magical from religion. It has shown man the folly of many primitive ways of trying to determine the divine will. It has protected faith from credulity. The more reason there is in faith, the better for faith, and the more vital will faith become. Reason as well as faith is a gift of God and is to be treasured and used as such.

Faith is not confined to the realm of religion alone. It has its place in other spheres of life as well. In the realm of epistemology much thought and labor has been expended, but we never seem to get beyond the point where we believe that we can know reality. We can not prove it but we simply must believe or have faith in the fact that our minds reflect reality. All co-operative enterprises are based upon faith, and faith makes many of these enterprises possible. Without faith they could neither originate nor continue to function. In the realm of personal relationships faith plays a particularly conspicuous part. Much of our activity in life is based upon faith. We must have faith in the integrity of the builder of our automobiles, the builder of our bridges, the builder of our roads, the skill of our surgeon, the reliability of our pharmacist. We could not prove in advance that any of these persons or things would do what we expect of them. The nature of most of these things is such that it would be impossible. Faith as a means of access to God is no more strange than faith in any of these other relationships. The intellect, however, does have a place in the experience of faith, and the latter is never an insult to the former. "Faith is simply reason grown courageous" (L. P. JACKS, *Religious Perplexities*, p. 19).

Faith also involves other sides of human personality. It takes in the feelings as well. In the New Testament faith often merges in the idea of trust. Love of God must include trust in Him. Faith trusts that God deals with the penitent sinner as a loving Father. This involves confidence. Trust also manifests itself in spheres outside of the inner personal experience of the believer. It trusts that God is working toward worthy ends and guiding the course of events in wisdom and love. When man's belief is established it becomes trust.

There is no poise or peace of soul for man apart from trust in God. Nature is immutable in her laws, but she is often ruthless and apparently manifests no regard for the objectives of human life. Often she seems to be indifferent to human values.

Society elicits a certain amount of trust, but it is also full of imperfections. Society killed the prophets and Jesus. It is only in God's love that we can find a stabilizing force for life. We trust in God's faithfulness when everything else seems to be against us, and such trust bears us up.

Trust in God means the commitment of self to God. "If I have knowledge that a certain man is trustworthy, that alone is not faith. But if I commit myself to that judgment by leaving a child in his keeping, and go off without anxiety, that is faith" (*Christendom*, Vol. I, p. 763). There is no peace of soul apart from trust in God.

Trust is not to be identified with foolhardiness. Sermons have been preached against the use of lightning rods as betraying a lack of trust in God. The same argument has been used against availing oneself of the protection of life insurance. God has given man intelligence and wants him to use it. Through a sanctified intelligence man can co-operate with God and should do so, yet the final outcome or the Christian goal can not be based on trust in self but must rest upon trust in the faithfulness of God.

We have already indicated that faith also involves the conative side of human personality. The fact that faith is a "commitment" implies this fact. The special Hebrew meaning of faith is faithfulness. The prophet Habakkuk was the forerunner of Paul and Luther when he wrote, "The righteous shall live by faith" (2. 4). The primary meaning of the term faith is faithfulness or a steadfast loyalty. "The righteous shall live by his fidelity, i.e., his faithfulness, his firm trust in Jehovah. In the long march of history the nations and men who trust in their own power and resources and defy morality are doomed; they do not live. It is the righteous that live, those who regard right and God. However much they suffer, and even when they seem to die, they live; and they live by their faithfulness, i.e., by leaning firmly upon the God who lives forever, and whose life is a guarantee of theirs. This is one of the profoundest utterances of the Old Testament" (DUMMELOW, *Commentary*, p. 590). In the New Testament the word "faith" often has the force of "faithful" (See 1 Peter 1. 21). That faith must involve faithfulness is a self-evident fact. If man has faith in anyone or anything, he must cherish the ideals which that person or thing stands for. It would not be possible to have faith in a criminal. If there is faith in someone else, it is there because we cherish the things for which the object of our faith stands. In like manner, if there is faith in God, there must be a devotion to the ideals which God stands for. There can not be faith in God and love of sin at the same time. There is an ethical element in the experience of faith itself.

Faith then involves belief in, trust in, and devotion to God. Faith is the belief which shapes the life of man or the belief by which man lives. Faith is the life principle of the Christian. Faith is the "Weltanschauung," the "världsåskådning," of the Christian. That such faith has its ethical implications is too evident to need any apologetics.

The Scriptures speak of faith as "a gift of God" (Eph. 2. 8). It is God-given, not man-made. Luther expressed this idea when he said, "I believe that I can not by my own reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ my Lord, or come to Him" (Explanation of third article in his *Catechism*). Faith is not something which man spins out of his own imagination. Man is surrounded by a spiritual environment and it is this environment which calls forth the response which is called faith. In other words, it is the object of faith which produces the faith. Man does not manufacture his faith, but God comes to man, through the means by which He reveals Himself, and faith is born. Man does not produce his faith in his friend. It is the friend who calls forth such a response because of what he is. In like manner it is God that produces faith in man by virtue of the fact that He reveals Himself and by virtue of what He is. Faith, then, is not a figment of the imagination, but a fitting response to the revelation of God in Christ.

Reconciliation.—We have seen that sin separates from God. Christianity presents man with a way in which this breach can be healed. "Being therefore justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ" (Romans 5. 1). Divine love has in Christ removed that which separates man from God. Man is justified, and a reconciliation takes place. Reconciliation has reference to the guilty separation between man and God and signifies the divinely effected peace with humanity. This reconciliation was a costly one. Calvary testifies to the cost. The demands of justice have been met in that God Himself, in Christ, has suffered in order to effect the reconciliation. Reconciliation involves a new attitude of God toward man and a new attitude of man toward God. God and man, who have been estranged from one another, are reconciled and commence to regard one another with favor. This must not be interpreted in a way to imply that God did not love man before such a reconciliation took place. "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life" (John 3. 16). "God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us" (Rom. 5. 8). God loves men, even the grossest sinners, and this fact is the ultimate basis of our reconciliation with Him. The love which God has for the sinner is a love of compassion which seeks to save that which is lost. When reconciliation has taken place, God loves man with a love of complacency or with a love which looks with delight upon the person loved.

It is outside of our scope to consider the process by which reconciliation is effected. We are primarily interested in the ethical implications of it. In reconciliation guilt is canceled, but this fact is closely related to freedom from bondage under sin. A burdened conscience is connected with an enfeebled will. Assurance of the forgiveness of sin brings peace to the conscience and strength to the will for the moral struggle. When man thinks of God as displeased with him, he experiences such a depression of spirit that he can not engage in the moral struggle with any degree of power. There is literally strength in the joy of the Lord (Neh. 8. 10). Reconciliation with God, the most objective of the experiences in the *ordo salutis*, also has its ethical implications. The Christian gospel is the gospel of a new start, and such a new beginning is the necessary presupposition for moral amendment.

Regeneration.—Christianity does not merely set Jesus before man as a teacher and example to be accepted. Neither is Christianity satisfied with mere amendment of outward conduct. It insists upon an inner transformation. The tree which is to bear good fruit must first be made a good tree. This inner transformation of man is called regeneration or a new birth. "Except one be born anew, he can not see the kingdom of God" (John 3. 3). Regeneration is a divine act, accomplished in the soul of man, by which a new life principle is imparted. Regeneration emphasizes the transition which takes place in the experience of the Christian, from the point of view of the creative divine causation or efficiency.

The Christian still finds sin in his life, but sin has been conquered in principle and there is a new attitude toward God, self, and fellow man. The life in Christ is perfect qualitatively, and that life has been given to the Christian, even though there still may be much of the "old Adam" manifesting itself. The needle which has been magnetized points toward the pole, even though it may flutter at times. The Christian is at the core of his being attached to the things of God and his desire is in that direction, even though he often fails to steer a straight course.

Regeneration does not effect a change in man's essential constitution. When Paul says that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2. 14), he does not mean that when man becomes a Christian he receives a new set of brain cells and does his thinking in another way than before. Logic and the processes of thought for the Christian and the non-Christian will always be the same. What Paul does mean is that man gets a new body of experience upon which to draw, and this experience makes it possible for him to understand what he could not understand before.

The Psychology of Religion may throw a great deal of light upon the processes by which this inner transformation is brought about. However, psychology can never say anything about the power which operates through these psychological laws without stepping outside of its field. A law is never a power. It is only a form. Psychology can no more dethrone God than could evolution in the physical sciences. Psychology may offer various explanations of the inner transformation which has taken place in the life of the Christian, but the Christian still says that it is the Spirit of God which has touched his spirit and effected the change. Regeneration then also has its ethical implications. Through this experience new ethical attitudes are brought about.

Sanctification.—Sanctification is a gradual process through which the Christian develops toward the ideal. It is the progressive victory over sin. It is the growth and development of the Christian life. The Christian life is not a finished product which we acquire. Our Christian life is not simply a gift but also a task. That task is sanctification. The Christian is to grow "unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" (Eph. 4. 13). That sanctification has its ethical aspects is too self-evident to need elaboration.

No time sequence in the various steps in *ordo salutis* is to be considered. Each term has something definite to emphasize, but it is all a life process in which time is not essential. The roots of sanctification are to be found in repentance. Repentance, faith, regeneration, and conversion, all represent different conceptions of what is essentially the same life process. Repentance has reference to the turning away from sin. Faith fixes attention upon the turning toward God. Regeneration emphasizes the divine causation or efficiency. Conversion describes the process with reference to the direction in which man is going. We need all these terms to describe the different aspects of Christian experience, but we need to keep in mind that they are aspects of one process. The most casual knowledge of the way of salvation makes it evident that Christian experience is not divorced from ethical conduct. Christian experience must lead to ethical conduct. Good works will not be done on a debit-credit basis but will follow as the natural results of Christian experience. The tree, having been made good, will bring forth good fruit, by virtue of its very nature.

PART II

The Content of the Christian Ideal

CHAPTER VIII

THE HIGHEST GOOD

One of the crucial problems of ethics is the question as to what is the highest good or what is of absolute moral worth. What is the supreme good that man may know and do? Kant taught that the proper estimation of worth is the good will. A good will is good, not because of what it performs or effects, but simply by virtue of the volition. The good will is good in itself. Kant's solution of the problem of the highest good reflects his deep reverence for the moral consciousness and has the virtue of stressing the inner motive, but it explains very little in the field of concrete realities. The will can only be good if it be sanely and wisely directed. Kant's maxim, "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature," is too formal to give any guidance in determining what acts of the will are good. Fichte, Schleiermacher, and others have found the highest good in the authority of reason in various spheres of experience, such as sense or nature. We have already shown that Christian ethics is rational, but we must define what that rationality is, or our answer to the problem is again too formal to be of any value. Christian ethics insists that the fundamental moral concept is an unconstrained unity of man's will and God's will. We must, however, define the nature of that will more closely, and this we can do from a threefold point of view. The highest good of Christian ethics presents itself in a threefold way: 1. The highest object of our efforts is the kingdom of God. 2. The Christian strives for personal perfection in imitation of Christ. 3. The law of God is also an expression of the highest good.

The Kingdom of God.—The kingdom of God is the Christian's highest good. Jesus set forth the ideal when He said, "Seek ye first his kingdom and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you" (Mt. 6. 33). The idea involved in the phrase "the kingdom of God" is variously designated in the Scriptures. It is called "the kingdom of the Father," "my kingdom," "his kingdom," "the kingdom of the righteous," and "the kingdom of the Son of Man." Usually the ideal is expressed by the phrase "the kingdom of God" or "the kingdom of heaven."

There are those who have tried to make a distinction between the expressions "the kingdom of

God" and "the kingdom of heaven." Such a distinction is not valid. A comparison between parallel passages in the Synoptic Gospels proves conclusively that the terms are used interchangeably and are synonymous. The form "kingdom of heaven" is characteristic of Matthew. He wrote for the Jews and thus adopted the Jewish custom of avoiding the use of the divine name.

The phrase expresses the very essence of Christ's life purpose. "The kingdom of God" was the keyword of Jesus' teaching and message. He made use of the conception from the beginning and to the end of His ministry. The Sermon on the Mount centers around this theme. Jesus appeared in Galilee at the beginning of His public ministry, "preaching the gospel of God and saying, Repent ye, and believe in the gospel: the time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand." He "went about all the cities and villages, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the gospel of the kingdom." When He sent forth the twelve, He commissioned them, saying, "And as ye go, preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand." When He sent forth the seventy, He instructed them to preach, "The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you."

The burden of the apostle Paul's message was also the kingdom. When he makes his farewell address to the elders of the church at Ephesus, he says, "And now, behold, I know that ye all, among whom I have gone preaching the kingdom of God, shall see my face no more." In the last glimpse which we get of the apostle in the Book of Acts, we are told, "Paul dwelt two whole years in his own hired house, and received all that came in unto him, preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching those things which concern the Lord Jesus Christ."

A phrase which occurs over one hundred times in the Gospels, not to mention the other New Testament books, is an important phrase. Archbishop Söderblom designated "the kingdom of God" as the central subject of discussion at the Stockholm conference of 1925, and we note that all the discussions, consciously or unconsciously, revolved about that theme. In 1927, a conference which lasted six days was held in Canterbury, England, by a group of English and German theologians, for the purpose of discussing this one subject.

The importance of the theme for our generation is well emphasized by an English bishop. Söderblom quotes him thus: "Every generation finds in the gospel something of peculiar importance for its time which seems to have been neglected in previous periods or in certain cases during the whole history of the church. The great discovery which our generation has made is the tremendous importance which the Gospels place upon the kingdom of God. We can not understand the subordinate place which it has had in theology and religious literature during almost the whole history of Christianity."

The discovery of the meaning of the term "the kingdom of God" has come to many an individual as a revelation with dynamic power. It was the vision of the kingdom which inspired Kagawa, the great Japanese Christian.

The concept of the kingdom of God has its roots in the Old Testament. Jesus did not invent the phrase but took it over from Judaism. The Jews were looking for an ideal king and an ideal kingdom. That kingdom takes on varying aspects in Jewish history, but the ideal was always this, that it would be a kingdom in which the will of God would be accomplished. Jesus took this phrase, which He found at hand, gave to it a richer and fuller meaning, and used it more than any prophet had ever done before him.

The use of the term is rather rare in the epistles as compared to the gospels. The main reason undoubtedly was that when Gentiles were addressed the writers realized that these were not familiar with the term and therefore they used synonymous thought forms and terms. Another reason may have been that the popular conception of the kingdom was political, nationalistic, and imperialistic, and the term therefore had its revolutionary connotations which needed to be avoided.

Through the history of the Christian church a great variety of ideas have been maintained as to the nature of the kingdom of God. On one occasion, we are told, the people wanted to take Jesus by force and make Him king. They were thinking of a temporal and earthly kingdom. When the apostles disputed among themselves as to who was to be the greatest in the kingdom, they, too, were undoubtedly thinking about an earthly kingdom.

The conception that the kingdom was to be an earthly one was revived by some of the early church fathers. They believed that the kingdom of God is the kingdom which Jesus will establish when He comes again. They expected Him to set up a kingdom in Jerusalem and to reign there as a temporal sovereign. Among those who held this view were Papias, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus.

Such a conception of the kingdom has never wholly died out in the history of the church. In times of distress and failure it has usually appeared. In times when faith in progress in history has been difficult to maintain, some form of chiliasm has usually appeared. In the early church the extravagances of the Montanists tended to discredit the doctrine. Time and again they tried to fix the exact time and the exact manner of the Lord's return. The theologians of Alexandria usually opposed this conception of the kingdom, and when

Augustine identified the millennium with the earth-reign of the church, the doctrine lost its ecclesiastical standing (*The City of God,* Book XX, sections 7–11).

All such materialistic conceptions of the kingdom are, as the Augsburg Confession states (Article XVII), attempts to revive Jewish opinions. They are an attempt to revive an interpretation of the kingdom which Jesus rejected. Jesus substituted for this an ideal which was spiritual. The parable of the leaven and the parable of the mustard seed (Mt. 13) can never be made to fit this interpretation. The practical effect of this interpretation is also dangerous because if carried out to its logical conclusion it is bound to cut the nerve for all social endeavor. Instances have been found where disasters have been welcomed as signs of the coming of the kingdom.

Augustine practically identified the kingdom of God with the visible church. The church became an earthly monarchy. The Reformation of the sixteenth century came as a needed corrective of this interpretation of the kingdom. The Lutheran definition of the church can not be considered as synonymous with "the kingdom of God" in all its aspects. Such passages as Mt. 3. 2, Mk. 1. 15, Mt. 5. 3, and Luke 12. 32, indicate clearly that we can not substitute the word "church" for the word "kingdom." The kingdom of God is much the broader concept and includes all human pursuits and interests. If we try to substitute the word church wherever the word kingdom occurs in the Gospels, we shall soon see how absurd it becomes. As was agreed by the church universal at Stockholm in 1925, the church is the means by which God brings in the kingdom. The church is the means by which the kingdom is realized.

Another interpretation of the kingdom is that it is the place where Christians go when they die, or heaven. This is perhaps the most popular view. When Jesus said, "My kingdom is not of this world," He was not thinking in geographical terms, nor did He mean that the kingdom is to be found only on the other side of death. He did mean that the kingdom does not originate in this world, but has its source in God; it is not founded on the principles of this world, and it will not use the means of this world for its propagation and protection. Heaven is a part of God's kingdom, but only a part. The redemptive activity of Christ is to manifest itself not only in heaven but also on earth. Christianity does not only prepare us for death, but it is also destined to influence life here and now. Christianity is other-worldly, but it is also meant to influence life in the present and is concerned with the things of this world. Jesus came in order that we might have life and have it more abundantly.

There are also interpretations of the kingdom which assume that it is possible adequately to express God's purpose for the world in terms of His relation to the individual. The individual and the social order can not be separated, because the Christian lives his life in an environment which affects every phase of his being. The church has recognized this fact of human solidarity through such doctrines as the doctrine of original sin. Certainly the salvation of the individual is necessary and absolutely essential for the advancement of the kingdom. If individuals had not been saved, the kingdom would not have advanced, but we must never forget the leaven of Christianity in the lump of human society as a whole. We pray in the Lord's Prayer that the will of God may be done on earth even as it is in heaven. If we are not interested in realizing the principles of the kingdom of God in society, we had better cease repeating that petition. Like its King, the kingdom of God is transcendent, but it is also immanent in history, and the two conceptions do not exclude each other. Both are true.

What, then, is the kingdom of God? The apostle to the Gentiles gives us a definition of the kingdom. He says, "The kingdom of God is not (does not consist in) eating and drinking (ceremonialism or asceticism), but righteousness and joy and peace in the Holy Spirit." Someone has defined the kingdom as "the domain in which God's holy will is done in and among men." The kingdom of God is the rule of God in the hearts and lives of men. The kingdom of God is not a political unit which can be localized. A kingdom is a realm in which a king's will is law. The kingdom of God is that realm, state, or condition in which the will of God is done. Christians pray, "Thy kingdom come," and this petition is interpreted and expanded in the following petition, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." Wherever God rules, we have the kingdom of God.

The only way to make clear to ourselves what Jesus meant by the kingdom is to study the passages in the New Testament where the expression occurs. By so doing we find that Jesus thought of the kingdom from a threefold point of view. At times He spoke of it as a present reality, at times as something which was in the process of coming, and at times as something which was to come in the future. Neither one of these points of view excludes the other. They are all different aspects of the same kingdom.

Jesus thought of the kingdom as present among men as a potent reality. "And being asked by the Pharisees, when the kingdom of God cometh, he answered them and said, The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; neither shall they say, Lo, Here! or There! for lo, the kingdom of God is within you." This passage might be translated, "For lo, the kingdom of God is in your midst." Both the American Standard and the Authorized Version prefer the former translation, but if we adopt the latter it does not alter the significance of the passage for our purpose, because under any circumstances the kingdom was there presented as being present. Again the present aspect of the kingdom is set forth by Jesus when He said, "But if I by the spirit of God cast out demons, then is the kingdom of God come unto you." And again, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

The kingdom of God is here at present in the subjective state of all individuals who have yielded their lives to the will of Jesus Christ and have submitted to the control of God's will. The kingdom of God is present in all those who find themselves "in a state of grace." It is heaven in the soul, or the individual aspect of God's kingdom. The kingdom of God is also present in the social order in the measure in which God's will is accomplished in the group life of a people.

Jesus also speaks of the kingdom as something which is in the process of developing. The parables of the mustard seed and the leaven emphasize this aspect of the kingdom. The parable of the seed growing secretly presents the same idea. The mission of the Christian as a salt and a light in the world has the same implication. The kingdom is destined to leaven the lump of human society by overcoming that which is contrary to the will of God and by transforming the world into a place in which the spirit of Christ is manifested.

This conception of the kingdom implies a belief in progress or, at least, a faith in the possibility of progress. Such faith is not based upon any natural law of evolution, but it is based upon the fact that God is working in human history. Until modern times the idea of progress never existed outside of Zoroastrianism and the Hebrew-Christian tradition. The Greeks held to the cycle theory of history which has been resurrected by Oswald Spengler in his *Decline of the West.* The idea of progress in the historical process is a definitely Christian point of view. The Hebrew prophets and Jesus saw God in the historical process. God was advancing the ends and the interests of His kingdom in history. He who would hold to the point of view of Jesus and the prophets must take history along. For the Greeks, history led nowhere. Orthodox Christian theology has always struggled to relate the ultimate salvation of the individual with the consummation of the historical process. We must say either that it is possible for the kingdom of God to progress in the onward movement of history or that Jesus and the prophets were mistaken and were simply beating the air as they sought to apply the principles of the kingdom to the social order. If they had been trying to accomplish that which can not be accomplished they could not long remain very high in our estimation. Much of the activity of both Jesus and the prophets loses all meaning unless history has something to do with the kingdom of God and the kingdom of God with history. The Christian is not a superficial optimist, for he is well aware of the reality of sin in the world. This world is evil enough, and the Christian is realistic about it, but he still holds that it is the world that God made and orders according to His providence. The doctrines of creation and redemption belong together, and the historical process is looked upon as leading somewhere. Neither is the Christian a pessimist, for he believes that God lives, and he has faith in the power of God to conquer the forces of evil. The Christian is a meliorist and believes in the possibility of progress.

The fact that there has been progress is something which can not be statistically demonstrated. The marks of progress are intangibles which can not be weighed on a scale nor measured in mathematical terms. Moral qualities can, however, be appreciated and the judgment of better or worse passed upon them. As I look back over history, I believe that there has been progress, I believe that the value and sacredness of personality are recognized today more than they have ever been before.

I believe that the principles of the kingdom of God are applied in the social progress to a greater extent as the millenniums pass in review. However, this question is a question of minor importance. We believe that progress is possible and we do not enter into the fray with a defeatist attitude. We know our duty. We follow that path of duty and leave the future to God.

Another question which concerns us in this connection is this, To what extent can we hope to realize the kingdom of God on earth? We pray for it in the third petition of the Lord's Prayer. Will we ever see the kingdom of God in its perfection on earth? We must not deprecate this earth as merely the scene of probation for a future life. This life, too, has its intrinsic values. However, I do not believe that this earth is capable of being the scene for the ultimate consummation of the kingdom of God. Many reasons for this belief might be advanced. Our globe will sooner or later reach a stage where it will be incapable of sustaining life. What we are interested in emphasizing is this, that by the grace of God we must strive to realize more of the kingdom of God on earth than we have at present, and by so striving we shall attain more than we now have. Christians must not withdraw to the fortress of individual salvation and then be content to see the world perish.

The third point of view from which Jesus viewed the kingdom was that of the future. This aspect is brought out by such passages as this one, "And I say unto you, that many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven." Jesus employs the term in an eschatological sense. The full consummation of the kingdom of God belongs to the future. The present, the progressive and the future aspects of the kingdom run side by side throughout the teaching of Jesus. The glorious and full consummation lies in the future. This ultimate consummation, our highest good, is the goal and purpose of God for human history and the human race.

The Imitation of Christ.—The kingdom of God finds its central realization in the imitation of Christ. The Christian should grow "unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" (Eph. 4. 13). The pattern after which the Christian self should develop is Christ. The Christian strives to become ever more Christlike. This ideal is no abstract theory, but one which has been historically given in the historical Jesus. The Christian ideal is a personality creative in the moral realm. The kingdom of God is to be built by persons having Christlike characters.

As soon as we ask ourselves the question what we mean by the imitation of Christ, we realize that we have a problem on our hands. Jesus lived the life of a celibate; he never assumed the duties or obligations of husband or father. He showed little interest in art, science, or philosophy. The historical Jesus never saw a modern factory and never faced the ethical and moral problems which the modern machine age has produced. There are those who feel that there is something incongruous about any effort to apply the teaching and example of Jesus in our factories in Detroit, or Chicago, or New York. How could an individual who lived two thousand years ago, in far-away Palestine, have anything to say to the twentieth century?

Likewise we are brought face to face with a problem when we look at the impact of Christianity upon personality in history. The Christian life has unfolded itself in a great variety of forms. There is the hermit, the monk, the crusader, the social reformer. They all claim to be inspired by Jesus in their particular mode of life and attitude. Furthermore, the Christian life unfolds itself in connection with the life of the family, in connection with education, patriotism, economic effort, art, science, and various other fields of endeavor.

In the midst of all this diversity, what can it mean to imitate Christ or to order our lives in imitation of His? Underneath all these diversities we can detect a self-same spirit. The outstanding feature in all variety is the sense of the reality of God pressing in upon human conduct and exerting its influence upon it. Jesus never gave us a code of laws as regulative for conduct and He never outlined any program for His followers. He did give us a spirit that we are to apply to our various problems. That spirit is applicable to all times, all problems, all conditions. Had Jesus given us a code of laws, His religion might have easily become a brake to progress and the exponent of a static culture, but His spirit is adaptable to an ever-changing environment and has a message for all times and conditions. Christian ethics will therefore never become obsolete or outworn. We are not called upon to slavishly follow Christ in His manner of life but rather to lay hold of His spirit and apply that to our problems and conditions. That spirit is a spirit of love, and what love means we shall consider under the head of the Christian virtues. Christians are not called to outward imitation but to obedience to Jesus' inner spirit. Jesus is our model in disposition in relation to God and man.

The Law.—The law of God is the rule and criterion for man's acting and being. It is the binding rule or obligation for the world. It is the rule which man as a moral being is obligated to obey. Christian ethics finds its basis in the will of God, and it looks upon the law as the expression of the will of God. Protestantism finds this will or law revealed in the Holy Scriptures, which are the rule, not only of faith, but also of practice.

The decalogue has often been spoken of as a summary of the law. Such a statement is inadequate, at least until the decalogue is interpreted in the light and in the spirit of the New Testament. However, through the decalogue (Exodus 20. 1–17) a covenant relationship was established between Jehovah and His people which was morally conditioned. This circumstance reflects one of the greatest advances in the history of religion. The significance of the decalogue as a moral guide is well emphasized by the fact that it still serves as the guide of millions of people. It would be difficult to find a document which has exercised a greater influence upon religious and moral life than the decalogue. The ethical status of the world would be lower were it not for the influence of the Ten Commandments.

Parallels to the legislation of the decalogue may be found outside of the history of the Hebrew people. Striking parallels between the code of Hammurabi and the decalogue may be pointed out. Hammurabi lived centuries before Moses, having reigned in Babylon between 2081 and 2024 B.C. In Exodus 34. 1 Jehovah is said to have written the decalogue. ("I will write upon the tables the words that were on the first tables, which thou brakest.") In Exodus 34. 28 we are told that Moses wrote the ten commandments. ("And he (Moses) wrote upon the tables the words of the covenant, the ten commandments.") Apparently, to say that God wrote the ten commandments and to say that Moses wrote them is to say the same thing. In Exodus 31. 18 we are told that "the two tables of the testimony, tables of stone," were written "with the finger of God." In Luke 11. 20 Jesus defends Himself against His adversaries by saying, "But if I by the finger of God cast out demons, then is the kingdom of God come upon you." It is evident that the expression "the finger of God" means the power of God. Whatever may have been the mode of revelation or whatever the historical process which served as a medium of this revelation, we are sure that these commandments came from God.

The first striking feature of the decalogue is its monotheism. Whatever the implications of the first commandment, the fact remains that it did introduce a practical monotheism. The image of Jahweh could not be made in stone. Jahweh was a spiritual being, too sublime to be represented by an image, too great to be portrayed in the likeness of an animal. Here is a conception which needs no defense and which stands forth in greater significance when viewed in the light of contemporary religious ideas and ideals. Reverence for things holy, a fundamental characteristic of religion, is inculcated. Provision is made for worship. Anarchy is guarded against. The sacredness of life is recognized. The sex instinct is regulated. Property rights are protected, and truthfulness is required. The decalogue likewise takes into account the inner motive in that it forbids coveting. It is remarkable to find this evangelical note in the early legislation (Cf. Mt. 5. 28).

The Sabbath commandment has a ceremonial side as well as a moral side. In Col. 2. 16, Paul says, "Let no man therefore judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a feast day or a new moon or a sabbath day." Then he goes on to speak of these things as "a shadow of the things to come." In writing to the Galatians, Paul says, "Ye observe days, and months, and seasons, and years. I am afraid of you, lest by any means I have bestowed labor upon you in vain" (Gal. 4. 10–11). Paul includes the Sabbath commandment among those features of the law which have fallen away with the coming of Christ. In his struggles with the Judaizers in Galatia, he sets himself against the reintroduction of the Sabbath law. The statement that God requires one-seventh of man's time is false and violates the very spirit of the gospel. God does not require one-seventh of man's time, but rather all of man's time. No one day is, per se, more holy than any other. In crossing the Pacific ocean, there is a line, established by international agreement, where a day is dropped or added, depending upon the direction in which the vessel is going when it crosses the line. This might prove to give the traveler two successive Saturdays or Sundays, the one following immediately upon the other. If one day were more holy than another, *per se*, which one of these Saturdays or Sundays would be the holy one or the most holy? The Christian observance of Sunday is not a transfer of the Old Testament Sabbath observance. The Sabbath law does not exist for the Christian. We might choose to observe any day in the week for rest and worship. All days are equally holy. It is to be noted that Luther in his explanation of this commandment never mentions the "day" but merely says, "We should so fear and love God, as not to despise His Word and the preaching of the gospel, but deem it holy, and willingly hear and learn it." The ceremonial side of this commandment does not apply to Christians. There is an aspect of this commandment, however, which has a permanent religious and moral significance. Man must have rest from physical labor, and if he is to develop spiritually, he must be given opportunity for worship. The spirit of this commandment is broken unless we observe Sunday for these purposes. These are moral matters and they have abiding significance.

The moral aspects of the commandment are of permanent significance, even though the ceremonial aspect of it has ceased to be binding.

There are some civil points of view in the Ten Commandments which were of only temporary significance. Obedience to the fourth commandment would be rewarded with length of days "in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." Respect for authority was inculcated and must be maintained if the nation was to continue to exist in Palestine (the land which God had given them). This promise was directed only to the people to whom it was first given. However, there is a moral aspect to this commandment as well. Respect for authority is the antithesis of anarchy, with which no nation can long endure. A moral principle of universal significance is thus inculcated.

The decalogue thus contains some ceremonial and civil elements which might cause us to question the propriety of speaking of it "as a summary of the law." It is also to be noted that the emphasis in the decalogue is usually negative. The commandments consist to a large extent of prohibitions, introduced with the phrase, "Thou shalt not." The law, as an expression of God's will, is not only something negative but also something positive, in the light particularly of the New Testament. The foolish virgins were shut out from the marriage feast because they had neglected to do something which they should have done. The sin of the priest and the Levite was not that they had wounded the man on the road between Jerusalem and Jericho but that they neglected to help him. Dives suffers in hell, not because he did anything to hurt Lazarus, but because he failed to help him. Thus the parables of Jesus teach the positive aspects of doing the will of God. The decalogue is a marvelous revelation of the will of God but hardly a summary of it.

A word may be said here about the numbering of the commandments. The Old Testament itself speaks of the number of the commandments in the decalogue as ten (Exodus 34. 28; Deut. 4. 13). There really are eleven commandments, but we can maintain the number ten by combining the first and second into one, as has been done by the Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches, or by combining the last two into one, as is done by the Reformed church. The method of numbering the commandments is not of vital importance, but it would serve to obviate confusion if a common system were adopted and adhered to.

We need to remind ourselves of the fact that the will of God is not broken up in a number of atomistic units. The will of God and the law of God is a unity. James stresses this unity when he says, "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all" (2. 10). James does not mean to say that he who has stolen has therefore committed adultery, or murder, or borne false witness. He is stating a deep moral truth by pointing out that if a man willfully transgresses one commandment, he shows that in principle he sits loose to all. Actual transgression of one commandment involves a potential transgression of all. If a person willfully transgresses one commandment, it is only by virtue of favorable circumstances that he does not transgress the others. The unity of the law is emphasized by Jesus when He says in His answer to the lawyer, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments the whole law hangeth and the prophets" (Mt. 22. 37–40). The sum and substance of the law is love, and the law finds its unity in love. Any and all individual commandments must be an expression of love.

Two extreme attitudes have manifested themselves within the Christian movement with respect to the relation of the Christian to the law. On the one side is nomism and on the other antinomianism. Nomism looks upon the law as a number of outward precepts. The law is to be fulfilled by paying attention to the letter of it. The law is an aggregation of individual precepts and regulations. Rules for conduct are parceled out in a multitude of individual commands and prohibitions. The unity of the law, as love, is lost sight of, and the nomist often becomes hard, censorious, and disagreeable. The Jewish rabbis with their 264 prohibitions and 284 precepts, which they had spun out of the law, are a typical example of nomism. The party known as the Judaizers, whose attitude precipitated the apostolic council in Jerusalem in the year 50, and against which Paul had to struggle through his missionary career, were nomists. In his letters to the Romans, to the Corinthians, and to the Galatians, Paul is emphatically counteracting the influence of the Judaizers with their nomistic tendencies. We find references to them in all of Paul's epistles. Pietism has tended to develop nomistic tendencies in various branches of its development.

The Christian must not lose sight of the unity of the law as a law of love. The Scriptures can not be used as a book of laws for the governance of the Christian life. There is a paradoxical lack of consistency in the application of this principle. There are those who recognize and apply the principle in some cases and completely forget it in others. If we were to use the Scripture as a code of laws for the regulation of conduct, we would be constrained by 1 Cor. 11. 15 to prohibit women from bobbing their hair. We would be constrained by Mk. 9. 43

to seek the help of the surgeon in solving moral problems. It is evident that cutting off a hand does not get at the seat or the root of sin. It would become impossible to use women Sunday school teachers (1 Tim. 2. 11–12). We should have to insist upon women wearing a hat when praying (1 Cor. 11. 5). Sometimes the rules of the New Testament are laid down for special situations and occasions (Mt. 19. 21). Communism was practiced by the members of the early Jerusalem church, but Christians have not as a rule felt the example of the Jerusalem church to be incumbent upon them (Acts 2. 43–45, 5. 4). The New Testament does not in so many words forbid slavery nor prohibit war, yet Christians have come to realize that the application of Christian principles to society demands the abolition of both. Again, the law of love is a spirit, applicable to each and every new situation as it arises. The Bible does not offer ready-made solutions or precepts for concrete cases but rather reveals eternal principles. Christianity thus becomes applicable to all times and not the guardian of a static culture or civilization, like Buddhism or Mohammedanism. The nomist errs in seeking to apply rules instead of a spirit. To be a slave to the letter of the law is not the substance of Christian ethics.

Antinomianism rejects the authority of law. There is an echo of the maxim of the antinomian spirit in the words, "All things are lawful for me" and in the words, "Meats for the belly, and the belly for meats," in 1 Cor. 6. 12–13. The antinomian divorces religion from morality and morality from religion. The Nicolaitans (Rev. 2. 6) were apparently a party which converted the liberty of the gospel into license for the flesh. One group of Gnostics were antinomian in their outlook. In practical life the Gnostics were divided into two groups which at first thought appear to be antithetical to each other but on closer scrutiny are found to be branches of the same stock. They all believed that matter was evil. Since matter was evil, one group took to the practice of asceticism. The other party argued that since matter was evil, the body also was evil and only the soul of man could be kept pure. Let the body sin and give it license, because it is only the soul that has any value. The soul is the arena of religion, and the body has no religious value. It matters not what a man does with his body. The body may indulge in sin without any harm to the spiritual life. This tendency Paul combats in his letter to the Colossians. In the first epistle of John we also find the author at grips with antinomianism (2. 3–8 and 3. 22–24). At the time of the Reformation, antinomianism found a champion in the person of Johann Agricola. Together with his followers he taught that a man is justified if he only believes the promises of the gospel, no matter how impure his life may be. The believer is above the law. He suggested that all who had anything to do with Moses should go to the devil and that Moses be hanged (Disputation at Wittenberg, 1537). In England this sect had its adherents under the name of the "Ranters." Various orthodoxistic movements have tended to identify faith with intellectual assent to dogma to the neglect of the ethical emphasis, approaching an antinomian attitude.

John Wesley defined this doctrine as that which "makes void the law through faith." The moral law is as eternal as the will of God and can not be abolished. It will be binding as long as the will of God is binding. Christian liberty is not license. The change affected in man by Christianity is an ethical change, and the gospel of salvation by faith does not relax moral obligation. The Christian must not use or interpret his freedom as a "cloak of wickedness" (1 Pet. 2. 16).

The law has its value for the Christian. Christianity recognizes a distinction between human and divine law, between that which is legal and that which is moral. Legality and morality are not always synonymous. The validity of civil law rests upon external power and authority, but the moral rests upon inner grounds. The result of transgressing civil law is outer punishment, but the result of transgressing moral law is inner self-depreciation.

Civil law will be the more or less adequate expression of the moral consciousness of the community or the rulers and may therefore be fallible. Civil law can not reach or change the disposition of man. The divine moral law is of value for human law in serving as a guide in the framing of such laws. The improvement of human laws must be brought about by enlightening the moral sense of the community through the divine law. Here we touch upon the sphere in which the church can exert the greatest influence on the social order. The church must enlighten the conscience of its membership to the end that Christians may come to a common mind on social problems and to the end that the will of God may be done in the public as well as in the private affairs of men. The church will thus indirectly influence the moral sense of those who are outside of its fold.

The apostle Paul speaks of a pedagogical use of the law when he calls the law a "tutor to bring us unto Christ" (Gal. 3. 24). The law is a disciplinarian who by his chastisement causes us to see our need of grace and pardon. Without the law, sin is dormant (Rom. 7. 7–13). The law also has a didactic purpose for the Christian and serves him as a guide in his Christian living.

Chapter IX

CHRISTIAN VIRTUE AND DUTY

Virtue.—Virtue is an active quality or power. To choose the good habitually is to be virtuous. Virtue has reference to a permanent quality or character of the will which manifests itself in devotion to goodness. That which makes the Christian character what it is is its virtuous principle. To desire the good is to be virtuous. The steadfast direction of the will to the realization of the Christian highest good is Christian virtue. "My heart is fixed, O God, my heart is fixed," said the Psalmist (Ps. 57. 7). That is virtue. Expressions such as "life in the Spirit," "walking in the Spirit," and "the mind of the Spirit" express the idea of the unitary principle of Christian virtue.

Virtue being a quality of character can not be atomistic. The various Christian virtues must be a unity, and that unity is found in love. Love is the primary virtue in Christianity. The apostle Paul speaks of love as the greatest of the Christian graces. "Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love" (1 Cor. 13. 13). Faith and hope are receptive and have reference to getting; love is communicative and has reference to giving. Christ Himself exalted love when He said, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." The New Testament does not speak of God as either faith or hope, but it does say that "God is love" (1 John 4. 8). If love is the highest conception we can have of God, it is evident that we can think of no higher ideal for man. The Christian character is formed in faith, but it lives in love. Faith energizes in love. "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith working through love" (Gal. 5. 6). Love includes all the other Christian virtues. All Christian virtues grow out of love to God and man. Out of this root clusters of virtues grow (Gal. 5. 22–23, Eph. 5. 9–10, 2 Pet. 1. 5–8). Faith and love are the formal cause and the material principle of the same character. Just as a flower gives off its fragrance by virtue of its nature, so the life of faith issues in love. Love is the unifying and prime virtue of Christianity. Justice is one virtue which must never be separated from love. Only that love is true love which is just. No form of injustice can be reconciled with Christian love, no matter how much sentimentality there may be in that love. The Christian professing to have love for his fellow man while tolerating injustice being done to him does not have Christian love. If he would but realize that justice is a part and an aspect of love, many caricatures of Christian love would be avoided. Gifts of money unjustly earned to charitable causes, for example, are not an indication of Christian virtue.

Love to God.—Christian love manifests itself in love to God, love to ourselves, and love to our fellow men. The question has sometimes been asked what it might mean to love God, with the implication that such an attitude seems impossible. Love is a judgment of value, a sentiment of interest, a giving of one's life to another and finding one's life in another. It is a love of the same things and a striving for the same ends and purposes. It is primarily a matter of the will and of being one in purpose with God. When love is thus defined and understood, there can be no objection to speaking about love to God. Love to God, as well as Christian love in general, is not simply amativeness or sentimentalism. Sex terminology has sometimes been used in describing the relation between God and the individual. Such usage has drawn down upon itself well-merited rebuke. The Scriptures themselves do make use of figures from sex life, but there is not a single such figure in all the Scriptures which describes the relation of the individual to God. Those figures always refer to corporate bodies or groups, such as the church or the nation (Hos. 2. 2 ff. and Eph. 5. 23 ff.).

Love to God manifests itself in worship and adoration and also in service to our fellow men.

There is a sense in which all sin is sin against God. Man is not self-existing. He has been brought into being by a power higher than himself. Man must therefore be in harmony with the power which has brought him into being and to which he is obligated, if he is to be an ethical being. Any sin, therefore, whether it be against God, self, or fellow man, is a sin against God, because it separates man in purpose from God. This is what the Psalmist meant when he said, "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned" (Ps. 51. 4). The converse of this is also true. Man may serve God and manifest his love to God by service to his fellow man. This is what Jesus meant when He said, "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me" (Mt. 25. 40). Every deed has a cosmic relationship and is thus related to God. The unqualified self-surrender of man to God and His purposes is love to God. Such a commitment will naturally issue in worship and adoration.

The love of God grows and develops as we contemplate His love toward us. "We love, because he first loved us" (1 John 4. 19). Love to God can not be produced by a command, but must grow as a spontaneous response as we comprehend God's love. Meditation is a valuable asset in the development of this love. In meditation we allow the mind to dwell upon some object, in this case, the love of God. The study of the Scriptures brings to us a revelation of the love of God, particularly in Jesus Christ, and this will elicit a response on our part, which is love. It is always the object of our love which elicits our love. It is not something which we manufacture. Man commits himself unqualifiedly to God because of what God is in His revelation of Himself. Therefore, if love to God is to grow and develop, we must expose ourselves to those means through which His love is revealed, particularly the Bible.

The love of the Christian to God constitutes a childlike relationship. This is something new and unique, which Jesus brought into the world. Paul expresses it beautifully when he says that the Christian has received "the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father" (Rom. 8. 15). Through Christ the Christian has been taught to regard God as "Father."

The first epistle of Peter urges the Christian to "pass the time of . . . sojourning in fear" (1. 17). The love of God is joined with fear. It is to be noted that Luther begins the explanation of every commandment with the expression, "We should so fear and love God . . ." The Christian realizes and recognizes his responsibility and obligation to God, and this inspires him with a reverent fear. This fear is not the shrinking fear of the slave, nor is it the fear of the coward, but it is the fear of being untrue and disloyal to God.

Love to Ourselves.—Love is not only self-impartation but also self-affirmation. If love requires the giving of myself, that self must be of some value, or the giving of the self would lose its significance. There can be no value in giving something which is valueless. Love to self is implied in the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Mt. 22. 39). The meaning of life and the self must be identified. This is fundamental for all ethics and morality. The ultimate ethical duty is to become one's own true self. We must love ourselves in the effort to bring ourselves to the ideal which God has set before us. We owe it to ourselves to develop and care for both body and soul in the best possible manner. The question as to what constitutes the good life has long been debated among philosophers and moralists. All thinkers would undoubtedly agree that the good life consists in the exercise of our highest faculties upon appropriate subject matter, interspersed with intervals of recreation in art, music, and nature, and conversation with friends. The culture of the self will be necessary in order to live the good life. Self-culture must be guarded against degenerating into a refined epicureanism or a pessimistic stoicism. Excessive selfishness and other byways from the road to self-culture may be avoided if it is remembered that culture is a means to service and service is the way to culture. Culture does not lie in the attitudes of selfishness but in those attitudes which make for service. Man becomes most truly himself when he lives in harmony with God and in a spirit of good will to his fellow men. It is on this path that man approaches the goal of his true being and becomes what God intended him to be. Self-affirmation is therefore not selfishness but love. It is *love* that is being affirmed as the quality which gives value to personality. Self-affirmation and self-respect must be an element of true love. Without them love may simply be lust and it might be dissociated from such qualities as holiness, justice, and righteousness. We are to love ourselves by striving to realize the goal which God has set before us. The honor of our personality is always to be respected. No spirit of self-sacrifice obligates man to sacrifice his honor. Jesus Himself is the supreme example of sacrifice, but He maintained His integrity. Self-sacrifice is not an end in itself but a means to attain love's noblest ends. Self-sacrifice is justified only as it secures to man the higher or supreme ends of life. Therefore even self-denial and self-sacrifice are not negations of self-affirmation and self-respect but affirmations of it. To disregard the value of our own personalities is as immoral as to disregard the personality of others.

Love to One's Neighbor.—Love to one's neighbor is self-impartation and self-existence in others. Man gives himself to and identifies himself with others. The latter implies vicariousness and sympathy. Love to our neighbor is not to be identified with friendship. Friendship implies intimacy and harmony of mind and purpose and mutual understanding. It is possible to love a person without "liking" him, according to this conception of Christian love. Christian love for one's neighbor is primarily a matter of good will, benevolence and a desire for that which is good for others. It implies that "whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them" (Mt. 7. 12). God loves with a love of complacency, a seeking and saving love, a love of compassion, and the Christian should reflect this love in all its aspects. Christian love of fellow men is also universal in scope. The Greeks spoke of the barbarians and the Jews of the Gentiles. In each case there was a barrier between the two classes. All forms of race prejudice must give way before Christian love. (See Luke 10. 25 ff.) "There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female; for ye all are one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3. 28). According to Mt. 5. 44 and Luke 23. 34 Christian love even extends to enemies.

In dealing with our fellow men we are in the realm of the social, and Christian love in this realm involves one fundamental principle. This principle is that our fellow men are beings like ourselves, with the same fundamental rights, and are to be looked upon as ends in themselves and not to be used as means for our own selfish purposes or the selfish purposes of others. Human values are the supreme test in the realm of social living. Men, not things, are to be made the goal of our social relationships. This principle was enunciated by the prophets of the Old Testament. They condemned cruelty in wars of conquest, they denounced slavery, they took the part of the oppressed over against the privileged classes, and they denounced the evils of child labor. Under all these attacks upon specific evils lay the principle that human rights are superior to property rights or any other rights. If cheap labor and bigger profits are more important than human rights and values, there is no meaning in the condemnation of slavery or child labor. If the possession of land is more important than human rights, condemning wars of conquest and the dispossession of the poor has no meaning. The fundamental principle which underlies all the social theory of the prophets was that human rights are primary and must come first. We find the same emphasis in the teaching of Jesus. For Him even the sacred ceremonials of religion were made subject to that end. He even looked upon the Sabbath commandment from this point of view when He said, "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath" (Mark 2. 27). He defended the action of His disciples (Mark 2. 23) on the principle that human need comes before ceremonial purity. On another occasion Jesus said, "For what shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life?" (Mt. 16. 26). Whatever else this question may mean, it does mean this, that a single "life" is of more value than all the world. Not only in direct teaching but also through His whole attitude and bearing, Jesus stressed this principle. A Christian social order would be a society in which the true development of human personality comes first and all other things would be made subordinate to that end. For Christian social theory, man is the end, and he must never be made the means to any other end.

This principle that man is not to be used as a means but always to be considered an end is no mere utopian dream. It is a principle which is practical and has worked for the uplift of society and a better social order. In fact the application of this principle is the one thing which has worked toward true progress in civilization. The path of history is strewn with the wreckage of nations and peoples who have violated it. There lie Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and modern European nations. No one will deny that the emancipation of the slave was a step in the direction of progress for civilization. That emancipation was a recognition of the principle that man is an end and not a means in social living. Infanticide has come to be recognized as wrong and has been more and more restricted and childhood has been coming to its rights. Child labor is being attacked and is being progressively eliminated. The application of Christian principles to the problems of childhood has proved a boon to childhood. In many lands and climes woman has been and still is a piece of property. The emancipation of woman is due to a realization of the validity of the Christian social principle. Our American school system is an application of this principle to education. The rich man's child and the poor man's child go to the same school. Nominally, at least, they enjoy the same privileges. The rich man may pay a great deal of taxes for the support of that institution and perhaps the poor man pays little or nothing. Looked at from the point of view of selfishness and profits, the public school would represent senseless waste. Yet the public school is a good institution of which we want more instead of less. It is a recognition of the fact that man is the highest social value we know. Democracy in the realm of government is the closest approach to this principle we know. Democracy has had some setbacks in the form of dictatorships, but I am firmly convinced that democracy is progress and every other form of government is retrogression which will ultimately mean its own undoing. Any dictatorship sows the seeds of its own destruction. The only principle that has been tried and found to work in the long run is the social principle for which Christianity stands. Its application will do away with the evils of child labor, of the sweat shop, of unemployment (even though we are forced to cut working hours and keep up wages); it will do away with unsanitary conditions for labor and eliminate the hazards to health and safety for the laborer.

We live in an age when there has been remarkable progress along the lines of mechanical contrivances. Our age has been called the machine age. With steam and electric power came the machine. With the machine man can do far more work than without it, and the result has been unemployment. One of the fundamental causes of unemployment is the machine. What is the solution for the problem? There are three roads open. One way would be to kill off all the unemployed, and in order to get social approval for the act we might call it a war. The second would be to destroy the machine and go back to the days of handicraft. The first alternative will not appeal to those who must do the suffering and the bleeding and dying. The second would be insanity. We can not afford to turn our backs upon the inventive genius of our men of science and our mechanical engineers. The third and only reasonable way is to commence to interpret the machine in terms of the welfare of men and women. Unemployment stops the wheels of industry by cutting off purchasing power. Our economic order must be interpreted in the light of the principle that human welfare, not profits, is the goal of social living.

Our problem is no longer production. We can produce all we need. Our problem is distribution. There is need in the midst of abundance. There is scarcity in the midst of plenty. There is only one reason for a situation of this kind, namely this, that something other than human welfare has been made the goal of life. We are not presenting an apologetic for Christianity, even though this approach does become that. Christianity needs no apologetic. What it needs is a trial and what our civilization needs is to give it a trial. Either we shall adopt this fundamental social principle of Christianity for our social living, or our civilization is doomed. We are forced to recognize that man is an end and not a means, or we perish.

Duty.—Duty is the moral obligation imposed by the moral ideal as a condition for its attainment. Teaching concerning duty is instruction in what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided. Duty is related to virtue as function to organ, as the act to the disposition, as the law to the imitation of Christ. Virtue is the quality of character which enables man to discharge the duty which corresponds to that virtue. In other words, virtue reveals itself in acts of duty.

Duty and law are not identical. The concept of duty does remind one of the concept of law, but duty refers to an individualization of the law. When law requires its realization in a particular case, it becomes duty. Duty is law realized in the individual person. Duties are different for different individuals. It may be my duty to send for a doctor for a person who has a fractured bone. It is the duty of the doctor to set the fractured bone. It is the teacher's duty to teach and the students' duty to go to class. It is the janitor's duty to build a fire and keep the house of worship clean and the minister's duty to preach. Man's vocation determines to a large extent what his duty may be.

Vocation.—The Roman Catholic church divided men into two classes. One class was to busy itself with the things of religion and the other was to engage in the secular or worldly life. The first class, it was believed, might gain more merit than they needed for themselves and this merit might be used to help out in the salvation of those engaged in the secular relations of life. Against this attitude Luther protested, insisting that God's will can be done in our vocation in secular life. The Roman Catholic solution for the moral problem is of no value because it really sidesteps the whole problem.

The ideal of perfection of monasticism is its worst feature.

The restoration of the vocation to its rightful place, which the Reformation brought about, was simply a return to Biblical Christianity, according to Paul who said, "Let each man abide in that calling wherein he was called" (1 Cor. 7. 20). It was not necessary to become a hermit, a monk, or an ecclesiastic in order to follow Christ. The Christian is to be in but not of the world, said Jesus (John 17). God may be served in and through the secular callings of life. Luther put it thus: "To serve God is for every one to remain in his vocation and calling, be it ever so mean and simple" (*Table Talk*, translated by Hazlitt, p. 447). Again he said, "When a poor servant maid sweeps the house and does it because God has commanded her, she does a better work and renders God a greater service than did Anthony in the desert."

Man's vocation should correspond to his natural endowments. It can not be the will of God that I should spend myself in tasks which are impossible for me or for which I am not fitted. A vocation, therefore, should be carefully and deliberately chosen. We are justified in considering ways and means by which we shall be able adequately to support ourselves and provide for our temporal needs. We are likewise justified in considering the needs of those dependent upon us. Still the primary consideration in the choice of a vocation should not be mere external prosperity; the choice should rather be made on the basis of the degree in which we may further the highest good. Under no circumstances is it right to choose a calling which renders the practice of the spirit of Jesus impossible or which makes it impossible or difficult to supply the needs of the soul. Vocation, from the Christian point of view, must be looked upon as a call from God, and when thus viewed the most menial task is more dignified than the rule of an empire without such reference. Deeds done and viewed as serving the ends of the cosmic process are religious in character. We need not give up our earthly calling in order to be holy. We are to do the will of God in that calling.

This does not mean that there are to be no special religious activities. A one-sided interpretation of the place of the calling may lead to a false naturalism. In primitive society, religion embraced the whole of life. Sowing, reaping, birth, death, law, medicine, and morality, all were religiously conditioned. Likewise, throughout the Middle Ages the church exercised control, to some extent, over practically all of life. In our day, a very large sector of life has declared its autonomy. Among us there is a rather sharp line drawn between the religious and the secular, and the result has been that religion has often lost contact with life and reality. Yet there is a sense in which religion is *one* of the functions of life. Religion needs its own organ, the church, in order to function, and the activities connected with that institution are specifically religious. Also the cultic practices and the devotional life of the individual are specifically religious. Religion is one thing in life, but it is that which imparts a certain quality to all of life, if it is to be vital. There can be no absolute separation between religion and the secular because religion demands a unification of life under its control. As frequently stated, religion is the whole of life viewed *sub specie aeternitatis.* Religion can not rest satisfied with any ultimate dualism between the religious and the secular. That harmony, even though it may seem paradoxical, must be brought about by an emphasis on the contrast between the sacred and the secular. The secular will never become so permeated with the spirit of religion that religion will not be needed as something *apart.* Worship is a kind of "celebration of life." It is a magnifying glass by which we look at life from the religious point of view. Through worship, as it were, we stop to take our breath for the race, apart from which we can not run. The rays from the sun impart a certain quality to our atmosphere, yet the sun is not the atmosphere but something apart from it. In the same sense religion is something apart and yet it permeates all of life with a certain quality. We must guard against the dualism of Romanism on the one hand and against a false naturalism on the other. There are certain specifically religious activities in the life of the Christian and these must determine the quality of all of life.

The Conflict of Duties.—Theoretically there can be only one duty at a time. Were our conscience keen enough, there would never be any conflict of duties. We should seek to make of conscience an instrument so keen that the problems arising from apparent conflict of duties may be reduced and, if possible, vanish. In the case of Jesus apparently there were no conflicting duties. When in the temple at the age of twelve, He undoubtedly realized His obligations to Mary and Joseph, but there was no wavering in His mind as to His duty when He said, "Knew ye not that I must be about my Father's business" (Luke 2. 49). Practically, however, because conscience is not as developed as it ought to be, it does at times become difficult to determine what our duty may be in a given situation. At times men find that the claims of public and private life clash. Shall I go to prison, if necessary in order to remain faithful to my convictions, and thus leave those dependent upon me to provide for their temporal needs? Or, shall I be untrue to my convictions, at least by remaining silent, and thus be left free to provide for them? Many such conflicting claims upon duty have arisen and may arise.

In all cases where duties conflict, the only right choice is to heed the voice of conscience. We must never act contrary to what conscience tells us to do. If it be possible to defer action without immoral consequences, it is sometimes well to wait in the hope of attaining clarity in the matter of our attitude and action. If forced to act at once, we must choose what seems to us to be the right thing. There are a number of considerations which may help conscience in determining the course of action. When we are called upon to serve God in our vocation, the deed most intimately connected with our vocation is the one which ought to be done. Another consideration is the matter as to which of the conflicting duties, if done, would render the greatest service to our fellow men. The duty which, when realized, will bring the greatest good to our fellow men is undoubtedly to be preferred. A third consideration is the question as to which claim requires my initiative. There may be some good left undone unless I do it, and in such a case my duty is clear. Under any and all circumstances we must avoid violating the dictates of our conscience.

Casuistry.—The theological discipline which seeks to determine which among several possible moral actions is the most probable course of duty is called casuistic. It deals with those cases of conscience which arise from the conflict of duties. It is a kind of directory and legal guide for the individual. It has been cultivated by Roman Catholic theologians for use in connection with the confessional. It has never enjoyed great favor in Protestant circles, yet there have been Protestant theologians who have cultivated it, especially during the seventeenth century. Questions such as whether suicide is permissible in order to escape disgrace, whether murder in self-defense is justifiable, have been discussed.

One of the chief objections to casuistry is the fact that it lays down a number of general rules for conduct. It thus tends to look upon both sin and virtue too atomistically. There is not sufficient emphasis on an inner unitary principle governing moral conduct. We have already stressed the fact that Christianity is a religion of the spirit and not of the letter, and a set of rules always seems out of place in Christian ethics. Often casuistry has also degenerated into a kind of sophistry in the moral realm. The moral judgment is taken out of the realm of conscience, and the church or the ecclesiastic is made the keeper of the conscience. The moral autonomy of the individual is thus sacrificed in casuistry. Conscience must decide in the moral realm, or Christian ethics as disposition or intention ethics loses its significance.

Probabilism.—Closely connected with the casuistic discipline is the doctrine of probabilism. Probabilism is applicable only in cases where duty or obligation is in doubt. The argument runs that a doubtful law imposes no obligation on conscience and that man has liberty till obligation is imposed. Authorities may be cited for two different courses of action in a given case. One course may be more probable than the other. Probabilism says that we are under no obligation to follow the more probable of the two courses but that we are free to adopt either course and may choose the one that accords with our inclination. The principle of probabilism is, "Si est opinio probabilis, licitum est eam sequi, licet opposita sit probabilior."

Probabilism is at fault in that it takes the moral judgment out of the realm of conscience and places it in the realm of ecclesiastical opinion. At times it also lodges the moral judgment in the realm of inclination, which can never be a moral norm. It also sacrifices the moral autonomy of the individual. Really it leaves the moral realm altogether in that it considers what *may* be done instead of what *ought* to be done.

Adiaphora.—Adiaphora have reference to the realm of the indifferent or to those things which the Christian may do or may omit doing without fault. There is a sphere of activity which the Christian is neither commanded or forbidden to engage in. The problem relative to adiaphora arose even in New Testament times (Mt. 15. 11; 15. 20; Rom. 14. 1–6; 1 Cor. 8. 8; Col. 2. 16).

It is true that no part of life should be left outside of the realm of the moral, as to its scope, content, or personal relations, and it is also true that subjectively nothing is morally indifferent. Everything from this point of view is either right or wrong. However, there is a realm of the indifferent (adiaphora) which is only indirectly governed by the ideal of duty. There is a realm where room must be left for individual freedom of choice. This includes amusements and recreation, social life, friendship, the enjoyment of music, drama, and other arts, the use of the day of rest, and countless other matters.

The Christian should in all things be regulated in his conduct by his love of his fellow men. He should avoid giving offense or becoming an occasion of stumbling to his weaker brethren (1 Cor. 8. 9–12). Our liberty, even in the realm of adiaphora, should be regulated by the law of love, and we must not injure the faith life of the brethren. We need not permit the morbid conscience of our fellow men to tyrannize over us. It is only when we might otherwise harm the spiritual life of others that we should desist from using our liberty. All our activities should serve the ends and interests of the kingdom of God. Anything which might detract from such service ought to be avoided. In the first place we ought to watch over our own spiritual welfare (1 Cor. 10. 23, 6. 12, Gal. 5. 13); in the second we should have love and consideration for our fellow men: these two attitudes should be determinative in our relation to adiaphora.

CHAPTER X

THE CHRISTIAN'S RELATION TO GOD

Christian ethics finds its unity and basis in the will of God. The highest good for the Christian is the will of God. Subjectively, fellowship and communion with God, with all its implications toward unity of purpose and desire, are the highest good for the Christian. The Christian is not self-sufficient but realizes his dependence upon God, both with respect to the origin and the goal of life (Ps. 63. 1–3, Rom. 11. 36).

There is a goodness in man apart from the historical Jesus. (See p. 113 ff.) There is a certain natural recognition of goodness in man. Romans 2. 14–15 and John 1. 9 imply that all good comes from God. All goodness, inside and outside of historical Christianity, has its origin in God. No one knowing the thoughts of a Plato, a Socrates, a Buddha, a Zoroaster or a Marcus Aurelius can deny that they have expressed divine truths. The story of Melchizedek in the Old Testament (Gen. 14. 18–20) is a testimony to the knowledge of God outside of Israel. One of the great lessons of the Book of Jonah is that the spirit of God in its operation was not limited to the Hebrew people. However, the New Testament emphasizes that it is only through Jesus Christ that *true fellowship* with God is attained, and thus it is only in Christianity that the highest good, communion and fellowship with God at its best, can be attained.

I. VIRTUES EXEMPLIFIED IN THE RELATION TO GOD

The relation of the Christian to God implies a number of virtues, all manifestations of the one supreme virtue, the love to God. Among these is the virtue of humility.

Humility.—Humility is one of the primary virtues of Christianity. Humility is a sense of dependence or the absence of a spirit of self-sufficiency and pride. It was taught by Jesus in passages such as Matthew 5. 3, 18. 3, Mark 10. 15, and Luke 18. 9–17. Jesus not only taught humility, but He lived it (John 13. 5 ff. and Phil. 2. 6–8). The Christian experience of repentance implies a sense of humility.

Humility is one of the virtues most difficult to attain. The story is told of a man who tried diligently to attain to humility and said he found it the most difficult of the virtues because, when he thought he had attained the goal, he became proud of his humility. A believer in perfection told a professor that she had not sinned for a long time. The professor suggested that she must be proud of such an attainment and she replied, "Indeed, I am."

Humility is not a poor-spirited or abject temper. Nor is it to be confused with an inferiority complex. Following the example of the apostle Paul, we are not to think less than the truth about ourselves. There is a measure of self-love and self-respect which is legitimate (1 Cor. 4. 1–13). Such self-respect does not imply pride but simply a recognition of the fact that we hold ourselves in trust from the Creator. There may be a great deal of conceit connected with an attitude of inferiority. One person may be as proud of his lack of self-assertion as another of some outstanding talent or power.

Jonathan Edwards, in *Religious Affections*, wrote, "A poor man is not disposed to quick and high resentment when he is among the rich: he is apt to yield to others, for he knows others are above him; he is not stiff and self-willed; he is patient with hard fare; he expects no other than to be despised, and takes it patiently; he does not take it heinously that he is overlooked and but little regarded; he is prepared to be in a low place; he readily honors his superiors; he takes reproofs quietly; he readily honors others as above him; he easily yields to be taught, and does not claim much to his understanding and judgment; he is not over nice or humorsome; and has his spirit subdued to hard things; he is not assuming nor apt to take much upon him, but it is natural for him to be subject to others. Humility is a kind of holy pusillanimity." In this passage there is a sentiment of inferiority and lack of self-confidence which is not to be confused with religious humility. We must not confuse a pathological humility manifested before men with the humility of the Christian religion.

Neither is humility artifically making oneself small before God through affecting a mystical feeling of nothingness. Jesus told His disciples that they were of more value than the birds of the heaven or the lilies of the field (Mt. 6. 26). There is also often an air of unreality and artificiality about the "poor-sinner" attitude in certain pietistic movements which is not to be identified with humility.

Humility develops as we realize our dependence upon God. Schleiermacher defined religion as "a feeling of absolute dependence." Such a definition is, to be sure, inadequate, because religious experience involves much more than that, but a feeling of dependence does have a large place in religious experience. As we meditate upon God's omnipotence, holiness, righteousness, greatness, and love, and recognize our finiteness, sinfulness, and own lack of perfection, we grow humble. Humility develops as we realize that all we possess and all our talents are gifts from God, and in points where we may be superior to our fellow men we must thank our environment for that fact. We did not create our talents. They have been given to us and are therefore not for us objects of pride but rather a source of a sense of responsibility. Our environment, from which we have received so much, is also only in a very small degree the product of our own making. As we sense our dependence upon God, we ought to become humble in our relations with our fellow men because a recognition of our dependence will eliminate boastfulness, vainglory, and a proud sense of superiority to others.

Thankfulness.—Thankfulness is a virtue closely related to humility and a sense of dependence, in fact so closely related that we are reminded of the fact that virtue must be looked upon as a unit. In the Old Testament a number of the festivals observed by the Hebrews took upon themselves the character of thanksgiving festivals. Among the sacrifices of the Old Testament the thank-offering had a prominent place. The words of thanksgiving are found on the lips of Jesus Himself (Mt. 11. 25, Luke 19. 22). Jesus made it very plain that an attitude of thankfulness was expected of His followers (Luke 17. 11–19). Thanksgiving is very prominent in the epistles of Paul (1 Thess. 1. 2). A large proportion of the Psalms of the Old Testament are a call to thanksgiving, such as Ps. 103 and 105.

A lack of this virtue was spoken of by Paul as a characteristic sin of the heathen (Rom. 1. 21). Where the sense of dependence upon God is not present and where man becomes proud in his self-sufficiency, the virtue of thankfulness will not be present.

Thankfulness develops as we contemplate God's blessings, both temporal and spiritual. We are often tempted to look upon our temporal blessings as the result of our own cunning and industry and forget Him who is the "author of every good and perfect gift." God gives the power to grow, the powers of body and mind, and the means to appropriate His gifts. "We believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." All these things are His and we hold them in trust from Him. "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof" (Ps. 24. 1). Each and every time that we pray the petition, "Give us this day our daily bread," we are confessing our dependence upon God, and in the measure in which this realization grows the spirit of thankfulness will increase. The attitude of thankfulness to God will also reflect itself in our attitude toward our neighbor.

The apostle Paul suggests a connection between thankfulness and moral strength (Col. 1. 11–12). This is good psychology. Self-pity saps our strength. To rejoice in what life brings and to receive it with thankfulness gives man moral strength and courage. Paul was neither a stoic nor a puritan.

Obedience.—Obedience is practical submission to authority. Obedience to the ideal is the very principle of the moral life. Obedience is the test of love to God (John 14. 15). There is no real fellowship with God apart from the desire to conform to His will (1 John 2. 3–5, 3. 24). No knowledge or sentiment is sufficient as a test of love to God, apart from obedience. Jesus is the great example of obedience (Mt. 26. 36 ff., John 4. 34, 6. 38, Phil. 2. 8, Heb. 10. 7). Worship should be an expression of love to God, but worship without obedience is an abomination in the sight of God (1 Sam. 15. 22, Is. 1. 10–17, Amos 5. 21–24, Hosea 6. 6, Micah 6. 8).

If obedience implies submission to authority, how shall the idea of freedom, which is necessary to the idea of morality, be maintained? The answer is that obedience to God *is* freedom because it rests on religious impulse and personal insight. In and through Christian experience the inward spirit and the outward act are brought into harmony. The Christian shares freely in the divine activity and so acts freely in the various relations of life, even while submitting to the authority of God. Christian obedience is not an atomistic obedience to a code of laws but an obedience which finds its fulfillment and unity in the law of love. To be under the law of love is the highest freedom.

Joy.—Jesus promised joy to His disciples (John 15. 11, 16. 24, Mt. 25. 21–23). Words related to joy also abound in the epistles of Paul. The keyword of the letter to the Philippians is joy (See 4. 4–7). Christian joy is no artificial gaiety or boisterous hilarity but consists in serenity and calm of soul. The word "blessed" expresses the idea of Christian joy. Blessedness is something higher than mere happiness. Happiness depends on outward circumstances, while blessedness is an inward fountain of joy with its source in the knowledge of God in Christ. The person who knows and trusts in God as revealed by Jesus must rejoice in that knowledge. It is only in such faith that there is true joy. Joy must ultimately be cosmically grounded and must have found in the nature of things that which supports it. This means that the highest joy and the only true joy is to be found in religion and the religious outlook upon life. Joy is a sign that we have triumphed in life and such triumph will come only when we are at one with the heart of reality.

Christian joy does not exclude the presence of sorrow (2 Cor. 6. 10). But again, there can be no true joy in the presence of sorrow until man begins to value life from God's point of view. We can rejoice in the fellowship with God and in the privilege of extending His kingdom even in and through suffering. Such joy is no mere theory but has been a concrete experience in the lives of the martyrs who have suffered even unto death.

Christian joy finds its basis in God; therefore the Christian can not be a pessimist. Pessimism says that existence is fundamentally and essentially evil and that this is the worst of all possible worlds. The pessimist is impressed with the facts of suffering, decay, death, injustice, and in general with the incongruity between man and his environment.

Usually pessimism is associated with a naturalistic or materialistic outlook upon life. Such views of reality and pessimism consistently belong together. Without faith in God there would be little hope for optimism. The Christian believes that this world is the creation of God and as such is a worthful task (John 1. 3, 10). Even the apocalyptists found an escape from pessimism in the conviction that God would triumph. There is a note of pessimism in Ecclesiastes where life is represented as being empty and without profit, but it is to be noted that the author looks upon it as such apart from God. In the Book of Job, the hero faces the hard facts and realities of life, but his trust in God saves him from falling into pessimism.

The moral struggle would undoubtedly lead to pessimism unless the moral is connected with the religious and finds its basis in God. Naturalism and materialism can not well look upon moral values as anything but addenda. Neither can there be much dynamic for the moral struggle unless man can feel that the universe and its powers are on the side of the moral. Theism gives both dynamic and hope to the moral struggle.

The pessimist makes the mistake of confining the world within too narrow a horizon. Man can not say that the universe is essentially evil because he can not see or experience the whole. Man's view is only partial both as to time and space. It is only from God's point of view that we would find ourselves in a position to judge. In the long run, evil has often been overcome. Hardship, labor, effort, danger—the very things upon which the pessimist bases his conclusions—are often the things that bring man his highest satisfaction. Pessimism assumes that the highest good is happiness. Men have often been willing to sacrifice what the pessimist means by happiness for higher satisfactions. Christian ethics believes that free, ethical, intelligent personality is the highest type of being. As long as that has been produced and is being produced, we need not become pessimists, even if happiness has to be sacrificed for it. Sometimes the very things on which pessimism is based are productive of this type of being.

Pessimism is a value judgment and as such can not be proved. It can only be asserted. It is only the objectification of a mood. We know that there is both good and evil in the world.

The Christian is not a pessimist. Neither is he a superficial optimist who would say that this is the best possible world. The optimist is prone to close his eyes to the fact of evil as the pessimist closes his eyes to the fact of good. While the Christian is well aware of the evil in the world, he still believes that this is God's world and that it is embraced in God's providence. Because of this conviction he believes that good will triumph. The Christian is aware of both good and evil but believes that good is in the ascendancy. Such faith brings joy and serenity to the soul.

Hope.—Hope is a virtue very closely associated with joy. In fact, as we consider these separate virtues, we are impressed by the manner in which they overlap. They must not be thought of atomistically but as a unit, all radiating from the primary virtue, love to God. Hope guards man from falling into cynicism and pessimism on the one hand and into an attitude of shallow optimism on the other. Hope is the expectation of the good. It is faith directed toward the future. It is the confidence that good will somehow overcome evil.

The New Testament speaks of the lack of hope as one of the characteristics of the Gentile world (Eph. 2. 12). There are some rays of hope in the Gentile world, but where they are found they are rather dim. The apostle Paul speaks of the Old Testament as having been written in order that there might be hope (Rom. 15. 4). The New Testament emphasizes hope as one of the chief Christian graces (1 Cor. 13. 13, Rom. 8. 20, 1 Pet. 1. 3, 1 John 3. 1–3). The epistle to the Hebrews is pre-eminently the epistle of hope. There are passages in the first epistle of Peter using the word hope where Paul would undoubtedly have used the word faith (1 Pet. 1. 3).

Hope is always directed to something not yet realized. Moral perfection is something not yet realized but a goal to be attained; therefore hope has a very definite place in Christian ethics. Human effort and aspiration must involve the hope and the possibility of progress or the result will be a despair which paralyzes the will for the moral struggle. Hope is that which gives endurance and firmness to the Christian in the moral struggle. No defeatist attitude will supply dynamic for this struggle. There can be no reason for giving oneself to a proposition which can not be realized or toward which progress can not be made. We can not be satisfied to know that we are simply beating the air. Sooner or later we will cease such exercise, if the truth is borne in upon us. The kind of progress in which the Christian places his hope involves the advance of the kingdom of God in the historical process. The Christian hope also extends beyond the temporal and to the future life (Heb. 6. 19). In fact, without the hope for the future life, this life would mean little, and, vice versa, unless this life has its intrinsic values, the most potent philosophical argument for immortality loses its meaning—the argument from the value of personality as the highest product of creation.

The Christian hope is based on the revelation of God's love in Christ. It is no castle built in the air; it has its foundation in what we actually believe and know about the nature and character of God. This insight gives conditional foresight or hope for the future. An insight into the laws of nature makes it possible for us conditionally to predict and hope for the realization of certain phenomena in nature. The Christian hope is no fool's paradise, but is built upon what we actually know about God's nature. We hope because we believe that God's love is a fact. There is a perverted hope not based upon fact and adequate understanding of the nature of God and His workings. Such hope takes the form of presumption in various ways. In the spiritual realm there are those who trust and hope in the grace of God without repentance. Hope not based upon and anchored in an understanding of God's ways with men is vain.

Hope implies that things are not now as they ought to be, and therefore it also implies a recognition of the evil in the world or a sense of sin. A recognition of God's love saves man from pessimism, and a recognition of the fact of evil saves him from a false optimism. We have not yet attained to it, but the goal of our hope is that true blessedness of which man is capable, that is, the Christian *summum bonum.* Hope is one of the most dynamic of the Christian virtues.

II. Duties to God

Prayer.—The New Testament exhorts men to prayer (Mt. 6. 5 ff., 26. 41, Luke 18. 1, Luke 22. 43, John 16. 23, Rom. 8. 26). Prayer is primarily communion with God. It is the respiration of the spiritual life and as such it furnishes sustenance for that life. True prayer is an expression of God's life in man and a means of appropriating that life. It is the turning of the heart to God.

Prayer must be distinguished from magic or the spell, though magic has often been mingled with prayer in its practice. Magic is an effort to force the deity to grant the wishes of the petitioner. Magic is characterized by a spirit of self-sufficiency, while prayer is submissive to the will of God. True prayer seeks the realization of the divine will, while magic seeks the accomplishment of the will of the magician through the use of divine power, as a means to an end. God must not be looked upon as passive in His relation to man. It is God, not man, who controls the universe. Prayer does not force God to give us that which He is not good enough to give us without our prayer. Prayer in its most primitive forms borders on the magical. Prayer in its highest form is exemplified by the prayer of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane (Mt. 26. 42). Prayer, as communion with God, implies that fellowship with God is an end in itself, and not simply a means to an end. The child who insisted upon remaining in her father's study was asked by the father, "What do you want?" She answered, "I don't want anything, I just want to be with you." That is an illustration of what prayer in its highest form should be.

The New Testament often speaks about prayer "in the name of Jesus" (John 14. 13). To pray in the name of Jesus is to pray for His sake, in His interest, in a spirit purified with His spirit, and in fellowship with Him. What has been said about the nature of prayer illustrates what it means to pray in the name of Jesus. Such prayer not only invokes the mediation of Jesus but is a prayer of faith (Mt. 21. 22), a prayer in the spirit of charity toward fellow men (Mt. 6. 14), a prayer desirous of keeping God's commandments (1 John 3. 22).

Christian prayer is not interested in changing the "immutable" will of God but in seeing His holy and gracious will accomplished among men.

The question might be asked why we should pray at all if we can not change the will of God by our prayers. We might as well ask if it pays to love or to admire the beautiful. The Christian lives in fellowship with God, and it is only natural for him to give expression to that fellowship. No one ever asks if it pays to have fellowship with one's friends. As natural as it is for the bird to fly or for the fish to swim, it is for the Christian to pray. It is the element in which he moves. This does not mean that prayer is a mere reflex in its influence. It is no mere psychic gymnastics. If the laws of auto-suggestion or any other psychological laws throw any light on the nature of prayer, they can not explain away the power which operates through those laws. If psychology teaches that prayer is only auto-suggestion, the wise thing for it to do would be to keep silence about it, or psychologists will not long have anything to psychologize about. Men will not long continue to live in a fool's paradise. They will not long continue to pray if they be convinced that their prayers do not reach something objective outside of themselves. Prayer is not magic, but it does open channels for the divine grace and makes men receptive to it.

Nor is prayer mere submission to the divine will. There are many elements in life and experience contrary to the will of God; these the Christian would combat through prayer. There is therefore an element of struggle in prayer. The Christian often agonizes in prayer to the end that the will of God might be accomplished. Prayer is something more than a spirit of resignation to the *status quo.* Prayer, at its highest and best, is an expression of joyous devotion to the good and gracious will of God, rather than a mere spirit of submission or resignation.

Prayer includes various elements. One of the Christian virtues is humility, and the experiences which produce that virtue are expressed in prayer in the form of confession. Thankfulness is another of the virtues in relation to God, and that too is given expression in prayer. A spirit of humility and a spirit of gratitude often produce prayer in the form of adoration. Prayer also includes petition. Petition may concern itself with either temporal or spiritual things. The Christian may and ought to talk to God about all his concerns. In the fourth petition of the Lord's Prayer Jesus taught us to pray for daily bread. In the measure in which we know God's will we may pray not only in general but in specific terms. Intercession, too, is a form of Christian prayer. Someone has defined intercessory prayer as "love on its knees." The

Christian loves his fellow man and must carry him on the arms of prayer before the heavenly Father. No one is in a position to deny that intercessory prayer also exerts a direct influence upon the person prayed for. Under all circumstances intercessory prayer is a spontaneous expression of the very essence of the Christian life.

The New Testament urges the Christian to "pray without ceasing" (Luke 18. 1, 1 Thess. 5. 17). There is a sense in which the whole life of the Christian should be lived in the spirit of prayer. All of life should be lived as in the presence of and in fellowship with God. This spirit and attitude requires certain seasons of prayer if it is not to disappear. Christ Himself set aside certain seasons for prayer. As there is need of a certain alternation of work and rest for the well-being of the physical self, so the Christian needs, as it were, to stop to take his breath. Such moments are to be had in the practice of prayer. There need be nothing mechanical or legalistic about observing regularly stated intervals for prayer. Christian freedom should not be anarchy but an organized freedom. It is the spirit which wills and arranges the order. Self-discipline needs to be exercised in the life of the Christian. Whether a set form or a free prayer is used is of little consequence in itself. There may be formalism with form and formalism with an absence of form. The important thing is that prayer may be uttered "in spirit and truth" and that formalism, the mechanical and the legalistic, be avoided. The Christian ought always to walk as in the presence of God, but that attitude needs to be brought into the focus of prayer and worship if it is not to cease. We ordinarily look at nature through our unaided eyes, but there are times when sensitivity needs to be heightened through the use of the microscope. Prayer is such a microscope by which we look at life *sub specie aeternitatis.*

Oaths.—The oath involves the calling upon God to bear witness to the truth of a statement. The person taking an oath affirms that he realizes that he is speaking in the presence of God, in all good conscience. The oath points to the presence of sin, in the form of untruthfulness, but it also implies that when men are placed before God, they will tell the truth.

Christ warns against swearing needlessly. The love of God excludes all flippancy, sacrilege, or profane use of the divine name. In Matthew 5. 33–36 it might appear that Jesus absolutely prohibited the use of the oath. This passage, however, must be interpreted in the light of the teaching and practice of the rest of the New Testament. We find that Jesus Himself took an oath (Mt. 26. 63–64). On numerous occasions He also used the expression "verily, verily," which, if not strictly speaking an oath, comes very close to it. The apostle Paul, who must have known what the mind of Christ in this matter was, uses the oath on many occasions (Rom. 1. 9, 9. 1, 2 Cor. 1. 23, 11. 31, Gal. 1. 20, 1 Thess. 2. 5, 10). Basing their position on the prohibition of Jesus, quoted above, some denominations, such as the Friends and the Mennonites, absolutely forbid the use of the oath. It is to be noted that Jesus did not say that the oath is absolutely and unqualifiedly evil, but that it springs from evil. It is the presence of sin in the world which makes it necessary. The absence of the oath does not lessen man's obligation to tell the truth. Among Christians the spirit of truthfulness should prevail to such an extent that the oath would not be necessary. Christians should always tell the truth. It is true that in the measure sin ceases the necessity of the oath ceases. However, there is sin in the world, and the oath is a way of making the lie a legal crime. It would be impractical for various reasons to make every lie a crime under the law. Christians do take such oaths as oaths of testimony, of citizenship, of allegiance, and of office, and it is difficult to see why this should raise conscientious objections. The oath merely testifies to the fact that God is remembered in connection with the statement. This does not imply the introduction of anything foreign to the Christian life. The Christian should throughout life recognize the presence of God; hence there can be no objection to the fact that that presence is acknowledged on certain occasions or in connection with certain statements. Reverence must always be an element of such acknowledgment. Immoral oaths or oaths contrary to the will of God need not be kept. This can never be a duty.

Vows.—Closely related to the oath is the vow. Vows are solemn promises offered to God or in His presence. Vows, in evangelical Christianity, are permissible only in the sense of earnest resolutions, made in the presence of God. Baptismal and confirmation vows are in this class. The baptismal vow is the response of the individual to the appeal of redemption, and the dedication of self and all its powers to the service of God. Confirmation vows are simply the confirmation of the baptismal vow. Vows made in connection with ecclesiastical offices also belong to this class.

Sometimes the vow is a solemn promise, made in the presence of God, in connection with the maintenance of a moral and stable social order. Marriage vows belong to this class as also vows taken in connection with political office. All of the vows mentioned so far have to do with duty which the Christian voluntarily assumes.

There is another class of vows, which are not necessarily connected with duty. The monastic vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience are in this class. They deal with matters which are not obligatory and which God has not commanded. Such vows, if they be looked upon as bringing a greater reward or leading to works of supererogation, can only have a place in the Roman Catholic dualistic view of the moral life. Such special vows are not necessary, and even though under special circumstances they may be legitimate, it is well to use them sparingly or perhaps not at all.

Duties to God's Creation.—Impersonal beings and inanimate nature are not ethical beings and can not therefore be considered in connection with a special class of duties. Nature and animals are not in themselves moral ends. It might be possible to consider our duties to these things under duties to ourselves, for there is an inevitable immoral reaction upon the man who inflicts cruelty upon animals or wantonly destroys nature, but the Christian is primarily interested in these things as the creation of God. Behind nature is God. It is His handiwork and revelation. It is the objectification of His thoughts. Our duty to these things therefore becomes primarily a part of our duty to God.

Jesus manifested a pronounced reverence for nature. His parables indicate how keenly he observed the phenomena of nature. His references to the lilies of the field and to the birds of the heavens point to the same fact. This is a part of the religious attitude. The Christian conscience can not complacently view the wanton destruction of the beauties of nature or the natural resources of a land.

The Christian also has duties to the animal creation. Wanton destruction of game which is not destined for food, the doping of race horses, cruelty in the use of animals either for food or for labor, can not be reconciled with a Christian outlook on life.

In pronouncing judgment on vivisection we must maintain an adequate sympathy for suffering humanity. Before we form a judgment, the pain inflicted upon animals must be counterbalanced by the greater pain we learn how to prevent. Much of our control of disease has come through experimentation upon animals. However, needless pain should not be inflicted upon the animals used, and they should be anaesthetized whenever possible. We are in duty bound to make use of God's creation in the spirit of reverence, realizing that it is the work of His hands.

Chapter XI

THE CHRISTIAN'S RELATION TO SELF

Selfishness is sin, but Christian Ethics recognizes a legitimate love of self. There is a self-love, a self-regard, self-respect which is a virtue. In this chapter we shall consider these relations to self.

I. Virtues Exemplified in the Relation to Self

The Christian's relation to self implies a number of virtues. Again, these virtues all proceed from the one primary virtue which is love. They are all manifestations, or aspects, of the one fundamental virtue.

Wisdom.—Love needs wisdom in its application. Love without wisdom may develop into something other than love. True love can not exist without wisdom. The development of wisdom is therefore something imperative upon the Christian. Wisdom is the cardinal virtue of the intellect. It is more than mere knowledge, though it must include the latter. A fool may have a great deal of knowledge and still lack wisdom. A correct knowledge of the facts is necessary, but we need wisdom in order to govern life by such knowledge. It is the direct and practical insight into the meaning and purpose of things. It determines what aims are to be pursued and what means to be used in attaining those aims. It is a virtue exercised in applying truth to life. It is moral discernment or an estimation of the values of life from God's point of view. It involves an insight into true religious and ethical goals, an appreciation of the significance of special tasks, and an understanding of the self and the drift of the age. The Christian needs wisdom, because the Scriptures do not consist of rules for the guidance of the moral life. Through wisdom the Christian separates the mere temporary aspects of the Scripture from its eternal principles and wisdom dictates their application in the light of present circumstances.

How shall such wisdom be acquired? We have already pointed to the fact that wisdom must be built on knowledge, and knowledge comes only through severe intellectual discipline. Our ideals must be built upon an understanding of the nature of reality and the purposes of God. In order to cultivate wisdom, we must learn to know ourselves, we must learn to know our fellow men, and we must learn to know God. Conscience, in other words, must be enlightened. In order to gain this knowledge it is imperative that the individual steep himself in the revelation of God. Men with a higher degree of wisdom than others become the great leaders and trail-blazers for the human race. Such wisdom may be due to a natural endowment over which man himself has no control. However, wisdom can also be developed. By making use of the light we have, we can get more light. Wisdom will develop through its own exercise.

Courage.—Courage must be distinguished from the fearlessness which is the result of a natural temperamental endowment. Neither is it foolhardiness, rashness, or daring without judgment. The virtues can be distinguished, but they must not be separated. Courage and wisdom belong together. Courage is that quality of mind which enables the Christian to meet difficulties and opposition from the world with firmness. It is that quality which lends manliness, stability, and perseverance to the character. It is the spirit of willingness to bear persecution for the sake of conviction. Courage as a virtue has sometimes given ethicists considerable trouble, because they have realized that courage may exist without moral qualities. Christian courage, however, is the courage which despises danger from a noble motive—from hatred of sin and love of the good.

Men ordinarily associate courage with war and think of it as primarily a virtue of warfare. Still, there is relatively little of the spirit of valor connected with modern methods of warfare. Many exigencies other than war call for great courage. It requires courage of a high degree for the conscientious objector to war to stand by his convictions. The scientist and the explorer are often called upon to face great risks as they go about their tasks. It takes courage greater than modern warfare requires to attack the sins of the social order, especially where those sins are entrenched in the high places of finance and of society. It involves risks to point out the wrongs and insist upon justice in the economic realm. It requires courage to follow truth wherever truth may lead, when that truth is unpalatable to society and requires a readjustment of a man's whole intellectual structure. The prophets of the Old Testament, a John the Baptist, a Paul, and Jesus Himself, are among the most courageous heroes of the human race.

Jesus had a great deal to say about taking up the cross and following Him (Mark 8. 34). Bearing the cross in following Christ is something more than enduring the afflictions which come to the rank and file of humanity in the form of sickness, disease, or suffering. It is not the martyr complex developed by some in consequence of reaping the fruits of their own folly. Bearing the cross implies that the Christian courageously follows the line of duty which his Christian faith dictates, and then bears patiently the persecution or hardship that may come to him. The Christian does not seek persecution for its own sake, but goes about his Christian duty indifferent to opposition. The cross must be something more than a symbol for the Christian. It must become a principle of life in the form of a spirit of love, service, and sacrifice. To bear the cross requires courage of the highest type. It requires courage to take a negative attitude to sin and to apply the spirit of Christ to the transformation of society.

Christian courage may involve the sacrifice of reputation, influence, power, and wealth, but what gives the Christian courage is the knowledge that he is on the winning side. The Christian is on God's side. God's cause is his cause, and God will win out. Even apparent temporary defeat may be victory for the Christian cause. The powers of the universe are on the side of the Christian, and faith in these gives courage in the conflict.

Temperance.—Temperance is the virtue of self-control, discipline, and self-mastery. Man's instincts, appetites, and drives must be subjected to the dominance of the Spirit of God. Some of man's appetites may be legitimate when indulged in with moderation but become vices when carried to excess. Self-preservation is a duty which man owes to himself. There is a legitimate assertion of self. The child whose will is completely broken will find that fact a liability later in life, and the child with an overdeveloped sense of dependence upon its parents will not develop the best type of personality. Self-assertion is legitimate, but it becomes a vice when it assumes antisocial attitudes. Self-assertion must be tempered with a recognition of obligations to others. There is a legitimate sphere of expression for the sex instinct, but when carried to excess, either within or without the married state, it becomes a vice. The sex instinct must be controlled. Such control must assume different forms within and without the married state, but in both cases it must be controlled, or it will become a vice. Eating is necessary, but eating to excess or eating unwholesome food which the appetite craves may become a vice. The same principle holds with respect to the use of intoxicating liquor. The moderate use of liquor may be a matter for individual judgment, but any excess is a vice. Drunkenness is immorality. It robs man of his highest faculties and is antisocial in its consequences. Abstinence from intoxicants is undoubtedly the best policy. The use of intoxicants easily develops into a habit to which man becomes a slave no longer able to control their use. He who does not play with fire will not be burned. The use of intoxicants by one who can control their use may encourage their use by those unable to exercise temperance. There is also a legitimate striving for wealth. Thrift is a virtue, but when carried to excess it becomes avarice, which is a vice. There is legitimate ambition, but when ambition assumes the form of domination over others it is a vice. Play has its place in life, but, carried to excess, that too becomes a vice. Even the use of the power of speech must be controlled, or it may become an evil.

The methods to be used in gaining control over our natural appetites are many and varied. Psychology and religion both agree in stressing the fact that evil is to be overcome with good. Attention should be directed away from the object which causes the temptation, and another object should be substituted for it. Suppression is not enough, and it often has disastrous consequences. The monk in the monastery has often experienced that his suppression of the sex instinct was no solution for temptation. Sublimation, rather than suppression, is the way to overcome temptation. There is "an expulsive power in a new affection." The "drive" should be given an opportunity to express itself in social attitudes and activities. The woman who has been denied the pleasure of association with children of her own may find satisfaction in the care of orphan children and thus sublimate her desires. Envy, jealousy, revenge, and similar attitudes should be controlled and not be permitted to express themselves in word or deed. They too can be sublimated in the form of help or kindness directed to worthy objects. Evil can be driven out with good.

II. Duties to Self

Care of the Body.—The body is not the seat of moral evil. Neither is the material body to be looked upon as a clog for the soul. The body too is the handiwork of God, and the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of God in Christ emphasizes the fact that God can reveal Himself through the human body. Paul speaks of the body as the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 6. 19). The body of the Christian is to be offered in the service of God (Rom. 12. 10), and belongs to the Lord (1 Cor. 6. 13). In spite of illustrious examples to the contrary, the old adage, *Mens sana in corpore sano*, is certainly the rule. The body should be made a fitting instrument for the expression of the Christian life and should be cared for to that end. The Christian owes it to himself to observe the laws of health in order that he may serve more effectively the cause of the highest good. Certain types of asceticism fail to recognize the duty of the Christian to care for his body.

Asceticism.—In the form in which it is popularly conceived, asceticism involves a world-renouncing attitude. It looks upon the natural, and in particular the material, as inherently evil. It looks upon the material as being the seat and source of moral evil. It would destroy the body or at least minimize its importance. Christianity is not ascetic in its outlook upon life.

The founder of Christianity was no ascetic. The contemporaries of Jesus recognized that He was not like John the Baptist or the Essenes (Mt. 11. 18–19). Connected with asceticism there is often a mystical trend which aspires to absorption in God; but we do not find Jesus advocating any absorption of the self in God but rather stressing the redemption of personality. Jesus did not tolerate any self-chosen performances (Mark 7. 11). He would have nothing but the moral in His ethical teaching. In certain types of religion there has ever been a tendency to set up certain prohibitions as involving the moral, which in themselves may be adiaphora. No self-imposed austerities have any place in the teaching of Jesus. The moral is not determined by man but by God, and moral discipline must not be taken out of the hands of God. Jesus rejected the ascetic practice of fasting as a legal requirement among His disciples. Jesus was a master in the use of the parable, and many of these are taken from nature, which implies that the nature of God can be expressed through the natural. We find Jesus accepting invitations to table (Luke 7. 36), and even to a wedding feast

(John 2. 1 ff.). He looked with a sympathetic interest upon the play of children (Luke 7. 32).

Neither is the apostle Paul an ascetic. He did not consider it essential to salvation to make distinctions in meats (Rom. 14. 2, 6, 14; 1 Cor. 8. 4; 1 Tim. 4. 3–5). He did not consider it essential to forego the use of wine (1 Tim. 5. 23). Nor was Paul averse to participation in social pleasures (1 Cor. 10. 27). He referred to the Grecian games with no spirit of disapproval (1 Cor. 9. 24–27). In one of his epistles he directly attacks the spirit of asceticism (Col. 2. 20–23).

Asceticism is mistaken in regarding the natural as evil in itself. The ascetic may be a very selfish individual, merely seeking the salvation of his own soul. The repression which the ascetic practices is an evil practice, bringing in its wake a long list of abnormal psychic states. Asceticism in its extreme forms could never become a universal practice without destroying the human race. However, in renouncing asceticism we are not urging laxness in the moral life, for there is an element of self-denial in Christian ethics.

Self-denial.—Character will grow only in constant struggle with temptations. Certain stimuli which the external world supplies, the sinful bent of the human will, and the sins embodied in the social order, do evoke a sinful resistance to the will of God and thus demand self-denial. Christianity demands an earnest combating of sin and a complete resignation to the will of God. No self-denial is, however, to be indulged in simply for its own sake. It is for the sake of the kingdom of God that sacrifices are to be made. It is the impulses and inclinations which stand in the way of true righteousness that are to be crucified (Luke 12. 16 ff.). Even something as important as an eye or a hand must be sacrificed, if need be, for the greater good (Mt. 5. 29–30). Jesus does not say that it is a good to destroy an eye or a hand but that it is *to be preferred* to losing the highest good. Temperament, vocation, and individual circumstances will determine what the elements of self-denial in the life of the Christian shall be. We can not legislate for others but will have to leave it to the conscience of each individual to determine. Yet the experience of others is not to be ignored in determining the things which stand in the way of pressing toward the goal of Christian perfection. Christians have found that a certain self-discipline is necessary for the growth of the spiritual life. The observance of the day of rest, keeping regular periods for prayer and the use of the means of grace, regular attendance upon worship, these impose a certain self-discipline necessary for most persons. There are those who find that, because of temperamental peculiarities, it is best to abstain from certain forms of amusements in which others may indulge without harm. Certain quick-tempered persons can not participate in certain competitive games without injuring their peace of soul. The Christian guards against and refrains from those things which hinder the highest type of life and stand in the way of true righteousness.

Suicide.—Christian ethics insists upon certain duties to our bodies. Such insistence leads to a consideration of the ethics of suicide. Is man ever justified in taking his own life? The New Testament has nothing specific to say on the subject, but the Christian conscience has through the centuries given a very definite negative answer. God is the giver of life, and man holds even his own life in trust from God. Only God, who has given life, can take it. From Augustine on, suicide has been looked upon by Christian moralists as a form of homicide and a violation of the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." Since this life is a period in which character is to develop, suicide is playing truant from the school of life. It is the life without meaning and value which leads to suicide. Religion gives meaning to life, and the attitude which leads to suicide is diametrically opposed to the religious attitude. It is the primary function of religion to give meaning to life, and life without religion is life without meaning. Suicide also manifests a lack of the Christian virtues of patience and hope. The spirit of Christ is revealed in the words of Paul when he says, "I have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therein to be content" (Phil. 4. 11).

Moral philosophers have been found to defend the ethics of suicide. Utilitarianism might lead to a defense of suicide. If happiness, and not character, were the goal of life, it is conceivable that suicide might be defended. However, the great majority of ethicists have questioned the ethical character of suicide. Aristotle branded suicide as cowardice when he said, "To die, and thus avoid poverty, or love, or anything painful, is not the part of a brave man, but rather of a coward; for it is cowardice to avoid trouble; and the suicide does not choose death because it is honorable, but in order to avoid evil" (*Nic. Ethics*, III, 7). The suicide is usually the individual who lacks courage to face life.

The law of self-preservation is against suicide, and no amount of casuistry is able to silence the voice of this instinct. Fichte puts the matter on a moral plane when he argues that the suicide is in effect saying, "I will no longer do my duty" (*Sittenlehre*, IV, 263). No man lives to himself. He is a part of a social organism, and it is not for him to determine to withdraw from the obligations to that organism.

The question as to the justification of suicide in cases where honor has been at stake has been discussed by Christian moralists. Eusebius tells of a Christian woman who committed suicide in order to escape disgrace at the hands of the Emperor Maxentius. "She requested but a little time, as if now for the purpose of adorning her body: she then entered her chamber, and when alone thrust a sword into her breast. Thus dying immediately, she indeed left her body to the conductors; but in her deed, more effectually than any language, proclaims to all who are now and will be hereafter, that virtue, which prevails among Christians, is the only invincible and imperishable possession" (Book VIII, 12, 14). Honor should be esteemed more than life, but suicide is not the only method of self-defense which may be used against dishonor. Spiritual dishonor can arise only when there is complicity in the crime. Rape, for example, is not moral dishonor to the person attacked.

The question is also sometimes raised as to whether suicide can be justifiable in the case of the aged, the infirm, or the helpless. Again we must answer that no man can know when his duty and influence for good are past. There may even be good accomplished through the development of character in those who are called upon to serve the helpless.

Closely related to suicide is euthanasia or the right to hasten death in order to shorten suffering. No doctor can be certain that any given case is absolutely hopeless. New discoveries in medical science have often brought health to those who before had been considered hopeless. The Christian conscience can not take the responsibility for life out of the hands of God and place it in the hands of the medical profession. Nothing should ever be done to hasten death, but everything possible should be done to relieve suffering while life lasts.

In passing judgment upon the moral implications of the act of a suicide the mental state of the subject should be taken into consideration. Dementia praecox, dementia paralytica and melancholia predispose to suicide. The mentally unbalanced suicide is of course not responsible for his act and must be judged accordingly.

The Christian would seek grace to bear patiently the afflictions of life and to give himself to some task which makes life meaningful. The suicide rate among the unemployed rich is the highest of that of any economic class in the world. With faith in God, love to fellow men, Christian self-respect, and a Christian outlook on life, suicide can not be defended and must be condemned.

Education.—The Christian also has duties to himself with respect to education. The aim of education should be to develop the whole personality to the end that all the potential capacities may reach their highest fruition. Self-realization, in the sense of a God-determined personality, should be the goal. The purpose of systematic education should be to aid the individual to find and assimilate the best materials for the development of personality. Education should be character-forming and productive of a religious-ethical character. It should involve the development of self for self, of self for the world, and of self for God. It should lead to a recognition of the highest duties to self, to service to fellow men, and to co-operation with God in the fulfillment of His purposes.

Mere impartation of knowledge is not education. However, it is possible to modify development of personality by means of knowledge. By means of rational reflection the will can be made to generate new motives for conduct. All genuine insights must be based on a knowledge of facts and truth, but the intellect is not the only avenue through which development of personality is brought about. Character develops as man engages in the duties which love dictates, as he engages in legitimate forms of recreation, and as he participates in those things which bring edification to the soul. Among those means of edification is worship. There is a sense in which worship is an end in itself. The highest and noblest thing that a man can do is to worship God, but if such worship is what it ought to be, the spirit of that worship will reflect itself in the development of the self and in service to fellow men. Worship at its best preserves and increases the human powers for the practical life. In Christianity there is no relation to man which is not a relation to God, and no relation to God which is not a relation to man. Other means of edification are prayer, self-examination, and self-clarification. Religious experience should be thought through to clarity.

The development of personality should take place according to the nature of the personality involved. Over-specialization, needs to be guarded against lest such specialization hinder the development of other capacities of the personality. A broad cultural background should precede specialization. It is possible so to concentrate upon individual trees in the forest that we do not get a view of the whole forest or its beauties.

Education is not propaganda, and free and unprejudiced thinking ought to be cultivated. Education ought to teach men how to think rather than what to think. To this end the right of free speech and freedom of expression must be zealously guarded. Any evil which the freedom of expression may involve is small in comparison to the evils which must follow a course where freedom of speech is denied. Truth must be followed wherever it may lead.

Education has a transmissive function, and it would be the mark of folly to ignore the inheritance from the past, but if education is to serve its purpose, such inheritance must be made creative in terms of the living present. The transmission of Christian doctrine is important, but doctrine must be translated into life. Education must not end with imparting information; it must also inspire and interpret. Knowledge about the universe must not become a substitute for personal insight into the nature of things and understanding of how things may be made to serve human welfare. Names, dates, and other facts may be of value as a necessary background, but they serve their purpose in education only when they become creative in the life of personality for the living present.

Amusements.—Jesus spoke of play with a kindly interest (Mt. 11. 16–19). He observed and enjoyed the beauties of nature (Luke 12. 27, Mt. 16. 2–3). He attended banquets and a wedding. He did not disapprove of social customs except when they injured the higher life (Luke 14. 7–14). He used many illustrations which certainly imply an approval of social customs (Luke 15. 22–24). There was also probably some sense of humor in the personality of Jesus (Mt. 7. 4 and 23. 24).

Man has a natural instinct for play, and there is a legitimate place for the expression of this instinct in the Christian life. There must of necessity be an alternation between the serious duties of life and play. The purpose of amusements or recreation is re-creation. As a bow needs to be relaxed occasionally if it is to retain its elasticity, so the individual needs to relax from his duties and vocation occasionally in order that his powers for the duties of life may be renewed and refreshed. Amusements and recreation should serve to recuperate man's jaded physical and mental powers and thus add zest to life.

Amusements become immoral when they are sought after at the expense of the serious interests of life, or at the expense of neglect of duty, when they become the chief interest in life and work becomes only a wearisome interlude for amusements, or when they are physically harmful or morally debasing. Amusements, when indulged in to excess, bring ennui and satiety.

It is very difficult to lay down any hard and fast rules to govern the amusement problem. Such attempts have been made, and they have as a rule proved very inadequate. To be sure, the judgment of others, whose moral insight is based upon experience, is not to be despised and may prove helpful.

The important thing is, however, that conscience be enlightened and that life be integrated around Jesus Christ as a center. If that is done, no rules are necessary and the amusement problem will take care of itself. Unless that be accomplished, little is won, from the Christian point of view, by the enforcement of any rules. In choosing our amusements we should make the love of the brethren a guiding principle lest we place a stumbling-block in the way of their spiritual development (Luke 17. 1–2, 1 Cor. 8. 9–13). The legalistically inclined person should also remember his duty not to give offense through his narrowness and legalism.

Sections of the church have often objected to the dance on the ground that it has given undue license to the sex instinct. That there have been evils connected with dancing can not be denied, and the dance hall has sometimes led to grosser sins. Objections have also been raised against the theater. It has been established that young children suffer from disturbed sleep and nervous shock as a result of attendance upon movies designed for adult audiences. It has also been proved that the movies definitely influence a number of children toward careers of crime. The movie may furnish a wholesome type of amusement, and the most immediate thing that any one can do is to stay away from, and keep children from seeing, the indecent picture, through the help of reliable guides.

Through all available channels pressure should be exerted upon the movie industry to raise the standard of pictures and eliminate objectionable features.

Another form of amusement is gambling. No legitimate defense for this sin can be offered. It is antisocial in its nature in that the happiness of the winner becomes the misery of the loser. It is based on selfishness and greed. It is an offense against charity, and money is often taken from those who can not afford to lose it. Even if the loser can afford to make the sacrifice, we can not have one standard of morality for the rich and another for the poor. Gambling is based upon chance and thus implies the negation of reason and conscience as the arbiter in life. It is based on covetousness and finds in this evil desire its motive. It is theft, for property can only be legitimately acquired through gift, purchase, labor, or exchange. The fact that there is a mutual agreement on the part of the gamblers does not alter the situation any more than the agreement of the combatants in a duel does away with the charge of murder. Gambling is inherently wrong from the Christian point of view.

CHAPTER XII

THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES IN RELATION TO FELLOW MEN

Jesus summed up the whole law in the word "love." Love to God and love to fellow men were the sum and substance of the law and the prophets. In connection with love to fellow men Jesus said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Mt. 22. 39, Mark 12. 31), quoting from the Old Testament. Again He said, "This is my commandment, that ye love one another, even as I have loved you" (John 15. 12).

The love of Jesus, which is the highest example of Christian love, was a sacrificial love. He laid down His life for His friends (John 15. 13). Self-preservation is a Christian duty, and we have already insisted that there is a legitimate love of self. How then can love of fellow men, which at times is called upon to manifest itself in sacrifice even to the point of death, be reconciled with such love of self? The answer is that sacrifice is never an end in itself. Suffering is not endured for the sake of suffering. In itself it is not a good. Sacrifice and suffering must serve some ethical purpose and goal, or they are of no value. Sacrifice must always be a means to nobler ends. The honor of the soul is of more value than anything that may be sacrificed for that honor. Jesus paid the supreme sacrifice, but He maintained His integrity through it all and had to sacrifice in order to do so. He maintained that which was most worth while. It does at times become necessary to lose life in order to save it. When self-sacrifice becomes necessary for higher ethical ends, it may be the highest form of self-love. Thus self-sacrifice may be harmonized with self-preservation.

Justice.—Justice was one of the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks. In the Old Testament the prophet Amos is the great champion of justice. "Let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream" (Amos 5. 24). In the greatest definition of religion which the Old Testament has given us, justice finds a place. "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth Jehovah require of thee, but to do justly, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (Micah 6. 8).

Justice is that virtue which would grant to others their just rights. Justice demands that man conduct himself fairly in dealing with his fellow men. It implies that prejudice and passion be eliminated in passing judgment upon others and their deeds. It is the disposition to desire and to make things right in the world. Justice demands that each member of society shall be given the opportunity of the fullest possible development consistent with the obligations of each to all. Such facts as the unequal and unjust distribution of wealth present a challenge to justice. Luxury and extravagance on the one hand and suffering and need on the other call for justice in the distribution of the wealth of a land.

Justice is one of the virtues which is predominantly social in its nature. Plato stressed that justice is the cement which holds society together. Without some degree of justice no social order can long endure. The purpose of jurisprudence is to establish justice. The apostle Paul in one of his epistles asks his readers, "Dare any of you, having a matter against his neighbor, go to law before the unrighteous, and not before the saints" (1 Cor. 6. 1). The conclusion might be drawn that it is always wrong for the Christian to make use of the courts in seeking justice. Again we need to remind ourselves that the New Testament is not a legal code. Paul's injunction was made necessary by virtue of the nature of the Gentile courts at Corinth and also because of the peculiar type of organization which existed in the church at Corinth. Their church organization, being modeled on the Jewish synagogue, undoubtedly had a court for the adjudication of disputes between its members, and Paul insisted that the members of the church at Corinth submit their disputes to this court rather than to a Gentile tribunal. Paul is not condemning the use of courts for the settlement of disputes in general, but the Corinthian manner of going to law. The litigious spirit is irreconcilable with the spirit of Christ.

Justice is not only a passive virtue but is also active in its nature. Justice implies a passion for righteousness and a fire in the soul. The Christian will give himself to the realization of justice and to the overcoming of injustice in his environment. The Christian needs constantly to be on his guard against rationalizing cowardice into prudence. Wisdom should of course determine both the weapons to be used and the opportune time in seeking to overcome injustice.

We must not forget that love is the primary Christian virtue and that justice must function as an aspect of love. Justice is an element of true love. Love without justice, from the Christian point of view, is unthinkable. Justice is the inner integrity of love. The puny, sickly sentimentalism that sometimes parades as love would be avoided if justice were given due emphasis as an aspect of love. Love without justice is blind.

Justice, however, must not be considered apart from love. Love is after all greater than justice. Justice, alone, may manifest a contentious and pugnacious spirit. At times it may be hard and cold. The Christian can not be satisfied with mere justice. He would seek a love which is just. In the realm of the state perhaps we shall have to be satisfied with a degree of justice. If love can not be made the motive in the secular order, we can at least attain to a greater and fuller degree of justice.

Kindness.—Kindness is the spirit of mercy and helpfulness to those in need, of pity for the suffering, of forgiveness of those who have offended us and a general disposition of loving good-will to others. It is one of those virtues which grows naturally out of love to fellow men.

Courtesy is an aspect of kindness. The spirit of courtesy manifests regard for the feelings of others. Tact and politeness belong to its essence. There are times when it is necessary in the interest of higher ends to speak an unpalatable truth, but courtesy and kindness would avoid all brutal frankness.

Kindness may also manifest itself as hospitality. Christianity implies that we share our blessings with others. It is one of the forms of Christian love, often emphasized in the New Testament as an outstanding Christian virtue. The virtue of hospitality has proved itself a mighty force as it has gone forth into the world. It has built hospitals, orphan homes, homes for the aged, and other similar institutions, which care for those who are not able to care for themselves. There was more need of direct hospitality in early New Testament times when institutions such as those mentioned did not exist than there is today (Heb. 13. 2, Mt. 25. 35, Rom. 12. 13). It was the spirit of hospitality which gave birth to these institutions. We are called upon to exercise this virtue by maintaining such institutions; by affording access to our domestic circle to the stranger who has inspired our confidence; by collecting about us those who may be deprived of the advantages of family life, and by inviting friends to social gatherings. If more hospitality were shown, it would tend to break down the artificial caste system based on birth, wealth, or education which exists even among Christians.

Truthfulness.—Truth is the conformity of an idea or its expression to its object. It is the correspondence of thought to reality. Epistemological realism finds no difficulty in such a definition of truth, and truth is at least that. Truth is also of such a nature that it involves coherence of thought. Incongruity is the sign of irrationality. All truth must have an inner unity. Truth also involves a correspondence between my conceptions and those of other individuals as discovered in the various forms of intercourse. Truth must also fulfill our anticipations of what will take place on the basis of our knowledge. In other words, it must work itself out in life. These characteristics of truth imply that truth will establish harmony in our thinking. It will bring harmony between our thinking and that of others. Truth will make it possible for us to anticipate the course of events and things and enable us in many cases to gain control over them.

The mystic would define truth from another point of view. Rufus Jones says, "Truth is that peculiar characteristic of absoluteness which attaches to our logical judgments" (*Pathways to the Reality of God*, p. 73). There is an element in this conception which we may well ponder. Somehow or other man is so constituted that he recognizes truth when he is brought face to face with it.

Truth has its roots in wonder and curiosity. While maintaining the unity of personality, we can speak of truth as the virtue of the intellect, beauty as the virtue of the feelings, and goodness as the virtue of the will. It is an indispensable bond of social life. All forms of credit and trust are based on truthfulness. Without some degree of truthfulness society could not function. We just can not conceive of a social order in which all men were always liars. It involves not only speaking the truth but honesty in the exchange of goods, honesty in work, honesty in thought, honesty in service, and honesty even in orthodoxy. It also implies that confidences be respected. It is the antithesis of exaggeration, deception, and misrepresentation. A lack of truthfulness reacts negatively upon the character of the person who lacks it. Affectation and artificiality destroy integrity of character. Hypocrisy is one of the sins which Jesus scored unmercifully. Someone has said that hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue. The hypocrite tries to make others believe that he is virtuous and thus recognizes the claims of virtue. Two of the commandments of the decalogue deal with sins of speech. The eighth commandment forbids the bearing of false witness, and guards the good name and reputation of our neighbor by prohibiting slander and libel.

Truthfulness is a Christian virtue, but it is not always necessary to say everything we think. Reserve in expression may itself be a virtue. Brutal frankness, without regard for the feelings of others, is no virtue. If the Christian must at times wound, he does not desire to leave that wound without healing. Truth is to be spoken, but it is to be spoken in love (Eph. 4. 15).

There is an obligation on the part of the Christian to share his insights into the truth. However, preachers and teachers in particular are often called upon to share their insights in accordance with the capacity of the hearer or student to comprehend the truth. As God has had to limit the revelation of Himself to man's capacity to receive, so we find that Jesus did not share all truth with His disciples at once (John 16. 13). Such an accommodation to man's capacity to understand is not a violation of the virtue of truthfulness. However, an untruth which must later be unlearned must never be taught.

The truthful mind is the mind which is sincere and open. It is objective and does not allow itself to be swayed by personal interests. It is alert and factually informed, persistent, fearless, and courageous. It must be critical of popular judgments and attitudes.

The opposite of truth is the lie. A lie is a conscious deception which injures the relations of confidence. The lie is a serious ethical breach, because it means the destruction of personal integrity, from the point of view of the individual, and also because of its dire social consequences. A rather large problem of casuistry is the lie of necessity. The question involved is as to whether or not a lie is ever justifiable. Would it be justifiable to lie in order to save a life? Would it be justifiable to lie in order to prevent murder? The story is told of a Roman matron whose husband and two sons lay sick at the same time. One of the sons died as the father was approaching the crisis of his disease. The father asked about the condition of the son. The mother controlled her emotions and told the father that the son was better. The father began to recover but would probably have died from the shock of grief had he been told that the son was dead. Was this mother justified in telling the lie that she did? A woman went to the door and there found a tramp who was intent on some kind of mischief. She called to her husband, feigning that he was in the next room, while in fact he was not in the house at all, and so she prevented the mischief. Was she justified? Is a doctor ever justified in buoying up the spirits of his patient by misleading statements? One night in a children's hospital the nurses were informed that a Zeppelin raid was expected that night. They told the children that they expected a display of fireworks that night. The town was bombed that night but the children were saved from panicky fear. Had they known the facts, fears might have been set up in their minds which would have injured some of them for life. Were these nurses justified in what they did? Such are some of the problems which arise in connection with the lie of necessity. Many ethicists have taken the position that the lie is never justifiable. They say that there is no lie of necessity. Among these may be mentioned Basil the Great, Augustine, Kant, and Schleiermacher. A. E. Garvie is not dogmatic on the subject, but he does say, "I pray that God may save me from the moral tragedy of having ever to admit that to tell a lie is right for me. If a man does not share that intense repugnance to falsehood of any kind in any circumstances, he has not truth in his inward parts" (*The Christian Ideal for Human Society*, p. 147). He seems to admit that the moral judgment does at times approve of a lie of necessity and yet he adds, "If he can tell a lie without pain or shame, his moral character must suffer" (*op. cit.*, p. 147). Chrysostom, Jerome, Luther, Martensen, and others defend the lie of necessity. There is thus no unanimity among ethicists on this question.

In a perfect world there would undoubtedly never be any need of a lie of necessity. Therefore, if such a lie be told, it should always evoke a sense of sin. We should also keep in mind that the highest Christian virtue is love, and even truth is subservient to love. It should also be kept in mind that a wise foresight may often obviate circumstances which call for the lie of necessity.

Those who defend the lie of necessity argue that it is justifiable when no claim can be made upon us for the truth. They say that there are those whose claim to the truth has been morally forfeited or is temporarily lost. The husband of the Roman matron, the tramp bent on crime, or the children in the hospital would be such. We must speak the truth to all who have claims upon us to know the truth from us. Such is the casuistical argument by which the lie of necessity has been defended. Newman Smyth, who takes this view, has this to say in summary: "Give the truth always to those who in the bonds of humanity have a right to the truth; conceal it, or falsify it, only when it is unmistakably evident that the Christian right to the truth from others has been forfeited, or temporarily is held in abeyance by sickness, weakness, or some criminal intent; do not in any case prevaricate, unless you can tell the necessary falsehood deliberately and positively, from principle, with a good conscience void of offense toward men, and sincere in the sight of God" (*Christian Ethics*, p. 399 ff.). Those who defend the lie of necessity, however, do insist that it must never be used where injustice would follow as a consequence.

Chapter XIII

THE CHRISTIAN'S DUTY IN THE REALM OF FAMILY RELATIONS

Jesus was reared in a family of at least seven children (Mt. 13. 55–56). The pleasant relationships of that family are undoubtedly reflected in the numerous figures and symbols from family life of which Jesus made use. The term "father" as applied to God by Jesus undoubtedly reflects a relationship between Jesus and Joseph. There are those who can not appreciate the term "father" when applied to God because of disagreeable associations with their own fathers.

Jesus looked upon the family as an original and inviolable order of God and the basic institution of human society (Mark 10. 6). The fact that He often used symbols from family relationships, such as "fatherhood" and "brotherhood," to indicate relationships between God and men and men to one another indicates that He wanted the family to serve as a training ground for social relations in general. No better school has ever been devised. In the relationships of the family men learn to reconcile self-regard with regard for others. The Christian home should strive to make the symbols from family life which Jesus used worthy of the reality.

Modern life and culture makes it imperative to stress the significance of the home. The home does not occupy the central position in life which it once did. Man is often born in a hospital, lives in an apartment house or a hotel, eats at a restaurant; if he becomes ill, he goes to a hospital, and is finally buried from a funeral home. Industry has been transferred from the home to the factory or the mill. Woman has always been, and will always be, the primary human factor in home-making. She often finds it necessary to work in order to swell the family income and ofttimes engages in a career. That these facts influence home life needs no proof. The economic independence and enfranchisement of womanhood are goals to be desired, but our problem is to keep these things without losing interest in the home.

Woman.—The status of woman in non-Christian lands and in pre-Christian times has been an unenviable one. As a rule girls have not been welcome at birth, or at least not as welcome as boys. Education has been denied them generally and that until quite recent times. Marriage has been about their only vocation. Betrothal and marriage have often depended upon the arrangements and the will of the parents. Child marriage has been prevalent in large sections of the world. Woman has been looked upon as the property of her husband, and the right to divorce has often been granted to the husband alone. History furnishes countless examples of polygamy and concubinage. The burning of widows has been practiced. Suicide on the part of the widow has been looked upon as a virtue. The prostitution of slave girls and temple girls is a lurid story. Even an other-worldly hope has been denied womankind. Heavenly paradise for men linked with the eternal degradation of woman is the picture which a Mohammedan heaven presents. In Hinduism the hope of woman is to be reborn a man. The history of the degradation of woman is not pleasant to dwell upon.

What Christianity has meant for womanhood is well illustrated by the missionary schools for girls on foreign mission fields. The spirit of Christianity, when applied, has lifted and must lift woman to a higher level. The New Testament attitude to women has often been criticized, but unjustly so. The words of Jesus to His mother, "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" (John 2. 4), have appeared rather harsh to some occidentals. However, it is to be noted that when Jesus, as He hung upon the cross, entrusted the care of His mother to the beloved disciple He made use of the same form of address, "Woman, behold, thy son" (John 19. 26). This certainly proves beyond all question that there was nothing disrespectful or disparaging in this form of address. In His dealing with the Samaritan woman, Jesus transgressed all convention in relation to womanhood in a most astounding manner. He not only spoke to a Samaritan but to a woman, and the disciples themselves "marvelled that he was speaking with a woman" (John 4. 27). When we view that scene against its historical background, we can realize in some measure what Christ and His spirit have meant for womanhood. Contemporary rabbis would not teach religion to a woman and refused to speak to a woman in a public place.

Paul's attitude toward women has often been criticized. His statement, "As in all the churches of the saints, let the women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but let them be in subjection, as also saith the law. And if they would learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home: for it is shameful for a woman to speak in the church" (1 Cor. 14. 33–35), has appeared harsh, in the attitude reflected, to many moderns. Likewise the statement, "Let a woman learn in quietness with all subjection. But I permit not a woman to teach, nor to have dominion over a man, but to be in quietness" (1 Tim. 2. 11–12), has been interpreted to mean that Paul tended to depreciate the status of women.

Paul had undoubtedly at one time been a married man. He was probably a member of the Sanhedrin (Acts 26. 10) and that required a man to be not only married but also a father. The argument ran that domestic affection tended to soften a man's judgment and dispose him to mercy (*Sanhed.* 36. 2). The fact that Paul was not married when he wrote 1 Cor. 7. 8 does not prove that he had never been married. There is good reason to believe that the word in 1 Cor. 7. 8 translated "unmarried" in the American Revised Version, really means "widowers." The word ἄγαμος may denote either one whose partner has been lost or one who has never been married. The former meaning is certainly the one to be adopted here, or Paul would not have singled out those who had not been married in verses 25 to 28 of the same chapter. Some have suggested that the sternness of Paul's attitude toward women may be the reflection of a hidden domestic tragedy.

Some church bodies have made use of the passages quoted above from Paul's writings as an argument against the introduction of woman's suffrage in the church. We have already emphasized that the New Testament must not be used as a legal code. Furthermore, Paul himself commended Priscilla and Phoebe and other women helpers (Acts 18. 26). In his first letter to the Corinthians (11. 5) Paul himself seems to allow women to speak in the congregation, provided that the head was covered. What Paul had in mind was undoubtedly that women were not to aspire to positions of leadership but rather to fulfill the wonderful ministry of motherhood and home-making. Furthermore, special conditions undoubtedly existed which made the advice of the apostle prudential. Under any circumstances, we are not to make use of these prohibitions as legal enactments which are binding for all time and all places.

Few men in history have done so much to raise the status of womanhood as the apostle Paul. It was Paul who said, "There can be no male and female; for ye all are one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3. 28), and, "Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter against them" (Col. 3. 19), and in these statements is to be found the spirit which has led and will lead to the emancipation of woman.

The degradation of womanhood reaches its lowest depths in the various forms of prostitution. Prostitution violates the principle that personality is something sacred. It makes of human personality a means for the gratification of lust. The causes of prostitution are to be found in depraved human nature, in conditions such as poor housing affords, low wages, a lack of education, a lack of healthy recreation, mental deficiency, and the use of intoxicating liquors. Much prostitution can be eliminated by changing the environment which is conducive to this sin.

The Child.—Christianity has meant much for childhood. The first sermon in history directed against depriving childhood of its rights was preached by the prophet Micah in the eighth century B.C. (Micah 2. 9). One of the most beautiful word-pictures of the New Testament is the description of the attitude of Jesus to little children (Mt. 19. 13–15). Jesus loved and thought highly of the children (Mt. 18. 3–6).

One of the greatest evils under which childhood has suffered is child labor. All labor is not evil for the child. Tasks suited to the capacity of the child are rather an asset in its development. However, by child labor we understand the work of children under conditions which interfere with their physical development, education, and the opportunities for recreation which children require. Conditions have existed where children of five, six, or seven years of age have been forced to work as much as fourteen hours per day. Child labor is still a blight on our national life. The evils of child labor are emphasized by the fact that as late as 1855 the state of Connecticut was forced to pass a law excluding children under nine years of age from the factories. The accident toll among minors working in industry is very high. The awkwardness of the adolescent, the natural irresponsibility of childhood, the carelessness and curiosity of youth and the unaccustomed strain of labor subject the child to an extremely great accident hazard.

Methods which may be used to eliminate this evil are the enforcement of compulsory school attendance laws, requiring work-permits for minors, exclusion of children from hazardous occupations, and the passing and enforcing of minimum age and maximum hour laws.

Christianity recognizes that parents have duties to their children, but it also recognizes filial piety as a virtue. Children have duties to their parents. Jesus taught that even the performance of religious observances must not stand in the way of duty to parents (Mark 7. 10–13).

Marriage.—Christianity stands for monogamous marriage (Mt. 19. 3–9). Monogamy justifies itself psychologically, biologically, historically, and eugenically. Psychologically mankind manifests the desire to have one mate and to have that mate alone. Jealousy in sex and marital relations is one expression of this fact. From the biologists' viewpoint monogamy is justified because there are approximately as many men as women born. Historically, any other arrangement than monogamy has proved to be a curse, especially to womanhood.

Witness the Mohammedan harem, for example. Promiscuity in sexual relations also breeds disease.

No better arrangement than the home has ever been devised for the rearing of children. The child has a right to the care which a father and a mother can provide in a home environment, and such home life can not exist apart from monogamy.

Polygamy and polyandry might serve if marriage were based simply upon the lust of the flesh. However, if marriage is to be a union of heart, mind, and soul, it can exist only in the monogamous form. It is not possible for a man or a woman to give himself or herself to more than one mate in such loyalty. The Christian stand for monogamy can readily be justified from any angle at which we desire to look upon it.

Marriage should be based upon mutual attraction on the part of the parties for each other, or upon love. Such affection, however, must be considered in the light of our moral obligations and social responsibilities. The spiritual attitudes and moral ideals of the parties must not differ too widely if marriage is to prove successful. Physical attraction must be buttressed by common tastes and sympathies. Two comrades through life must be able to help each other, and without an appreciation of each other's aims and world views physical attraction will not long serve to keep them united.

It should be the business of the church to educate for marriage. It is better to try to prevent the dissolution of marriage than to try to decide what to do once that dissolution has been effected. This will involve education on matters of sex. All sex education should guard against stimulating sex curiosity in the young in regard to these matters. A good rule to follow is not to try to instruct faster than the spontaneous interest of the child demands. However, the dangers that await indulgence and the cruelty and brutality of prostitution are matters that should be carefully and cautiously taught. If parents can be depended upon to do it, the best teacher in this matter is the parent. Nature has provided the sex instinct with a guard in the sense of shame and modesty. Prudery is no virtue, but modesty is, and it should be developed and emphasized.

As a means of impressing upon the parties the sacredness of the marriage relationship, the marriage ceremony should be as solemn as it is possible to make it. Some pastors have advocated that the pastor should marry only those who belong to his own parish or church. So much of life has already been secularized that it ill behooves the pastor to try to turn over another area of life to the secular. We ought rather to rejoice over the fact that there are so many who desire the blessing of the church and its ministry on the marriage relationship. This does not mean that the pastor should officiate at any and every wedding. He can not officiate at a wedding where in so doing he will be compromising his position as a Christian minister. As an example, a couple under the influence of intoxicating liquor could not be married by a conscientious minister. It is evident that the so-called "marrying parson" is a prostitute in the pastoral office. Cases are on record where the minister has split fees with taxi-drivers, license agencies, and hotel-keepers. Neither is it ethical or fitting that a minister should officiate at a "stunt wedding." Let us not hesitate to surround the marriage ceremony with the religious sanctity that it deserves and needs.

Divorce.—According to Matthew, Jesus said, "Every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress; and whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery" (Mt. 5. 32. See also Mt. 19. 9). In the Gospels of Mark (10. 2–12) and Luke (16. 18) Jesus also discusses the question of divorce with this difference, that He recognizes no cause for divorce. In 1 Corinthians 7. 15, Paul writes, "If the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases." On the basis of the two passages quoted above, many churches recognize two reasons as legitimate grounds for divorce, namely, adultery and willful desertion.

It is a noteworthy fact that the exception for adultery or fornication is not given in Mark or in Luke. Some scholars maintain that the exception is a later addition to Matthew's Gospel and cast doubt upon the genuineness of the words. They point to the fact that Jesus laid down an ideal law in the Sermon on the Mount, and that He even forbade all swearing (Mt. 5. 43). They would maintain that Jesus simply forbade divorce, emphasized marriage as a life-long relationship as the ideal, and taught that departure from that ideal was always sin, or caused by sin. "Christ restrained the excessive license of divorce which existed at the time and declared marriage to be absolutely indissoluble. Since Matthew alone mentions the exception, and all other NT passages speak of Christian marriage as absolutely indissoluble, it is maintained by very many, probably the majority of recent critics, that the words 'except for fornication' both here and in 19. 9 are an interpolation, introduced by Jewish Christians to modify the excessive strictness of the original utterance, and that Christ Himself forbade divorce altogether. On the principle of criticism now accepted, this view is highly probable" (J. R. DUMMELOW, *Bible Commentary*, on Mt. 5. 31–32).

We have repeatedly emphasized that the New Testament is not a law code and that in fact it is impossible to use it as such. Why then should we use it as a legal code in dealing with the divorce question? That such a procedure has never been very satisfactory is evidenced by the fact that the churches which have tried it never seem to be done with arguing about the divorce problem and their attitudes to it. There are also times when adultery is committed simply for the sake of getting a legitimate ground for divorce.

The church should teach that according to the Word of God marriage is indissoluble. Whenever divorce occurs, it is due to sin and should be condemned. This much is recognized even by those who allow two grounds for divorce. The will of God and the ideal of Jesus was indissoluble marriage. He presented His ideal as a rebuke of the sinful laxity which existed in His time in interpreting the legal provisions for divorce. The church should present this ideal, and a pastor should refuse to perform a marriage ceremony for anyone who refuses to accept this ideal.

However, Jesus did not censure Moses, but recognized that there was a necessity for provisions for divorce because of the moral perverseness of men (Mt. 19. 8). Jesus was not legislating for a mixed society of Christians and non-Christians. We have already indicated that it might appear as though Jesus absolutely prohibited the use of the oath (Mt. 5. 33–36). However, Jesus Himself took an oath, and the apostle Paul, who certainly knew the mind of Christ in this matter, did likewise. (See p. 246.) Jesus did not say that the oath was unqualifiedly evil but that it springs from evil. It is the presence of untruth in the world which makes it necessary. Ideally conditions ought to be such that the oath would never be required, but the presence of sin in the world makes it necessary. In like manner the ideal is that marriage should last for life, but because of sin in the world divorce has been and is a matter of human experience. Divorce should never be made easy, and moral discipline should always be insisted upon for those who have entered into the married state; but it would appear that the divorce problem can never be solved in any legalistic fashion. It may be that the church will have to come to a position stressing the ideal and pointing to sin as the cause of divorce and then to deal in an evangelical manner with the divorce problem as it arises because of the "hardness of men's hearts." As the oath is necessary because of sin, so there may also be times when divorce must be granted by the state because of sin. Divorce can never be condoned, but we shall have to take human nature for what it is. Furthermore, the passages in Matthew do not bear the weight which they have been made to bear, if they be a legal enactment. They deal only with the right of the husband to get a divorce for the cause specified; they do not expressly permit the remarriage of the innocent party.

The divorce rate in the United States is alarming to those who recognize the evils of divorce, and it has been increasing at a fairly steady rate. Approximately one out of every six marriages terminates in divorce. Many mistaken notions are prevalent as to the causes for increase of the divorce rate. Biological unfitness or degeneracy is not the cause which has led to the increase in the rate. Divorce has increased about fivefold since the days of the Civil War, and it is not credible that degeneracy or biological unfitness has spread at such a rate. Religious decline can not be the cause, because it is relatively certain that religion has not declined in the degree that divorce has increased. Lax divorce laws are not the cause, because while divorce has increased, the laws have on the whole become more stringent. The cause is not to be found in the fact that people can go to states where divorce laws are lax to get a divorce. Migratory divorce constitutes only about three percent of the total number of divorces. The reason that people sometimes consider this to be a cause for divorce is undoubtedly the fact that the press plays up the cases that do occur. Over a considerable period of time it was found that twenty percent of the divorce cases occurred in states other than those in which the divorcees were married, but this percentage is not much greater than the mobility rate of the population. Nor is it true that most divorcees have already chosen another partner. Only about one-third of divorced persons remarry, and this rate is not greatly different from the rate of remarriage by widowed persons.

The cause of divorce is not to be found in any one particular realm. It has its roots deep down in human nature and in the warp and woof of our social fabric. One of the best ways to attack the divorce problem is to look into the circumstances which cause divorce. Our modern factory system is itself partly to blame for the condition. The central place of the home, only a few decades ago, as a place of industry, has vanished. The machine age with its hectic life has a tendency to produce distemper of various kinds. The rapid growth of cities, with their demoralizing influences, is a contributing factor. The divorce rate has increased as the number of women in industry has increased. Happy and lasting marriage is tied up with an established home life. Bad home-making is one of the outstanding causes of divorce. The relation between divorce and childlessness is also very striking. Many more divorces occur in childless homes than in the same number of homes having children. In the year 1927 sixty percent of the divorces granted were in childless homes. False standards of living, or the attempt to live beyond one's means, is a frequent cause of friction leading to divorce. The movies and the sensational press must bear their share of the guilt in that they tend to lower the conception of marriage and to loosen the marriage ties. Early, hasty, and secret marriages are other factors which lead to the divorce court. Family interference is also a contributing factor. One sociologist recently found that thirteen percent of the cases of domestic discord which he studied were due to family interference. Whatever can be done to remove the causes which lead to divorce becomes a moral responsibility. (See Appendix A.)

Birth Control.—Before discussing this question emphasis needs to be placed upon the fact that monogamy demands premarital chastity on both sides. A man, unless he be morally depraved, would not wish to marry an unchaste woman; and he has no right to offer any woman an unchaste husband. It should also be said that parents who for selfish reasons refuse to have children make a grave mistake. We have already pointed to the fact that children in the home serve as a bond to hold husband and wife together. Children enrich life for both partners in the married state.

During the last half century the birth-rate has declined at a very rapid rate in most countries in the civilized world. In some countries the numerical population is not holding its own. About four children per family are required for the population to reproduce itself. In the United States the size of the family has decreased, slowly and regularly, since the beginning of our national history.

Those who favor birth control advance various reasons for their position. They hold that it makes earlier marriages possible. They also advance the argument that too frequent pregnancy endangers the life and the health of the mother and that children are sometimes born to a life of suffering unless they are properly spaced. It is also said that large families tend to produce poverty and that too large families tend to limit educational opportunities for the children.

Those who oppose birth control hold that instead of promoting early marriages it will promote premarital relations and possibly do away with marriage; that the contention that it will benefit society is not well founded because there is no guarantee that the so-called unfit will have fewer progeny than the so-called fit, indeed, that experience shows the contrary. Furthermore, to maintain that birth control will ease the burden of poverty is simply to encourage economic servitude, instead of trying to distribute more equitably the riches of the earth. Mary Ross says, "It is clear that in hard times, as in good years preceding them, the largest increment of babies arrives in the homes financially least able to take care of them. One suggested remedy is birth control in families on relief. This raises many questions. Is financial success an aptitude test for parenthood? Should people be made to fit an existing economic order or should we try to fit that order to meet people's needs? A lower birth-rate now will mean a shrinkage in demand for goods in another generation" (*Survey Graphic*, Dec. 1935).

There is no unanimity among churches and churchmen with respect to the ethical aspects of birth control. Some are unalterably opposed to the use of contraceptives. Others give a qualified approval to birth control measures, and others are in doubt to such an extent that they refuse to commit themselves on the matter. In 1932 there was such a sharp division of opinion at the convention of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America that no action was taken in the matter. At the Lambeth Conference in 1930 qualified approval was given to the use of birth control measures. The Committee on Marriage and the Home of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America could not agree on the subject. A majority of the committee favored the use of contraceptives under certain conditions, but a minority report was opposed to such methods. The Roman Catholic Church opposes the use of contraceptives as contrary to Christian morals.

There is agreement to the effect that abstinence from intercourse is a legitimate method by which offspring may be limited; that intercourse between unmarried persons is immoral and antisocial, and that abortion, which has as its aim the destruction of life already generated, is wrong. Apparently this whole subject requires further study, and the church must seek the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the matter, because both Scripture and the ecumenical councils of the church are silent on the subject. (See Appendix B.)

Chapter XIV

THE CHRISTIAN'S DUTY IN THE REALM OF THE STATE

Definition and Basis of the State

Various conceptions as to the nature of the basis upon which the state rests have been held. Nietzsche taught that the state of nature is one of strife and warfare and that this principle must be applied to our conception of the state. The law of the jungle is the law of life. Man is not primarily a gregarious but rather a predatory animal. The strongest will rule, and so the basis of the state is a political absolutism.

Rousseau taught that the state is an artificial device, and he advocated a return to nature, which, in his opinion, meant an extreme individualism. Such an idea is not true to historical fact, because primitive man has very little freedom. No man is more enslaved by group convention and tradition than primitive man. Rousseau taught that the state arose when man surrendered his freedom for the sake of defense and safety through a social contract which is embodied in law.

Henry Drummond emphasized that man is not primarily a predatory animal but that love is anticipated even in the earliest stages of evolution.

The love of a mother for her offspring is also a part of nature. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the law of evolution and man's moral progress. There is a survival of the fittest but a survival of the morally fittest. The altruistic and group-regarding attitudes are also a part of nature and should form the basis of the state.

The function of the state is to bind men together in a justly ordered social life. The state is society organized for mutual protection and development in all spheres of physical, intellectual, moral, and religious activities. "The state means the political community. It is the inclusive social unit through which, within a definite territory, the community makes and enforces laws. Narrowly defined, it is the institution, or institutions, through which this political function of the community is discharged. Broadly speaking, it is the group of people who live under these institutions and accept their authority" (William Adams Brown, *Church and State*, p. 32). The Oxford Conference adopted the following statement, "We recognize the existing states as historically given realities, each of which in the political sphere is the highest authority, but which, as it stands itself under the authority and judgment of God, is bound by His will and has the God-given aim of upholding law and order, of ministering to the life of the people united within it or of the peoples or groups so united, and also of making its contribution to the common life of all peoples . . . Since we believe in the holy God as the source of justice, we do not consider the state as the ultimate source of law but rather as its guarantor. It is not the lord but the servant of justice. There can be for the Christian no ultimate authority but very God" (J. H. Oldham, *The Oxford Conference*, pp. 66–67).

Christianity does not look upon the state as due to the superior power of some individual group. Nor does it look upon it as a mere utilitarian social contract. God wills an ordered social relationship, and thus the state has its basis in His will. Christianity considers the state, generically conceived, as a divine institution. This attitude does not, of course, apply to every type of government, but to government as such (Rom. 13. 1–4; Tit. 3. 1; 1 Pet. 2. 13; Prov. 8. 15. See also p. 197). The state is an institution ordained by God and has its authority from Him. Even if all peoples were Christians, we could not have anarchy, because some degree of social planning would even then be necessary for society to function effectively.

Various Ideals As to the Structure of the State

1. *Utopias.*—For millenniums men have had their utopian dreams. Plato's *Republic* and the Messianic hope of the Old Testament are the two

best known examples. The Messianic hope of the Old Testament took on various forms as it passed on down through Hebrew history, but the nucleus in which all of these hopes centered was that the Messianic kingdom was to be a realm in which God would rule with righteousness, justice, and love. The New Testament looks upon Jesus as fulfilling (bringing to completion) the Messianic hopes and expectations of the Old Testament, and there is a profound sense in which He does fulfill all these yearnings. In the measure in which Jesus is laid hold of by faith, in that measure is the reign of God established and in that measure does the kingdom of God come. In Jesus the Messianic hope is fulfilled, not always literally in its historical forms, but always essentially in its moral and religious substance.

Utopian ideals manifest a number of common elements. Government is expected to function for the common good of all. There is to be equality, social solidarity, common interests, and mutual helpfulness. Science is to be devoted to the bettering of life for the common good. The ideal for industry is organization to meet human need and to conserve human values. Toil is to be reduced to a minimum; co-operation supplants competition; moral and cultural life is deemed more important than mere material welfare. The worth and dignity of personality is stressed together with faith in the possibility of achievement. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly are guaranteed and criticism is welcomed. Regulation puts bounds upon individual initiative and hinders it from promoting antisocial ends. These common elements of many utopian ideals are interesting as examples of what the moral sense of mankind has conceived with respect to the ideal state.

2. *Communism.*—The outstanding feature of communism is that it would abolish all private ownership of property and place the ownership in the hands of the community or the state. Christian ethics does not demand the abolition of private property. Many of the friends of Jesus owned property, and there is nothing in the New Testament to indicate that Jesus disapproved of it (Luke 8. 3). However, communism, as an economic theory, or in practice, is not necessarily anti-Christian. Many communistic communities have been established on a Christian basis. Jesus' band of disciples were communistic (John 12. 4–6). The first Christians in Jerusalem were also communistic and "had all things common" (Acts 2. 43–47 and 4. 32–35). The communism of the early Christians, however, differed from the Marxian type of communism in that the former was voluntary. The sin of Ananias (Acts 5) did not consist in that he had failed to turn over all his property to the common fund, but

in that he had lied about it. The communism at Jerusalem had a spiritual rather than a materialistic basis and was brought into being by a classless love rather than class warfare. It never proved very successful as it was not long until the members of the Jerusalem church were dependent upon the church at large for the very necessities of life. It should also be pointed out that it was a communism of consumption only, not a communism of production. The failure of the experiment at Jerusalem, therefore, does not disprove the practicability of communism as an economic theory.

When the term "communism" is used today, it usually refers to the Marxian brand of which the Russian experiment is the outstanding example of modern times. Karl Marx is the prophet of this type of communism. He taught a form of economic determinism. Karl Marx taught that the key to the interpretation of history is that the material productive forces, solely, make up the objective conditions which give rise to the various forms of social life. Communism also sets up the state as the *summum bonum* and stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat class, which is to be established through the use of force. Marx arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic which he applied to the historical process.

The movements of history can not be interpreted by the economic factor alone. Art, politics, religion, and science have influenced the course of history and modified man's dealings with wealth itself. Economic determinism is not true, or man could never rise to any higher levels, and in fact the idealism of communism itself would never have arisen. Communism is confessedly an attempt to liquidate all classes, but by setting up the dictatorship of the proletariat such liquidation becomes impossible. The propertied classes become the underprivileged. Furthermore, when communism says with respect to the distribution of wealth, "To each according to his need and from each according to his ability," how is the state going to establish a standard by which the need and ability may be determined? Such a yardstick has never been devised.

Christianity and the philosophy of Karl Marx are irreconcilable. Christianity can not recognize the state as the highest good. The will and law of God are supreme for the Christian and to that will even the state must bow. Christianity does not believe in an economic but rather in a moral determinism of history. Christianity must also set itself against the communist advocacy of the use of force in setting up the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whatever the goal may be, Christianity can not justify the use of immoral means in its attainment. Jesus was no revolutionist and never advocated the use of violence. In fact, He forbade its use. Violence only calls forth more violence. Evil can not be lessened with counter-evil. Christians must refuse the use of violence to attain their goal and must throw all their fighting ardor into moral protest. Furthermore, Marxism is hostile to religion and insists that religion is the opiate of the people. The Russian church undoubtedly had much to do with the creation of this impression, but whatever the cause might be, Christianity can not be reconciled with a movement that denies the reality of the supernatural. Communism leaves the inner burden on man's soul which religion alone can remove. Communist materialism and the Christian insistence upon establishing a cosmic relationship can not be reconciled. Communism, in practice, has also tended to ignore the Christian ideal of marriage.

3. *Nationalism.*—For lack of a better term we apply the term "nationalism" to the type of government which has developed, since the World War, in Italy, Germany, Turkey, Persia, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The best-known and most pronounced form of it is to be found in fascist Italy and nazi Germany. This movement is initiated by the privileged and propertied classes, inspired by national and conservative ideals, and takes a stand against the aspirations of the proletariat classes. Like communism, this movement is led by a dictator,

and the state is totalitarian. In communism the politician is the dictator, while in nationalism it is the capitalist who finds a spokesman in the dictator. Nationalism ranges itself against liberty, equality, democracy, and all forms of representative government. People should not think, but simply blindly follow. An effort is made to establish a self-sufficient economy, and this intense nationalism is usually antagonistic to any form of internationalism.

The modern totalitarian state suppresses the individual to such an extent that it makes impossible any true welfare which it may seek to promote. Raising the status of a nation and people by means of a dictatorship will inevitably, if and when attained, throw off the dictators, and so in the long run any such movement will destroy itself.

Nationalism has not only often in practice been hostile to Christianity, but its ideology can not be reconciled with the Christian faith. The exaltation of one race or nation can not be reconciled with the idea of world brotherhood for which Christianity stands. Instead of the primary Christian virtue, which is love, and the virtues which grow out of it, such as pity, humility, and sacrifice, nationalism exalts such virtues as courage, pride, and desire for conquest. In some of its forms nationalism has assumed a pronounced antisemitic attitude. It usually requires some kind of a scapegoat, and particularly in Germany the Jew has been made to serve in that capacity. Such persecution of the Jewish race can not be reconciled with Christianity. Communism seeks to destroy the church, but nationalism seeks to use it for its own purposes. In either case the church can not function in accordance with its nature. Christianity is totalitarian, and it can not be reconciled with the ideology of the totalitarian state. The two can not amicably exist together.

Communism and nationalism have much in common. Neither invites participation. They simply demand obedience. They do not try to persuade but simply declare. They silence criticism and do not permit discussion. They both have their dictators. They both possess the marks of a religion. They have a gospel of salvation for the individual and society; their heroes are worshiped as saviors; they have their authoritative writings, dogmas, and some measure of cult; they elicit a joyous devotion and self-sacrifice; there is an intense and passionate partisanship and proselytism; there are martyrs, and holy wars, and vivid apocalyptic hopes. These, all marks of a religion, are another reason why both movements come into conflict with Christianity.

4. *Socialism.*—Socialism is a political movement initiated by the working classes which aims to abolish exploitation by means of the collective

ownership and democratic management of the basic instruments of production and distribution of wealth. It advocates a mixed system of ownership based upon the principle that whatever is individually used should be individually owned; whatever is used by the family should be owned by the family; what is used by the community should be owned by the community; and what is used by the state or the entire nation should be owned by them. Socialism does not seek to abolish all forms of private property and differs from communism in this respect. It simply advocates that those who use the means of production should own them. Municipal water, light and gas plants, and the mail service of the United States are an application of the principle of socialism. Socialism also differs from communism in the fact that it does not advocate the use of violence as a means of attaining its goals.

The socialist emphasizes that wealth is always, in part at least, a social product. A pioneer settler increases the value of his land by the improvements which he makes upon it, but were it not for the development of the community life, that increase would be relatively small as compared to the actual fact. The actual increase in the value of the land is largely a result of the development of the community.

Socialism as an economic theory is not inimical to Christian ethics, but it has often failed to take into account man's sinful nature and has often lacked a spiritual note. As the church has often professed to believe in God but has neglected to emphasize the kingdom of God on earth, so socialism has often stressed a kingdom of God on earth without believing in God.

5. *Democracy.*—In a democracy the sovereignty of a state is placed in the hands of the people through their elected representatives. Democracy rests upon a humane ideal with equal rights of all to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It stands for as much collective action as is necessary for purposes of efficiency and at the same time allows as much freedom as is necessary for personal development. The difficulty is often to find the dividing line. All democracies guarantee, in theory, freedom of person, conscience, the press, assembly, and suffrage.

In granting suffrage to all, irrespective of property, it places human rights and values above property rights, and in this respect it emphasizes a Christian ideal. In practice that ideal is not always maintained. Democracy stands for the freedom of the press, but that freedom has often been used as a means of propaganda by the vested interests. In the realm of race relations the ideals of democracy have not been maintained. Democracy stands for economic security for all the people, but great concentration of wealth has taken place in many democracies, and in the long run there can be no political democracy without economic democracy.

If a democracy is to survive, government must maintain order and justice between individuals and groups; it must promote the economic welfare of all classes and promote education and the diffusion of knowledge. Democracy can not operate with an uninformed public. In so far as the ideals of democracy are realized, these ideals supply a framework in which Christian ethics can function.

The Relation of the State to Property and Wealth

In any ordered state of society the state must make property rights secure and prevent exploitation. Extremes of wealth and poverty are both intolerable and have led to the downfall of civilizations. Often the downfall of a civilization has been heralded by the concentration of its wealth in the hands of a few members of society. The concentration and control of wealth by the few is always a danger to the existence of any society. Justice can not exist together with extreme wealth for the few and poverty for the many, and justice is the cement which holds society together. The means by which the state can curb these evils are: limiting the accumulation of land; imposing a graduated tax on land in excess of the homestead and on inheritances and incomes; public ownership or rigid control of natural monopolies and utilities; prohibiting all business transactions which are not bona fide purchases; imposing heavy penalties for cornering the food market and on all extortion and profiteering.

Capitalism.—Capitalism has been an efficient economic system in the production of wealth. It has speeded up the production of wealth and has made possible the accumulation of wealth for large-scale production. It has developed the application of machine power to production and has thus lowered the cost of production and raised the standard of living. However, lest we give too much credit to the capitalistic system, it should be pointed out that progress within capitalism has to a large extent been due to the rise of science and scientific technique. Science would have been able to accomplish great things with almost any system. On the material side the present Russian system has been able to accomplish and bring about wonderful advances through the application of science to production. It must also be freely admitted that there are many good people who engage in production and distribution within the capitalistic framework.

There are, however, some systems which supply a better technique for the manifestation of the good life than others. If a cannibal is converted, he can not continue to live in the social patterns in which he lived as a cannibal. He must change those social patterns and establish others which are more adaptable for the manifestation of the Christian life. In like manner there are some economic systems which are better suited as a framework for the Christian life than others. Capitalism worked relatively well as long as we found ourselves in a period of expanding economy. Land and other natural resources seemed to many to be almost limitless. Unemployment and recurring severe depressions have, however, caused many to question the bases of the capitalistic system, and many Christians have come to challenge that system from the point of view of Christian ethics. Many of the outstanding leaders of Christian thought are today taking this position. In fact it is difficult to find a Christian leader today who does not challenge the capitalistic system at some point.

The outstanding feature of the capitalistic system is undoubtedly the profit motive. If the profit motive is removed, capitalism is no more. If anyone would strike a fatal blow at the capitalistic system, he can find the Achilles heel in the profit motive. Profit is net surplus after the cost of production has been met. We would not deny the legitimacy of adequate returns for service rendered or compensation for risks and responsibilities involved, but profit is benefit enjoyed without service rendered commensurate with it. It is also true that profits are not always sought for their own sake but for personal or family security, out of a desire to aid a good cause, a worthy institution, or some social enterprise. In general, however, profit motivated enterprises are run with an eye single to maximum profits and with little regard for social ends or human welfare. Christian ethicists challenge this motive and point to the fact that Christian ethics would substitute the service motive for the profit motive. They point to the fact that a long list of evils can be charged against the profit motive, such as, the wasting of natural resources; the promotion of scarcity in the field of consumption in order to keep up or raise prices; the adulteration of foods; the manufacture of quack medicines, many of which are not only harmful but even tend to hasten death; child labor; the exploitation of women in industry; and low wages. Machines crash and kill people because cheap material was used in some important part in order to promote profits. Railroads kill people because inferior equipment produces more profits than the installation of safety devices. Thousands of laws, police, courts, inspectors, and prisons are necessary in order to protect people from the dangers of the profit motive. People with kind and benevolent dispositions do make use of the capitalistic system, but the characteristic institution of the capitalistic system is the corporation, which is impersonal, soulless, and conscienceless. Christianity would emphasize that industry was made for man, not man for industry, and that the church should seek to procure the dominance of the motive of service over the motive of gain. Industry ought to be a co-operative effort adequately to supply the needs of all. It would be tragic to have to admit that the only motive which can be harnessed to the industrial process with success is the profit motive. There are other motives which can be appealed to, besides the profit motive, such as, the service motive, social approval, interest in doing a task, and desire for adventure. Some of the finest things given to the human race have been brought about without any consideration of profit. In spite of all its weaknesses and faults, modern Russia does prove that there are motives other than profit which can be harnessed to the industrial process.

There are other characteristics of the capitalistic system besides the profit motive. It allows the most capable or acquisitive to accumulate great wealth. In 1926 the Federal Trade Commission reported that one percent of the people of the United States owned sixty percent of the total wealth and ninety-nine percent of the people owned forty per cent of the wealth. During a recent year when the average income per capita in the United States was seven hundred dollars, five hundred and four persons each had an income of over a million dollars. In 1929 the upper ten percent of the population saved four times as much as the remaining ninety percent. In that same year, thirty-six thousand families with the largest incomes in the United States received about as much as the eleven million families at the bottom of the economic scale. Some four thousand five hundred families have average incomes of about four hundred thousand dollars per year, while about forty million of our people can be classified as "poor." That a system which allows such injustice in the distribution of wealth can not be tolerated in the long run is evident to all who would understand.

A third characteristic of capitalism is competition. "Competition is the life of trade." The principle of competition is that a man should try to get whatever he can get. No one can deny that in a competitive system gain for one is loss for another. Competition often represses good will and calls forth jealousy and selfishness and denies the spirit of brotherhood. Competition is often a temptation to dishonesty and adulteration which at times places a greater strain upon human nature than it can bear. Many Christian moralists feel that it is possible to devise an economic system in which the spirit of brotherhood, service and love can function more effectively than in the capitalistic system. They stress the point that it is the duty of the Christian to seek an economic system in which the tension between the personal attitudes of the individual Christian and the social economic pattern will be eliminated to the greatest possible extent. The tension between the motive of service, which is Christian, and the idea of competition must be keenly felt by all enlightened Christians.

A fourth characteristic of capitalism is a constant class struggle. Christianity stands for a classless love. Capitalism has created two distinct social classes. On the one hand are the owners or managers who own the tools of production or manage them, and on the other hand are the workers. The latter, as a rule, own no part of the business and have no voice in determining the conditions under which they labor, unless labor organization has taken place. These two classes face each other in distinct formation, and the capitalistic system in itself does not open any road to reconciliation. The interests of the two camps are diametrically opposed to each other. Wherever reconciliation is brought about, it is effected through elements and attitudes not inherent in the capitalistic system. Capitalism deprived the worker of his independence in the economic realm and such privation is bound to affect his independence in other realms, and it has done so, for example, in the political realm. Christianity considers human values to be supreme in the economic sphere and demands that property rights be made secondary and subservient to human rights. Capitalism has often made property rights primary and human beings mere instruments for the production of wealth. At this point there is an irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and Christianity. "We have grown rich because whole races and tribes have died for us and continents have been depopulated for us" (WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, *Christianizing the Social Order*, p. 245). As a result of this emphasis upon property rights and failure to recognize human rights, capitalism has often bred war. Modern war is usually rooted in economics.

Communism, in its modern Marxian form, and capitalism have much in common. Many capitalists fight communism, not because they are opposed to its materialism and atheism, but because of their own selfish stake in the capitalistic order. Both communism and capitalism are materialistic and productive of violence. The characteristics of capitalism, outlined above, can not be reconciled with a spiritual interpretation of life. It tends to corrupt man's spiritual life and smother it in its embrace. One of the greatest dangers is that capitalism does not openly oppose Christianity, but often embraces it and seeks to receive its blessing, and it has too often received it. It has often been so successful in this respect that Christians fail to recognize any contradiction between the techniques of capitalism and of Christianity. Many Christians are willing to repeat the confession of sins at public worship, but they refuse to recognize sin in their economic relationships.

Christian ethicists who challenge the capitalistic system condemn it because it is based upon materialism, because it is based upon competition, because it is based upon the profit motive (as we have defined profit), because it exalts property rights over human rights, and because it breeds war. They feel that modern capitalism is a challenge to the Christian way of life. (See Kagawa's works and Barclay's *The World Mission of the Christian Religion* for splendid presentations of this point of view.) Unemployment and the recurring cycles of prosperity and depression with attendant suffering are forcing men to rethink the basis of the system.

Co-operation.—Co-operation implies mutual aid and a common goal. It nurtures good will and a sense of solidarity. It fosters a spirit of brotherhood. The intelligence and the skill of an individual is made to serve the common good rather than the selfish interests of the individual possessing them. In the light of these facts many have seen in the co-operative movement a technique for a more Christian order of society. The defects of the capitalistic system are the factors which have called forth the modern emphasis upon this movement. The co-operative movement removes the profit motive from the industrial process. It does not attempt to bring about change through political effort as long as government permits it to develop. It does not advocate revolution or the use of force in any degree. It differs from socialism in that it does not advocate state ownership. It levels its attack against production and distribution for the profit of the few instead of the use of the many. Use and service are substituted for profit.

The co-operative movement is nothing new in history. The fact that so few people know anything about the movement is due to the circumstance that it does not, and need not, make much noise about itself. As a definite movement it dates back to the latter part of the eighteenth century. Today a large proportion of the business of almost every country of the civilized world is co-operative. The best known co-operative in the world is perhaps the Rochdale Co-operative in north England. It has served as a model for most successful co-operatives and it has functioned for about a century. In the winter of 1843 a number of weavers in the town of Rochdale came together to discuss ways and means of bettering their economic status.

Labor organization for higher wages seemed to them to offer little hope for relief. The plan decided upon was to raise their wages by lessening the cost of living through the establishment of a co-operative store. Thus the famous experiment started. It took some time to accumulate the capital necessary to start this store, but it was finally accomplished, and the members of the movement took turns in serving as salesmen during the hours when the store was kept open. Goods in the store were to be sold at the regular market prices. At stated intervals patronage dividends were to be paid back to the purchasing members on the basis of patronage. A substantial sum was set aside as a reserve fund. Capital, representing the original investment, received the current rate of interest. Each member has one vote in directing the affairs of the society, regardless of the number of shares held. This last provision is a recognition of human values as over against property values. The system thus eliminates profit completely. The patronage dividend is not profit but simply a refund of the purchaser's own money. The manager of a co-operative receives a fixed salary. With this system it is not necessary to destroy all forms of private ownership. It is not necessary to destroy the exchange system nor the culture of a civilization in order to bring about change. Co-operation does not destroy private business. It merely operates as a stabilizing factor in commerce and trade. The general principles of the Rochdale experiment are basic for all successful co-operatives. The co-operative system replaces the spirit of competition with the spirit of service or at least makes it possible for the service motive to function. No valid objection can be raised against the fundamental principle involved in the movement. If it is right for an individual or a corporation to own and control a unit of production and distribution, there can be no question about the right of a co-operative society to do likewise. The movement has another ethical implication in the fact that it tends to remove the temptation to misleading advertising methods. Where co-operatives are successful, education in the philosophy of co-operation must also be carried on, and this has its value in other social realms as well.

Labor.—The Oxford Conference on Life and Work took this position: "Labor has intrinsic worth and dignity, since it is designed by God for man's welfare. The duty and right of men to work should therefore alike be emphasized. In the industrial process, labor should never be considered a mere commodity. In their daily work men should be able to recognize and fulfill a Christian vocation. The workingman, whether in field or factory, is entitled to a living wage, wholesome surroundings, and a recognized voice in the decisions which affect his welfare as a worker" (*The Church and the Economic Order*).

The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, in its social creed, takes the position that the church should stand for: "The right of all to the opportunity for self-maintenance; a wider and fairer distribution of wealth; a living wage as a minimum, and above this a just share for the worker in the product of industry and agriculture. Safeguarding of all workers, urban and rural, against harmful conditions of labor and occupational injury and disease. Social insurance against sickness, accident, want in old age, and unemployment. Reduction of the hours of labor as the general productivity of industry increases; release from employment at least one day in seven, with a shorter working week in prospect. Such special regulations of the conditions of the work of women as shall safeguard their welfare and that of the family and the community. The right of employers and employees alike to organize for collective bargaining and social action; the protection of both in the exercise of this right; the obligation of both to work for the public good."

The Council for Social Action of the Congregational and Christian Churches has expressed itself on this question (1935) to the effect that "the worker in American industry has the right and the duty to organize, without let or hindrance; the right to bargain collectively, and to win an increasing share in determining the conditions under which he works."

The Fellowship of Southern Churchmen recently adopted the following resolution: "We reject the idea that the labor of men should be bought and sold as a commodity, a pawn in the hands of exploiters, since it violates the right of men and women to participate as responsible personalities in the organization of their economic life and moreover relegates them to a status practically identical with that of the machine in present society. In the belief that human values are more important than property values we seek to supplant an economic system motivated by profit with one motivated by service. We believe that it is essential to the self-respect of the workers that they have freedom to become part of the organized labor movement. We thus seek to encourage workers' affiliation with trade unions and to educate our church constituencies to appreciate and defend the right of all men and women to bargain collectively, free from intimidation and violence, legal or extra-legal."

The Roman church, particularly through the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI, has recognized, not only the right of labor to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining, but its necessity.

The state should protect labor in its right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining. In our present system the individual worker is helpless over against the giants of industry. There are employers who assume a paternalistic attitude to the worker, and the motive of such employers must be recognized for what it is and given due credit. However, a change of management may make any benefits derived from such paternalism insecure. Then too, who can say that such paternalism would have existed had it not been because of fear inspired by the organized labor movement. Above all, paternalism is not democracy and it does not give the worker a voice in determining the conditions under which he works. The worker owns a part of industry, and that part is his job. Jobs are as much a part of industry as the machine, and he who owns that job should have a voice in determining the conditions under which it is being used, if democracy is to prevail. Hours and wages are general objectives of labor unions, but there are cases on record where it has become imperative for labor to organize in order to protect the virtue of women employees.

Labor should be protected in its right to organize, but it is also the responsibility of the worker to seek the public good and not to abuse the power which becomes his through organization.

Lawlessness and Crime.—The state must protect its citizens against the criminal and all forms of lawlessness. In dealing with the criminal the fact should be kept in mind that crime is no mere individual matter but that it is often a joint product of the individual and the social order. It is the duty of the state and the church alike to endeavor to remove the causes which lead to crime. The state can do much to check crime by attacking the various forms of maladjustment in the economic realm; by providing, directly or indirectly, remunerative employment; by providing vocational training; by providing for adequate and wholesome recreational facilities, and by eliminating child labor, which, both directly and indirectly, is the cause of much crime. The state and the church can both contribute to making marriage stable and to prevent the break-up of the home. Much juvenile delinquency can be correlated with the break-up of the home.

The spirit of Christianity demands that the offender be approached, not from the point of view of revenge, but from the point of view of reformation. Society must protect itself, but in doing so it should seek the reformation of the criminal. There should be no coddling of the criminal, no extending of sympathy to the criminal rather than the victim of crime, but the spirit of Christianity demands humane treatment for the criminal. One of the darkest blots in human history is the record of the brutal treatment associated with penal methods. Brutal methods only tend to brutalize the criminal. The most successful wardens of penal institutions follow the principle of granting the prisoner the freedom and the privileges which he merits. Such a principle combines discipline and humanity. The prisoner should be provided with suitable employment while in prison. In no other situation is the old adage that "an idle brain is the devil's workshop" more true. The prison should return the offender to society better than it received him. Methods which may be used to this end are trade schools, education of various types, gymnasium work to maintain a high standard of health, well-stocked libraries, and religious instruction and inspiration. In the case of parole or release from prison suitable employment must be found and guidance given in rehabilitation.

Many Christians feel that the death penalty can not be reconciled with the spirit of Christ. They find no basis for it in the New Testament. They stress the thought that human nature can be reformed and that the death penalty shuts out the possibility. They stress the fact that human life is sacred and that only He who gave it has a right to take it. Other arguments against the death penalty are that there is an inequality in its application, that the death penalty has sometimes been inflicted upon innocent victims, and that the death penalty, as statistics show, is no deterrent to crime. There is not less crime in those states where the death penalty exists than in those which have no capital punishment, and there has been no average increase in crime where capital punishment has been abolished.

War.—The founder of Christianity is known as the "Prince of Peace" (Is. 9. 6). Jesus repudiated the messianic war-lord idea of His time in unmistakable terms (Mt. 21. 1–9; 26. 52). Jesus perhaps never definitely repudiated war, but the spirit of His whole message is certainly incompatible with war (See Mt. 5. 9, 22, 43, 38). The ideal of Jesus and the prophets before Him was a warless world (Is. 2. 4; Micah 4. 1–5). The general attitude among the early Christians was to repudiate war. Militarism gained a firm foothold in the church only after the state and the church had made peace under Constantine. (See *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. XIX. Art. by Prof. McGiffert.)

War itself and the various causes of war are antithetical to the spirit of Christianity. One of the causes of war is the sentiment of nationalism. Christianity recognizes a virtuous patriotism but not a nationalism which is a denial of world brotherhood, nor a nationalism which refuses to recognize the will of God as superior to the claims of the state. Another cause of war is economic self-interest. Even from an economic point of view, war in modern times has not shown itself to be a profitable venture, and Christianity insists that human values are of more worth than property. Christianity can not tolerate that men should be used as "cannon fodder" either to gain or protect property. The propaganda on the part of munitions manufacturers and militaristic groups has nothing in common with Christianity. The psychological attraction of war certainly has nothing in common with the spirit of Christianity.

Those who have delved deepest into the problem of eliminating war agree that the way to advance peace for the world is to bring about a juster distribution of wealth among individuals and groups; a lowering of trade walls which tend to keep nations at different economic levels; a more generous attitude toward race and population problems; greater sympathy for other people's aspirations and needs. These attitudes are all of a Christian spirit, and if the Christian attitude is the solution of the war problem, then war is antichristian. The culmination of antichristian attitudes in war can never be Christian. Long-range statesmanship bent on peace, on the basis of Christian principles, is necessary in order to insure peace. Most, if not all, of the causes of war lie in the antichristian attitudes of the capitalistic system itself.

The C.O.P.E.C. report stated that "all war is contrary to the teaching and spirit of Jesus Christ. The churches should oppose all policies that tend to provoke war, and they should stand for exemption from military service for all those whose consciences forbid them to engage in war. They should refuse to support any war until the matter has been submitted to a tribunal and then also if that decision of the tribunal has been defied."

The sixteenth article of the Social Creed of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America states that the church should stand for "repudiation of war, drastic reduction of armaments, participation in international agencies for the peaceable settlement of all controversies; the building of a co-operative world order."

Another pronouncement of the Federal Council reads, "We believe that war is contrary to the spirit of Christ and incompatible with the gospel of love and brotherhood which we profess. It is the most colossal and ruinous social sin which afflicts humanity. The methods used and the passions aroused by war outrage Christ's conception of a kingdom of God in which men shall trust, love, forgive, and help one another. We see in war's cruelties, made more terrible and devastating by modern scientific progress, not only a menace to civilization, but also a repudiation of the Prince of Peace.

"We hold that the agencies of our churches should never again be used in preparation for war, but should be used in the promotion of peace. The Church of Christ, as an institution, should not become an instrument for the fostering of international suspicion and hatred. It should not sanction war nor bless it. To support war is to deny the gospel we profess to believe.

"God alone is the lord of conscience, and we hold therefore that citizenship should not be conditioned upon the willingness to bear arms, or to take part as a war combatant, in contradiction to moral convictions. We believe that to base citizenship upon such a test is not only unjust to the individual, but contrary to public welfare and in conflict with the ideals of a nation into whose very structure the ideals of political and religious liberty have been built. Our country needs citizens who unswervingly follow the dictates of conscience, making allegiance to God the supreme guide to life and conduct. . . . Civilian educational institutions should not make military instruction compulsory. The state should not create the dilemma of loyalty to country or to Christ. Should such a dilemma arise, we follow Christ."

Three different attitudes are found among people in the churches with respect to the war problem. One group holds that in case of war it is the duty of the Christian citizen to obey the government when it calls to the colors and leave the moral responsibility to the government. Such an attitude is certainly not based upon New Testament Christianity, since the apostles themselves defied the secular power with the words, "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5. 29).

A second group takes the position that a Christian may engage in just wars. However, as soon as we yield this point in favor of participation in war, we need to remind ourselves that all wars are justified by those who wage them, at least until after they are ended. The Christian ethic and the spirit of Christ say, "Thou shalt not kill." It may be necessary for the Christian to die in the interest of faithfulness to his convictions. There are causes which are more important than our temporal lives and for which the Christian should be willing to lay down his life. *But he should never be willing to kill.* He may die in the interests of the kingdom of God, but he can never kill in the interest of that kingdom. The soldier is not motivated by a passion to die but with a passion to kill.

A third group assumes a pacifistic attitude. It refuses to fight evil with evil's own weapons, realizing that such a course only increases evil. Even the inroads of barbarians upon civilization can not be stayed by adding to barbarism through the destruction which modern warfare makes possible and inevitable. The pacifist does not necessarily assume a neutral attitude to aggression. He uses every means of moral suasion at his disposal and refuses to lend any form of co-operation to the forces of evil, but he repudiates the use of force or violence. To meet violence with violence only increases evil. The Christian pacifist is convinced that war is antithetical to the spirit of Jesus, expressed by the Master when He said to Peter, "Put up again thy sword into its place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Mt. 26. 52). The Christian pacifist believes that love, not hate, will ultimately win the victory.

Patriotism.—Patriotism is love and loyalty to the state on the part of its citizens and a willingness to sacrifice in its service. Patriotism does not define the form of sacrifice and service to be given to the state. Most often patriotism is thought of and defined in militaristic terms alone.

Vital religion has often found itself at odds with attitudes which have masqueraded under the name of patriotism. The first of the literary prophets of the Old Testament was driven into exile on the charge that he was unpatriotic (Amos 7. 11). The charge of disloyalty was often brought against the apostle Paul (Acts 16. 21). One of the charges which was brought against Jesus Himself was that

He was unpatriotic. It was said, "We found this man perverting our nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar, and saying that he himself is Christ a king" (Luke 23. 2).

There is an attitude passing for patriotism which can never be reconciled with the gospel of Jesus Christ. Any love of the state which is based upon lying propaganda and upon hatred of other peoples and states can not be reconciled with vital religion. One of the first casualties in time of war is Truth, and the war spirit is fed on lies about the enemy and his atrocities and cruelty. In fact, war-mongers insist upon such tactics in time of war, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, either to start war or to prosecute it successfully and yet remain faithful to the truth. The so-called "patriotism" which rests upon such a basis is abhorrent to the spirit of Christ.

Patriotism is, however, a virtue. The Christian may love his home more than he loves other people's homes, because it is his, and it is natural and legitimate that he should do so. However, in order to do this, he need neither hate his neighbor nor base his love for his own home upon such an attitude to others. In like manner the Christian may love his country better than any other and his own flag more than any other. Such love must not thrive on the lack of good will to other nations and peoples, if it is to remain Christian. Just as the love of self and the love of others can exist together, so patriotism and good will to other nations are not antithetical. Under all circumstances the Christian must keep in mind that all men of all races and nations are brothers.

Chapter XV

THE CHRISTIAN'S DUTY IN THE REALM OF THE CHURCH

The Nature of the Church

The word ἐκκλησία means "that which is called out." In the New Testament the word "church" is sometimes used to designate a local congregation. This usage occurs in Matthew 18. 17. Paul uses it in this sense when he says, "salute the church that is in their house" (Rom. 16. 5). In writing to Philemon, Paul also says, "to the church in thy house" (1. 2). In addressing the Thessalonians Paul speaks of "the church of the Thessalonians." The word is used in the same sense in James 5. 14 and in many other places in the New Testament. Paul does not speak of these local congregations or assemblies as parts of the universal church. He does not address those parts of the church which were present in the house of Philemon or in the city of Thessalonica but simply calls them "the church." The church, *in all its essential fullness*, was present in every house or city congregation. Nothing essential could be added to it by increasing its geographical boundaries nor by the fact that the local congregation might affiliate with others and form an organized union. The essential nature of the church is not determined either by geographical boundaries or by size. If the essential nature of the church were to be determined by such yardsticks, we could never be sure just when we would have enough to make it a real church. The church in all its essential fullness is present in the local congregation and nothing essential to the conception of the church is added thereto by increasing its size. If that were the case, a large congregation ought to be more truly the church than a small congregation. The means of grace create the church when they are received through faith, to the forgiveness of sins and life in the Spirit. This spiritual dynamic conception of the church will guard against the danger of its falling into ecclesiasticism in its various forms and with its dire consequences for religion.

That there are those who have been "called out," assemblies of Christians, in other places is a fact which Christians do not ignore but rather are cognizant of. With Christians throughout the world all Christians should maintain and cultivate a spirit of fellowship. There is a sense in which all Christians constitute the church. In this sense Jesus uses the word in Matthew 16. 18. This aspect of the church must not be forgotten, but it does not change the essential nature of the church as defined in the previous section. It does not make the church a political unit, nor an ecclesiastical organization. Many a saint has been excommunicated from the ecclesiastical organization who has not worried about any loss of membership in the true church. No human agency can excommunicate from the true church in any arbitrary manner. The Roman church looks upon the church as a political unit, inextricably bound up with the Roman pontiff and his bishops and the whole ecclesiastical hierarchy. From this position Luther departed radically. In his doctrine of the church and sacerdotalism Luther completely broke with Rome and the Middle Ages.

In its essence the church is not an external organization but a spiritual fellowship (Eph. 1. 22–23). It is an object of faith and not of sight. The church is designated an object of faith in the third article of the Apostles' Creed: "I believe in the holy, catholic church, the communion of saints." The phrase, "the communion of saints," is a later addition and serves as explanatory of "the holy catholic church." However, as the soul has a body, and expresses itself through that visible body, so the church has a visible manifestation. While it is impossible for men definitely to judge as to who are true members of the church, persons who are believers have bodies and can be seen. They gather in assemblies around the means of grace, and from this point of view the church becomes visible. It is on this basis that the Lutheran Confessions define the church as "the communion of saints, in which the Word of God is taught in its purity and the Sacraments are administered in accordance with the institution of Christ" (*Augsburg Confession*, Art. VII). By "saints" are meant those who stand in a living fellowship with Jesus Christ, through faith in Him. The Word and the Sacraments, or the means through which this faith is brought about, are the outward marks of the church. According to this conception the church in its true essence is not a political unit. Neither the Word, nor the Sacraments, nor the "communion of saints" can be a political unit. No geographical boundaries, no ecclesiastical hierarchy, no one form of cult, and no single type of polity constitute the marks of the church, according to the Lutheran conception. An outward empirical organization is necessary, and we sometimes speak of this organization as the church, but it is only by synecdoche that we do so. That outward organization may contain many individuals who are not members of the fellowship of saints or "those who are called out."

In every group of Christians, brought and held together by the Spirit of God, through the Word and the sacraments, the essential church is present. The church is present in all its fullness in the smallest local congregation. It is not necessary that such a church be organically connected with a larger organization in order that it may be a true church. It is such by virtue of the means of grace which it possesses and by virtue of the living fellowship of its members with Christ and one another. This conception, however, does not mean anarchy as far as the larger ecclesiastical organizations are concerned. "Not all the work which Christ has assigned to His church on earth can be done by the individual congregation. The gospel is to be preached not only in the community where the congregation is located but in all the world; educational institutions must be established and maintained for the preparation of men for the ministry and the general Christian training of the youth of the church; Christian charity must be practiced; the old and the feeble, the sick and the orphans must be provided for; Christian literature must be printed and disseminated for the edification of the church; such work can be done only in very rare and exceptional cases by individual congregations standing alone. It can be done better by co-operating with a larger number of the brethren, by a union of individual congregations in larger organizations. Hence there is a relative necessity for general church bodies and denominations.

"Such bodies are not directly of divine origin. They do not as such constitute the holy Christian church or a part thereof. Each individual congregation has all the powers which Christ has given to His church on earth, and nothing is added thereto by uniting with a larger organization. All larger bodies are merely human organizations formed for the sake of expediency in carrying on the larger work of the church, and it can not be made a matter of conscience for an individual congregation to unite with such a larger body. It is a matter of Christian liberty and judgment; though under present conditions it would be difficult to see how the work of the church could be carried on successfully in any other manner.

"As voluntary human associations these bodies derive their just powers from the units that form the organization. They can not deprive a congregation of its inherent rights and powers; on the contrary they have only such rights and prerogatives as may be conferred upon them by the congregations composing them" (Reu and Buehring, *Christian Ethics*, p. 310 ff.).

This implies that the larger organizations exist for the sake of helping the local congregations serve the interests of the kingdom of God more effectively. The larger organization does not exist for the purpose of tyrannizing over the local congregation, but this conception of the nature of the church does not mean anarchy. When a local congregation, through its representatives at a general convention, has agreed to do a certain matter, such a congregation is morally bound to live up to the requirements of such a decision. We must guard against a spirit of anarchy as far as the general body is concerned, and we desire to make it possible for the local congregation to participate effectively in the work of the church in the world, but at the same time we desire to hold fast to this democratic, spiritual-dynamic conception of the church, which is our heritage from the Reformation.

Church Unity.—Our conception of the church has a very definite bearing on the matter of church unity and its implications for all movements which strive to attain this goal. Our conception of the church does not unchurch any denomination where there is a sufficiency of the means of grace to produce faith in Christ. We recognize the fact that Christians exist in other denominations than our own. Christians have often failed to recognize the implications of the doctrine of the "communion of saints." The fellowship which exists is a fellowship which should be recognized and acted upon. However, we are not particularly interested in any large organic unions. The record of history, in this respect, does not give us much enthusiasm. A large, pompous ecclesiastical organization is not necessarily something to be desired. We might have that very organization and yet not realize the "fellowship of the saints." The church of the Middle Ages is a sad commentary on such an ideal. We are not opposed to a federation of institutional churches or even to organic unions when the work of the church can be facilitated through such moves, but they are not to be desired as ends in themselves. We know of only one holy catholic church. That church has always been, it is now, and will always be a unity. The "communion of saints," which is the true essence of the church, is a unity and something which we need not create. This fellowship of all those who believe in Christ is, however, something which we need to realize and become more fully conscious of. This is a type of church unity which is imperative for us as Christians and the only type of unity in which we need to be vitally interested. In considering questions relative to church unity, let us remember that we are not considering the bringing together of a number of social clubs or organizations, but let us be mindful of what we mean by the expression "the church." We ought to support any move which tends to make the work of the church more effective in its world mission, but ecclesiasticism will not accomplish it. Neither can a wholesome unity be established by ignoring differences. In the realm of doctrinal differences the only road to unity lies along the path of going deeper into God's revelation of Himself. In the measure that all denominations get closer to the truth, in that measure will they come closer together.

Relation to the State.—The apostle Paul urges subjection to "the powers that be." Paul's expectation of the immediate return of the Lord (1 Thess. 4. 17) may have influenced his attitude in this respect. He did not want to see a state of anarchy in the meantime. It is also to be remembered that the Roman government had often served as a means of protection for the Christians, and for Paul himself at the time when he assumed this attitude (Acts 18. 12 ff.). After Rome commenced to persecute the Christians, there is not the same spirit of subjection in the New Testament (Rev. 17. 5). Paul does not urge Christians to be subservient to all types of government but to government in general. The type of government to which Paul urges obedience is one which is "a terror . . . to the evil" (Rom. 13. 3–4). If the obedience demanded by the state conflicts with the will of God, the Christian is bound to follow the latter (Acts 5. 29). There is a law which is superior to the law of the state, for the Christian, and that law is the will of God. In emphasizing obedience to government Paul would stress that Christians are not to be anarchists and that government is necessary to the well-being of the social structure.

In the course of history four different relationships have manifested themselves with respect to the relation of the church to the state. The state has at times proved hostile to the church. Before the time of Constantine the state persecuted the church, and in modern Russia and Germany, and other parts of the world, the same situation exists. At other times the state has ruled the church. The old Byzantine Empire, czarist Russia, and some Protestant countries of Europe are examples of this relationship. The totalitarian state is often satisfied to leave the church unmolested, provided the church will permit itself to become a tool in the hands of the state. In Sweden the king is nominally *summus episcopus*, but churchmen have interpreted that to mean that the king will not interfere with the affairs of the church as long as the bishops respect the principles of the Reformation. A third relationship has existed in which the church has dominated the state. During the Middle Ages this was an ideal striven for by the church of Rome and attained at times. A fourth relationship has maintained the separation and independence of church and state. This is the ideal for which the constitution of our land stands and which the confessions of Lutheranism uphold.

"Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's: and unto God the things that are God's" (Mt. 22. 21). This passage has often been quoted as a proof text in support of the doctrine of the separation of church and state. The passage has, however, often been made to carry more meaning than it had on the lips of Jesus. At the time of Jesus there were three attitudes among the Jews to Rome and to the relationship which existed between Rome and the Jewish nation. One party was revolutionistic and was ready to raise the banner of revolt against Rome at any time when favorable circumstances might present themselves. A second party was complacent and rather well satisfied with the situation as it was. A third group felt rather uncomfortable because of Roman domination but chose peace by submission. Jesus took the part of the third group, and what He meant by the statement quoted was that they should pay their taxes to Caesar as long as God could be worshiped and served by them under his rule. Jesus realized that revolution against Rome would be futile, but also that because Jerusalem would not consider "the things that belong unto peace" (Luke 19. 42), but kept on looking for a chance to revolt, she would be destroyed (Luke 19. 41 ff.). Jesus never said and never implied that the church has nothing to do with the social order. Such an implication can not be drawn from His words, in the interest of a quietistic type of piety.

If we maintain the definition of the church indicated before, the doctrine of the separation of church and state simply guards our conception of the nature of the church and guards against making the church a temporal power or an external organization. The church is not a political unit, and therefore we could not mix church and state even if we tried to do so. We can not send the "communion of saints" to the capitol to legislate, and we can not send the Word and the sacraments there to function in that capacity either.

This does not imply that the church has nothing to do with the affairs of the state. The Christian is not only a Christian but also a citizen, and when the Christian functions as a citizen he can not leave his religion out of the picture. Christians should be guided by their Christian convictions when they go to the polls, when they serve in legislative halls, or whenever they function in a civic capacity. It is the duty of the church to enlighten the conscience of its membership to the end that the will of God may be done in the affairs of the state as well as in all the public affairs of men. We can not have the church in politics, but we can and must have religion in politics if our social order is to survive.

There is a sense in which the church must hold aloof from the state and the political order. It would be a mistake for the church to identify itself with any political group or faction. A group which today embodies certain Christian principles may repudiate them tomorrow because of changing personnel and conditions. The church must hold aloof from all partisan politics in order that she may judge all things from the point of view of Christian principles. This does not mean that she has nothing to do with the character of politics but rather the contrary. She must denounce sin wherever sin is found, and she must take a positive stand for righteousness and justice. Thus the church will bring its influence to bear upon the state and its affairs. If Christians, by virtue of their Christianity, are to be a salt of the earth, they can not withdraw from the world but must come into contact with it. They must be "in but not of the world." They are separate from the world but in it, leavening the lump of human society and preserving it from corruption.

A general agreement has not been reached as to the relation of the church to the state and the social order. There are those who hold that the church has nothing to do with the social order. Some years ago the National Religion and Labor Foundation sent out a questionnaire to determine the attitude of pastors to social problems. One answer reads, "We kept our nose out of business not belonging to the church. I still believe that the government will do a better job at social service than the professional reformers. When churchmen begin to spit on the blood of Jesus, they invariably take up social service." A second answer was, "We believe that our calling is to preach the Word of God. We believe in the separation of church and state." A third answer illustrates the same attitude. "Tell me, what has all this to do with me or my position as a pastor, or what has this to do with the preaching of the cross? Jesus says, 'My kingdom is not of this world.' Why try to make the two identical? I'll tell you one thing which we have done during the past year, and which should have the attention of religious leaders; we have preached Christ Crucified, Christ the everlasting Son of God who died for the sins of all mankind (also yours) that we through His death and sacrifice might be saved everlastingly. Preach this doctrine, let this light shine more and more and a questionnaire such as this will not be necessary, because the conditions alluded to will not exist."

The same attitude was recently revealed before the Senate Civil Liberties Committee. At one of the sessions the Rev. Charles F. MacLennan was called to testify. The minister told about the unsuccessful efforts of the laborers in the rubber plants of Willoughby, Ohio, to organize. After such a failure in 1935, the minister arranged to have a union leader address a meeting of the Lake County Ministerial Association. When the minister and guest speaker arrived at the meeting they found some representatives of the business interests there before them. One of the men warned the ministers that they would commit a "moral delinquency" if they listened to the union leader. He insisted that the gospel has nothing to do with economics or business, and that the clergy should stick to the gospel. However, the ministers decided to hear the union man. One of the big business representatives leaped to his feet and shouted at the clergyman: "There are very few churches of any denomination in Cuyahoga and Lake Counties that have not gotten substantial sums of money from my family. I think that is true of your church, MacLennan. I told you at the ministerial association meeting, MacLennan, that I was a good deal older than you, and that my advice to you was to stick to the teachings of Jesus Christ and let business run itself." Here we have the same attitude reflected from two very different sources, and yet they agree fundamentally.

This attitude is sometimes expressed by pointing to the fact that individuals control institutions and social systems, and therefore the church should confine its activity to the task of creating a new heart in as many individuals as possible. It is asserted that many an individual has risen above the most deplorable outward circumstances and therefore we need not become deeply concerned about changing those circumstances. All we need interest ourselves in is to change the individual.

True, there are men who have risen above the most terrible combination of circumstances. Certain exceptional individuals do rise high above their environment, but it is not the rule. That we must thank our Christian environment for what most of us are today, I believe most people will agree. This fact is often ignored by those who would urge the pastor to preach the "simple gospel," meaning thereby, that the pastor should limit his message to the individual.

The gospel for the individual and the social application of that gospel are not to be set over against each other. Each is but a partial phase of one indivisible whole. The gospel is a message for the transformation of personal character, but character is also a matter of social relationships. Society is composed of individuals, and the individual lives his life in a social order. There can be no effective preaching of the gospel for the individual without an emphasis upon its social application, and there will ultimately be no application of the gospel to society unless an appeal is made to individual hearts and wills. The social teachings of Christianity are not something added to the gospel of Christ but an integral part thereof.

In a bulletin of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, this point is well made thus, "It should be stressed that to save the individual members of society is not all that is necessary to the saving of society as a whole. If we are to have a Christian society, Christians must come to a common mind on the meaning of Christianity for contemporary issues and then express that mind so unitedly as to influence public opinion. The minister who makes it his only business to save individual souls neither minds his business nor understands what it is.

"The glorious declaration of the Bible that God loved the world so intensely that He gave His Son to save it is meant for the individual members of the world, as well as for the whole universe collectively, including our family, business, national and international relations.

"Changed environment, however, is not a substitute for a changed heart. Nor shall we get a greatly changed environment until men's hearts are changed. The City of God will never be built upon the earth at all except as individual men and women in increasing numbers find a new motive and new power in their lives and deliberately commit themselves to the way of brotherhood and love and service incarnated in Jesus Christ."

Christians recognize the Holy Scriptures as the norm for faith and practice, and if the Bible stresses the social application of the spirit of Christianity, that fact ought to settle the matter. Already in the Pentateuch we find a great mass of social teaching. With respect to ownership we find the principle of stewardship laid down and laws preventing the accumulation of land in the hands of the few (Lev. 25. 23, 14, 24; Dt. 17. 17). As to poverty there are specific regulations for its prevention and for its relief where it exists (Lev. 25. 3–7; Dt. 23. 19; 24. 19; 26. 12). The laborer was protected against cruelty, exploitation, and need (Dt. 24. 14; 15. 12–15; Ex. 21. 20). The stories of Abraham, Jacob, and Joseph all have their social applications, emphasizing unselfishness, peace, courage, filial piety, sexual purity, and magnanimity. The story of creation, the creation of woman, the account of the fall, Cain's crime, and the story of the flood, all have their social implications. The first recorded labor movement of history is the exodus from Egypt under the leadership of Moses. Moses, as far as we know, was the first person in history with a well developed social consciousness illustrated by his identification with his people.

No one can read the great prophets of the Old Testament without becoming aware of their tremendous passion for social righteousness. Amos, the first of the literary prophets of the Old Testament, in his first two chapters condemns a series of crimes of an international character. The peoples against whom he directs his rebuke have broken treaties, murdered defenseless women and children in their wars of conquest, have sold captives into slavery, and have manifested cruelty in their relations with their neighboring peoples. But Israel itself has also committed social evils which have kindled the ardor of the prophet. There has been extortion. The innocent have been convicted by unscrupulous judges. The poor man has been sold as a slave, even for a pair of shoes. The rich had coveted the small possessions of the poor. There was short measure and overcharge (2. 6; 8. 4–7). Amos was, as far as the writer is aware, the first in history to set forth the principle which lies at the basis of all our pure-food laws (8. 6). There was immorality in Israel, and Amos is not silent. He condemns it, together with the corruption of city life (2. 8; 5. 5). Class inequality and oppression are an abomination to the man of Tekoa (4. 1; 5. 11–12). Wasteful luxury is scorned (4. 1; 3. 15; 5. 11; 6. 4–6).

Hosea Ben Beeri has this pre-eminent social message to his own and all future ages, that marriage vows involve sacred obligations, and that to regard them lightly means to undermine human society. The consuming passion of Hosea is also directed against murder, robbery, a mercenary priesthood, licentiousness, and corruption in the courts. Religion and morality were inseparably connected in the mind of this prophet.

Isaiah has a great deal to say about the land question and the liquor question (5. 8; 5. 11). He can not tolerate vanity in dress and the coveting of idle ease and needless extravagance (3. 8, 11). Arrogance, lack of sympathy for the suffering, dissimulation in love, and historical sentimentality are rebuked. The privileged classes are indicted for having acquired the possession of vast estates through dispossessing the poor (5. 8). Isaiah also had a great deal to say about the foreign policy of his people as well as the internal political situation.

Micah, the last of the great eighth century prophets, also has a social message. The heart of his message is expressed in the finest definition of religion which the Old Testament has given us (Mic. 6. 8). He pleads the cause of the oppressed and the dispossessed (2. 1–3). Court procedure was corrupt, and Micah condemns the situation. One of the most terrible indictments of all literature is brought by Micah against the leaders of the people because of their social sins (3. 2–3). In 2. 9 we have the first injunction against child labor in the history of the world.

Zephaniah's social messages are these: 1. The wickedness of the princes will be a cause of judgment. 2. The unscrupulous merchant who has acquired wealth and ease through unfair and dishonest dealing will receive his punishment. 3. The civil and religious leaders are unworthy of trust. 4. He pronounces doom upon the man who is indifferent to public welfare.

The social message of Nahum is that a nation which follows the path of social injustice and corruption and works at cross-purposes with the plans of God will inevitably be destroyed. No nation built on blood, and iron, and brute force will long endure.

Habakkuk has a social message in his condemnation of the Chaldeans. Their violence, cunning, rapacity, plundering, murder, injustice, drunkenness and intemperance make it impossible for the nation to endure.

Jeremiah hurled a terrible rebuke against the cruelties of slavery (34. 12–22). He complains bitterly that "the land is full of adulterers." He is the great champion of human rights (7. 10; 22. 13–14). He is repeatedly interested in making property rights secure and condemns covetousness. Truthfulness and trustworthiness are commended as social virtues. That this prophet has something to say about the political status of his people is apparent to the most casual reader. He advocated a definite national policy. His policy of government was that rulers must execute judgment and righteousness, and the private relations of men must be placed on a basis of social justice and fair dealing.

Ezekiel gives us a social message in his indictment of Jerusalem. Unjust dealing, oppression of the stranger and the dependent, lewdness, extortion, and unfair business dealings are some of the social crimes charged up to the people of Jerusalem. He scored the sin of unchastity more severely than any of his predecessors. The social message of Ezekiel is well brought out in his decalogue of the personal practices of the just man (18. 5–9). In this ethical code it will be noted that Ezekiel is particularly interested in guarding the interest of the debtor.

Obadiah's social message is a condemnation of the wicked satisfaction in the disaster that befell another nation. Retribution comes sooner or later to the nation that falls a victim to it.

Haggai and Zechariah condemn many of the social wrongs which had been dealt with by their predecessors. Haggai's message is a declaration of the duty of a man of faith in an age of adversity.

The prophet Malachi raises his voice against adultery, perjury, dishonesty, and oppression of the dependent. He has a great deal to say about the marriage of Jews with alien women and emphasizes that divorce is an evil to be shunned.

Joel ridicules the plight of the drunkard of his day, and his stern demand for repentance is a continual reminder of his ethical and social interest.

When we turn to the New Testament we need not go far until we realize that the gospel of Jesus has its social implications. Jesus did not only appeal to individuals but at times also addressed His words to cities, to professions, to parties, and to nations. He denounced graft, and many of His miracles were performed for social service. I make bold to state that there is more material for sociology than for theology in the New Testament. The kingdom of God which lies at the very heart of the gospel of Christ is, among other things, a social concept. In the prayer which Jesus taught His disciples He taught them to say, "Thy will be done *on earth* as it is in heaven." When He taught us to pray, "Give us this day our daily bread," He forever connected religion with the bread-and butter problem and economics. He did the same thing when He said, "Seek ye first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you" (Mt. 6. 33).

James is the great champion of social justice in the New Testament (James 5. 1–6). The epistles of Peter abound in social teachings, and Paul, the great apostle of justification by faith, is not behind the other New Testament writers in insisting upon a social application of the spirit of Christ.

These illustrations are sufficient to emphasize the social teachings of the Scripture. The marching orders for the church are clear if the Bible is to be the rule of faith and practice. We dare not ignore the social application of the gospel message if we are to "declare the whole counsel of God" and "divide the Word of truth aright."

The answer to our problem which would confine the interest of the church to the salvation of the individual is neither satisfactory nor adequate. It is not for us as Christians to wait until every individual has been converted before we do anything about the social order. If everybody would always continue to say that it is our business to see that individuals are converted and then to let them influence the social order, how would Christianity ever make any social impact? We are converted individuals, and our responsibility is as great as that of any future generation of Christians.

A second answer to our problem has been given by those who find nothing but a social message in the gospel, or at least they hold that all that is of value is the social emphasis. They would maintain that the social gospel covers the whole field of Christianity. To these we would answer that the social problem is a moral and ethical problem and against all forms of humanism we would assert that the moral must be grounded in the very nature of things if it is to have a claim upon us. (See the section on the mutual relations of religion and morality, p. 70 ff.)

The third answer to our question is that this is not an either-or but a both-and proposition. It is not a matter of stressing either individual salvation or the social gospel as the exclusive business of the church. The salvation of the individual is of primary importance, but Christianity has its social implications and application as well. The Christian way of life is meant for the individual as well as for social relations.

Through this answer we avoid the extremes to which the so-called "social gospel" has sometimes gone when it has been thought that moral characters could be developed by mere social reform and improvement of environment. Such an attitude is mistaken, but so also is the attitude which would cultivate merely a private type of piety. We must definitely insist that God be allowed to rule in the public as well as the private affairs of men. Nor must we forget the fact that Christianity works not only from within the individual out to the social order but it also works through the social order upon the individual. It works from the inside out and it works from the outside in. The church can do much for the individual by influencing the social order in which he finds himself. (See JONES, *Christ's Alternative to Communism*, p. 155 ff.)

We need not fear that an insistence upon the social application of Christianity will tend to minimize the importance of individual salvation. Both processes must work harmoniously together. The individual lives in society, and society is composed of individuals. Jesus Himself sought the regeneration of the individual and enjoined that method upon His followers. This is the only successful method. The individual is the unit of society, and the stream will never rise higher than its source. But on the other hand man can not repent in a vacuum. Faith as a vital principle of life will not manifest itself in solitude. The sanctified life can not be lived apart from relationships to others. All of these things will of necessity take place in the social order. The first question in the Bible was, "Where art thou?" That was individual. The second question of the Bible was, "Where is thy brother?" That is social (Gen. 3. 9; 4. 9).

We are not particularly interested in having the name of Christ written into the constitution of the United States. We are not interested in realizing a church-state. But we are interested in seeing the church testify against sin, both individual and social, wherever it finds it, and in seeing the church take a stand for the application of Christian principles in the realm of society. All this to the end that the kingdom of the world may become the kingdom of our Lord, and of His Christ: and that He shall reign for ever and ever (Rev. 11. 15).

APPENDIX

A. DIVORCE

The Committee on Social Trends of the National Lutheran Council in 1936 published a report on divorce which is worthy of note. It is here quoted in part.

"One of the dangers which seriously threaten the family and which have been growing in an alarming degree is divorce. The difficulty in dealing with it is that not only are there widely different views and practices prevailing among the nations and, in our own country, among the states—from South Carolina, recognizing no ground for divorce, to Nevada, whose divorce mill grinds surely but not slowly—but also theologians even in the same synod are hopelessly divided on the question, so the church is not able to present a united front.

"The Protestant churches, which allow a greater freedom of conscience, seemingly are at a disadvantage in such a case compared with the Roman Catholic church, which is governed by one head whose decision is final, but we should not lose sight of the difference between principle and practice so common in that church.

"In a general way the division is between the stricter and the more lax view, or perhaps it might more properly be called the legalistic and the liberal tendencies. The passages in the New Testament which bear on the question are: Matthew 5. 21–32, 19. 3–10; Mark 10. 2–12; Luke 16. 18; 1 Cor. 7. 10–16; 1 Cor. 7. 39. But a problem arises from the fact that Mark 10. 11 and Luke 16. 18 state the case absolutely, while in Matthew 5. 32 and 19. 9 fornication is added as a ground for divorce.

"The limited space at our disposal does not permit a full discussion of the question, but briefly we may sum it up as follows:

"1. In these passages Christ did not legislate but stated principles.

"2. The advocates of the stricter view take Matthew 5. 32 and 19. 9 as a law, while they are unwilling to apply the same principle to other sayings of Christ of a similar character.

"3. The contention of the Roman Catholic church and others that Christ sanctions separation in the case of adultery, but not divorce with liberty to remarry, is without foundation.

"(a) Christ's words refer to Deut. 24. 1–4 which expressly permits remarriage. This permission must be assumed to remain in force when not expressly rescinded.

"(b) The words 'causeth her to commit adultery' assume that the divorced woman will remarry.

"(c) Divorce without liberty of remarriage was unknown both to Jewish and Roman law.

"(d) The last clause in Matthew 5. 32 and parallels, 'Whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery,' must refer to cases where the real ground for divorce was lacking. From the ideal viewpoint, marriage was still in force in such cases.

"(e) Where this stricter view has been held (especially in the Roman Catholic and Episcopal churches) the practice of annulment of marriage on technicalities or on the ground of so-called spiritual relation has disgraced the church when there was sufficient money to pay the cost. Or, as in England, the practice developed that the parties desiring divorce agreed on one of them being found in a compromising position with a third party so as to produce the only legal cause, since the law did not require that actual intercourse be proved. That this course is commonly resorted to in England is publicly charged by men of high standing who are in a position to know the truth. Where there is a will there is a way.

"(f) Luther and Calvin held adultery and desertion to be the New Testament grounds for divorce, to which Melanchthon added threatening of the life and brutal treatment, on the basis of the Roman law. The stricter view is not held in the Lutheran countries in Europe, but by individual theologians. The Roman Catholic church, which considers marriage a sacrament, officially denies divorce, but allows separation on other grounds than adultery.

"On the basis of the above we recommend:

"1. Marriage is a union for life, and, ideally considered, leaves no room for divorce.

"2. Divorce, when it occurs, is always caused by sin and is a deplorable thing, breaking asunder the most sacred bonds in life and causing grief to the parties concerned, especially where there are children.

"3. While the committee recognizes as a glaring evil the growing number of divorces in our country and condemns this evil as an assault upon the sanctity of marriage and upon the integrity of the home, we feel that the subject must be more thoroughly studied before any declaration of the attitude of the Lutheran church can be made."

B. BIRTH CONTROL

In 1931 the New York East Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church adopted the following resolution: "We recommend such legislation as will permit a physician to render information on this subject. In this connection we direct attention to the doctor's bill. Should this bill be enacted into law, it would give greater freedom to physicians, hospitals, and clinics in extending to needy persons such information as would be in accord with the highest principles of eugenics and the best health of the individual."

A Special Commission on Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. reported to the General Assembly in 1931 as follows: "Earnest Christian people are asking for the church's guidance on the subject of birth control. This subject demands attention today as never before. Economic conditions and a worthy standard of living clearly make it wrong to bring children into the world without adequate provision for their nurture and proper consideration for the health of the mother.

"The Christian conception of sex clothes the relationship between husband and wife with spiritual significance, sanctifying marriage as a divine institution. Moral control is the basic essential to a worthy experience of a marriage relation.

"In expressing its judgment on this subject, the church in no sense modifies its condemnation of sex relations outside of marriage.

"Two methods are possible in securing birth control. The first is continence. The second is the use of contraceptives. When this method is adopted in seeking the worthy objectives stated above, it should only be in fidelity to the highest spiritual ideals of the Christian home."

The Lambeth Conference, in 1930, issued the following pronouncement on the subject of birth control: "It must be recognized that there is in the Catholic church a very strong tradition that the use of preventive methods is in all cases unlawful for the Christian. We acknowledge the weight of that testimony, but we are unable to accept that tradition as necessarily final. It must be admitted that it is not founded on any directions given in the New Testament. It has not behind it the authority of any Ecumenical Council of the church. . . .

"It is axiomatic that parenthood is for married people the foremost duty; to evade or disregard that duty must always be wrong. It is equally axiomatic that the state of marriage is a divinely ordered relationship in which intercourse between man and woman calls for the highest exercise of the Christian virtues of self-discipline, self-control, and self-sacrifice. There are multitudes of married people who have found in that mutual sacrifice a bond of deeper unity as well as an ever-increasing moral strength. It follows, therefore, that it can never be right to make pleasure or self-indulgence the motive for determining to limit or refuse parenthood. Equally it can never be right for intercourse to take place which might lead to conception where a birth would involve great danger to the health, even to the life of the mother, or would inflict upon the child to be born a life of suffering, or where the mother would be prematurely exhausted, and additional children would render her incapable of carrying out her duties to the existing family.

"The primary and most obvious way of dealing with such circumstances as seem to make the limitation of parenthood obligatory is total abstinence from intercourse, even if it may be for long periods. Such abstinence brings with it to those who claim and receive divine grace the opportunity for the highest exercise of Christian love and self-denial.

"Yet there exist moral situations which may make it obligatory to use other methods. To a certain extent this obligation is affected by the advice of medical and scientific authority. But in all cases, as in those where abstinence is the way chosen, the final decision must still be determined by reference to the spiritual ends for which marriage was ordained; and the attainment of these still calls for the same exhibition of Christian self-discipline and virtue. Each couple must decide for themselves, as in the sight of God, after the most careful and conscientious thought, and, if perplexed in mind, after taking competent advice, both medical and spiritual.

"In our judgment the question which they should put to themselves is this: Would conception be for any reason wrong? If it would clearly be wrong, and if there is good moral reason why the way of abstinence should not be followed, we can not condemn the use of scientific methods to prevent conception, which are thoughtfully and conscientiously adopted.

"Other reasons are often urged for the use of such methods—circumstances of income, housing, and education are all advanced in justification. These need careful scrutiny. We are unable to accept conception control as the right solution of unsatisfactory social and economic conditions which ought to be changed by the influence of Christian public opinion.

"Plainly we can not provide a complete list of circumstances affording a good moral reason for avoiding conception. But as it seems to us the principle involved is this:

Children are the primary end of the intercourse to which marriage leads. Married people do wrong when they refuse to have children whom they could train to serve God and add to the strength of the nation. But intercourse has also a secondary end within the natural sacrament of marriage. Where for any morally sound reason the first end is to be ruled out, it does not necessarily follow that the secondary end must be ruled out also, provided that self-control is exercised, and husband and wife have truly examined their consciences upon the matter.

"In all these matters of sex, self-deception is all too easy. Let none forget that in this as in all relationships of life Christ calls to a heroism to which by His power His servants can attain."

We shall also quote the statement of the Federal Council's Committee on Marriage and the Home:

"There is a general agreement also that sex union between husbands and wives as an expression of mutual affection, without relation to procreation, is right. This is recognized by the Scriptures, by all branches of the Christian church, by social and medical science, and by the good sense and idealism of mankind.

"As to the method of control of conception, two ways are possible. One is the use of contraceptives, or methods other than abstinence which may be classified as such. The other is self-control or abstinence for longer or shorter periods of time. Both may be considered as forms of birth control.

"As to the rightfulness of the use of contraceptives, Christian opinion is not united. The problem in its present form is a new one. The Scriptures and the ecumenical councils of the Christian church are silent upon the subject. The Church of Rome inflexibly opposes the use of contraceptives as contrary to Christian morals. In the Anglican communion opinion is sharply divided, as indicated by the fact that at the Lambeth Conference of 1930 the resolution approving birth control under certain conditions was the only vote during the conference which indicated division of opinion upon a question of fundamental importance. It is known that opinion in the churches of the United States is divided, as is also the medical profession, but nobody knows as yet the prevailing opinion. Under the circumstances, the problem requires unprejudiced study, and guidance should be sought from the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life. It should be expected that guidance will find expression through the researches and experience of physicians and men of science as well as through the corporate conscience of the church.

"Whatever the final conclusion may be, the committee is strongly of the opinion that the church should not seek to impose its point of view as to the use of contraceptives upon the public by legislation or any other form of coercion; and especially should not seek to prohibit physicians from imparting such information to those who in the judgment of the medical profession are entitled to receive it.

"So far the Committee on Marriage and the Home is in agreement. But at this point it has been found necessary to express divergent views. Perhaps such divergent differences, frankly expressed, may have compensating value in helping Christian people to face the issues involved, especially since they mirror also the perplexity in the public mind.

"A majority of the committee holds that the careful and restrained use of contraceptives by married people is valid and moral. They take this position because they believe that it is important to provide for the proper spacing of children, the control of the size of the family, and the protection of mothers and children, and because intercourse between the mates, when an expression of their spiritual union and affection, is right in itself. They are of the opinion that abstinence within marriage, except for the few, can not be relied upon to meet these problems and under ordinary conditions is not desirable in itself.

"But they can not leave this statement without further comment. They feel obliged to point out that present knowledge of birth control is incomplete, and that an element of uncertainty, although it is small, still remains. More serious is the fact that all methods are as yet more or less subject to personal factors for their effectiveness. Married couples should keep these facts in mind and welcome children, should they come.

"The public should be warned also against advertised nostrums, which are beginning to appear in thinly disguised forms in reputable periodicals, and so-called 'bootlegged' devices at drug stores, for which there is no guarantee of safety against injury or of suitableness for individual cases. It is essential to consult the family physician or go to established clinics or health centers for information or assistance.

"That serious evils, such as extra-marital sex relations, may be increased by a general knowledge of contraceptives must be recognized. . . .

"A minority of the committee believes that sufficient stress has not been laid upon the idealistic character of the teachings of Jesus concerning marriage and its obligations. His sayings concerning divorce seemed 'hard' to the disciples. They said to Him, 'If the case of a man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry.' His answer was, 'All men can not receive this saying, save they to whom it is given.' In another connection He said, 'With men it is impossible, but not with God: for with God all things are possible.' The command governing all cases of conflicting duties is the command of the absolute: 'Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.'

"In view of the widespread doubt among Christian people of the morality of the use of contraceptives, and the scruples experienced by many in making use of them, it appears to these members of the committee to be the plain duty of the Christian church, when control of conception is necessary, to uphold the standard of abstinence as the ideal, recognizing it as a counsel of perfection, and that Christian morals are much more exalted than is generally supposed. But they would point out that the grace of God is sufficient for those who are conscious of a difficult and high vocation; and that we have as yet but touched the fringes of spiritual power which is all about us like God's gifts of air and sunshine. Those who adventure and trust are rewarded, and they know the joy and strength which accompany all victories of the spirit.

"The method of abstinence is therefore to be used to meet conditions and situations in which otherwise contraceptives would be necessary. This does not mean that sex relations between married people as an expression of mutual affection are wrong, but they are to be denied when child-bearing is hazardous to the well-being of mother or child or household. That this is possible is shown by the large number of unmarried people who lead chaste lives, and by the number of married couples who practice self-control at all times and abstinence when necessary."

That opinion on the subject of birth control is sharply divided was emphasized by the reactions of both the church and the secular press, as well as by the report of the Federal Council Commission itself.

The Committee on Social Trends of the National Lutheran Council has prepared a preliminary report on the subject of birth control, and even though the Council has not had time to act upon the report (1936) it is worthy of consideration and quotation:

"Realizing that we are dealing with a difficult subject on which the opposing parties not only stand in sharp contrast against one another, but often bitterly denounce each other's motives in no uncertain terms, we may expect that whichever position we take it will be unsatisfactory to many.

"The subject in its present form is of a later date, but the practice in one form or another undoubtedly is as old as history can take us back. The Greek philosophers who treated the subject from the viewpoint of the state and its ability to feed its citizens did not prohibit the practice, but would apply government regulation.

"The history of the movement in modern times is interesting. Starting with the 'Essay on Population' by Thomas Robert Malthus, English clergyman and economist, 1798, after whom the movement at first took its name, writings on the subject appeared at intervals till 1833, when Dr. Knowlton of Boston published his *Fruits of Philosophy*, describing contraceptive methods. In the United States the movement was counteracted by the so-called Comstock laws (in 1869 by the New York legislature and in 1873 by the United States Congress). By these laws, birth control was classified as obscene and indecent, and importation of literature on the subject and transportation of such through the U.S. mail was forbidden. The first birth control clinic in the world was opened in Amsterdam, Holland, 1878, and later on leagues were organized in different countries and international conferences held, especially from the year 1900.

"In this country the movement has gained ground since Mrs. Margaret Sanger, a trained nurse of New York, took the lead, and she is recognized as the actual founder of the movement here. Working as nurse among the poor in New York City in 1912, she saw the conditions and environment under which children were born and grew up, and she began to lecture to the mothers on the subject, organized the movement and in 1916 opened the first American birth control clinic in Brooklyn. She was sentenced to Blackwell's Island, but released by Governor Whitman. The next year she was imprisoned for opening the clinic, but the case was appealed and decided in her favor. She has carried on the campaign in its different branches, preaching it almost as a new gospel and with the zeal of an apostle. In 1922 she made a tour around the world and established the movement in Honolulu; Tokio, Japan; Peking, China; Delhi, India; and the movement has grown by leaps and bounds. In 1927 there were six clinics in Chicago and more than fifty legally operated birth control clinics are distributed over twelve states. Clinics have been established in most countries throughout the world. Italy and Ireland have passed laws against it, and also France, on account of its falling birth rate.

"We have given these historical data to show that we are face to face with a movement that can not be ignored. We may choose to say with Dr. Coughlin that 'it is not a great moral issue, but a matter of dollars and cents,' but that, undoubtedly, is a wrong estimate.

"Many great and good leaders have taken their stand against it and the Roman Catholic church through the pope has condemned it, but on the other hand a number of Reformed church bodies have declared themselves in its favor and likewise many outstanding individuals both Christians and Jews. . . .

"According to figures available, the women come to the clinics in about equal proportions. About 33% Protestants, 32% Catholics and 31% Jews.

"To what extent the official declaration by the pope is effective can be seen when Mrs. Sanger in a public address could say: 'When you get 570 Catholic women in one clinic and 497 of them confessing abortions, I say that it is time for us all to consider the subject intelligently.' . . .

"Taking the leaders in the movement at their word, it is not a movement for race suicide, but for the purpose of giving information in regard to a rational spacing of the time between pregnancies and to counteract abortion by rational methods and under scientific guidance. Nor is it a question of birth control as such, since clinics for that purpose are established throughout the world and operating legally under scientific supervision. The question on which the fight has centered is whether the Comstock laws should be amended so birth control literature should not be classified as indecent and obscene, but could be transported through the U.S. mail and also imported from other countries.

"For a Christian the use of contraceptive means becomes a matter of conscience, and it would seem that candid advice and instruction from competent medical authorities would be to prefer instead of the ignorance prevailing to so large an extent.

"We would recommend:

"1. That the church for the present make no official statement on the subject of birth control.

"2. That it be left to a committee to study the subject carefully in all its relations."

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